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Abstract 
Over the past five years, a multitude of cases that have made their ways through the U.S. 
judicial system dealing with the question of how to adjudicate laws discriminating against 
individuals based on their sexual orientation. The common theme among them is a reliance on 
the 14
th
 Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, which states that no State may “deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” While discrimination of 
individuals on their sexual orientation would appear to violate it, the way that the courts have 
interpreted the Equal Protection Clause has posed many problems in achieving both a clear legal 
doctrine and a wider expansion of gay rights. Given these issues, this thesis seeks to remedy the 
constitutional quandary of how the courts should interpret laws discriminating against sexual 
orientation by finding an alternative constitutional justification for overturning said 
discrimination. The theory that I advance focuses instead on the well-established right to intimate 
association, which derives from analysis of the First Amendment rights to free speech and 
assembly and the 14
th
 Amendment right to substantive due process. This right states that the 
government cannot, without a compelling and narrowly tailored purpose, infringe upon the right 
of individuals to form and cultivate meaningful intimate relationships. My goal in writing this 
thesis is to articulate a theory that can provide a clear model for how courts should interpret 
sexual orientation discrimination in future cases.  
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Introduction 
The nature of social movements really is rather fickle. It was only about 30 years ago that 
those active in the gay rights movement were trying to change generally held views about the 
source of homosexuality. In response to a public and Supreme Court that believed that 
homosexuality was not an orientation, but merely a choice one made to advance their own sexual 
desires. When framed in this way, it is easier to have contempt and less understanding about 
those who take part in this conduct. Gay rights activists saw these perceptions as the fundamental 
barriers to gaining widespread equality. It was more difficult to gain far-reaching support for 
people that were seen to be making conscious, constant immoral decisions regarding their sexual 
conduct. Alternatively, if it could be proven that all of those who engaged in gay sexual conduct 
are all acting upon a common identity that dictates their sexual preference outside of their 
control, then activists could shift the optics of gay sexual conduct to persecution of a minority 
group unable to change the motivations for their actions. Such was the goal of those in the gay 
rights movements, who sought to change the perceptions of homosexuality by showing that all 
gays are not acting in rebellion to norms. They are merely realizing a fundamental element of 
their identity. This fundamental element happens to be shared by many others like individuals. 
Discrimination upon this group then becomes shifted from targeting persons’ immoral choices to 
targeting people’s fixed identity that beyond their choosing.  
 It was this perspective that dictated the way that advocates argued for gay rights through 
the courts, relying on Equal Protection justification. In order for gays to earn the safeguards of 
the Equal Protection Clause, they would have to prove that homosexuality was an immutable 
characteristic that individuals possess that has led to discrimination they have no opportunity to 
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remedy or change.
1
 This required the gay rights movement to argue for one overarching 
definition of sexuality for the Court in order to receive judicial protection. This was seen as not 
only preferable, but necessary, in order to change the widely-held perceptions that reduced 
sexuality to one’s sexual conduct.  
 The fickleness of social movements is apparent through a look into how gay rights are 
understood today, and how that understanding differs from 30 years ago. Nowadays, there is 
much less of a concern with demonstrating how all gays are unified. Rather, there is actually a 
concerted effort to show how sexuality and gender identity is very fluid, and can’t be defined 
through one umbrella concept of sexual orientation, because those perceptions can differ 
depending on the individual’s perspective. This change effectively highlights the issue that I seek 
to explore in this thesis: that as a constitutional doctrine, Equal Protection is rather problematic 
and not the silver bullet gay rights advocates originally saw it to be in terms of gaining judicial 
recognition and protection for gays. In order to have their rights recognized through an Equal 
Protection doctrine, the Court must define homosexuality through one, narrow understanding. 
This would go against much of the changing shifts in discourse around sexuality, and potentially 
misrepresent an entire minority group. Another result of an Equal Protection decision relying on 
one understanding of homosexuality that could eventually become obsolete renders the impact of 
the Court’s rights analysis weakened.  
 This is only one facet of the problems that exist in Equal Protection jurisprudence. An 
appeal to the Equal Protection Clause has other issues, such as difficulty in applying clear 
precedents that are easy for lower courts to follow. Given these two issues, along with others that 
                                               
1 There are many other factors that are necessary to establishing if a group earns heightened protections under the 
Equal Protection Clause that I will go into great depth in explaining throughout this thesis. In a very basic sense, the 
Supreme Court requires that groups prove that they are discriminated on qualities outside of their control, and that 
the individuals are unified as a distinct minority group.  
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I will develop throughout this thesis, I believe that the most proper constitutional theory to 
understand and frame gay rights is not through Equal Protection. The burdens placed on the 
minority group, combined with the ambiguities inherent to the precedents, signal a need to find 
an alternative approach to gaining equal rights. My alternative is an appeal to the right to 
intimate association, which is found in the 14
th
 Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Stating that 
“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law,” the right to intimate association was found to be essential to the liberty exercised by all 
humans in their lives. The right to intimate association protects individuals and the relationships 
that they form that are of an intimate nature, such as romance, friendship, or family. Being in an 
intimate association allows for individuals to fulfill basic psychological desires, such as the need 
to be social, the need for love, and the need for stimulation, be it mental, intellectual or physical. 
These, along with other benefits I will discuss in greater depth later on, make up the basis as to 
why intimate associations are essential to liberty and therefore are strongly protected by the 
Court. 
 The right to intimate association can be rather clearly applied to same-sex relationships, 
and the individuals who are either in such a relationship or desire to be in one. Same-sex 
relationships can provide many benefits to the individual of other protected intimate associations, 
such as opposite-sex romantic relationships. This right also does not require gays to give one 
broad definition of human sexuality, and instead only seeks to recognize whether there are 
meaningful relationships existing between individuals. If there are meaningful relationships 
existing between individuals of the same sex that can be considered intimate associations, then it 
does not matter why those individuals have found their bond. All that matters is that they have a 
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meaningful relationship that allows them to exercise the liberty endowed by the Due Process 
Clause.  
 To shed doubt that gay rights advocates should pursue Equal Protection arguments in 
order to achieve gay rights, I have taken a bifurcated approach to proving this. Chapters One-
Three cast doubt about Equal Protection precedents as a viable constitutional approach. More 
specifically, Chapter One explains the history of Equal Protection jurisprudence, including the 
first interpretations of the Clause and the way that courts now interpret claims made under the 
clause. Employing a system called tiered scrutiny, the courts rely upon a number of factors in 
order to determine which minority groups are entitled to the protection of the clause, and how 
strong those protections should be.  
 I then critique the use of tiered scrutiny over the course of Chapter Two.  Many of the 
factors that the Court relies upon are difficult to understand and measure, misrepresentative of 
many different minority groups, or allow for judicial arbitrariness and subjectivity. When dealing 
with law and the rights of individuals to cultivate their own identity and relationships, the Court 
should not allow itself to be vulnerable to charges of arbitrariness. Chapter Three then applies the 
factors used in Equal Protection litigation to gays, highlighting the inherent problems of the 
tiered scrutiny used by the Court to weigh the claims of groups petitioning for equal protection.  
 The reason that I differentiate Chapters Two and Three is to show the depth of the issues 
with Equal Protection jurisprudence. It is not just that the law is unfavorable to gays. Rather, the 
law is problematic regardless of the group petitioning for recognition of their rights. The 
problems are further elucidated when specifically applied to gays. Analysis about how broken 
the law is just heightens the need to find an alternative approach to substantiate gay rights. 
Finding an alternative approach is in the interests of both gay rights activists and the Court, as 
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they can find a clearer, more easily-applied and understandable theory to recognize for the 
onslaught of gay rights cases that will continue to flood the dockets of Courts across the country.  
 Chapter Four articulates the case law for my original contribution, that gays should be 
protected under the right to intimate association. While there have been fewer cases argued over 
the right to intimate association, the case law still provides a basis strong enough to have a clear 
understanding of the scope of the law and how it could be applied to those in same-sex 
relationships. Chapter Five encompasses the bulk of my original contribution, in which I argue 
that same-sex relationships should be considered intimate associations, based on the benefits 
derived from being in such relationships and the fit that these relationships have within the 
precedent. I then weigh the arguments for finding gay relationships as intimate association 
against views opposed to this recognition, and demonstrate that the arguments against 
recognition of same-sex relationships are not as strong as those in favor of recognition. I then 
discuss why this approach was not pursued by gay rights activists in past cases, which I believe 
was not due to any inadequacy in the legal justification. As litigation was only one facet of the 
wider movement seeking equal treatment under the law for gays, the constitutional approaches 
needed to align with the platform of the movement on the whole, and any constitutional theory 
could not undermine the national message. That national message was that gays are a 
distinguishable minority unified by their shared, fixed orientation that defined their identity. An 
argument focusing on the relationship and the benefits of the relationship distracted from the 
identity of the individual. 
 In conclusion, I consider the merits and flaws of Equal Protection and Due Process right 
to intimate association arguments when applied to gays, and conclude that the net benefits of the 
right to intimate association outweigh the net benefits of Equal Protection argument. An 
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argument appealing to the right to intimate association both reflects the interests of the Court and 
of gay rights activists in a more complete way. Given the Court’s preference for consistency and 
objectivity, this theory provides that in a much more substantial way than does Equal Protection. 
For gay rights activists, the shifts in discourse on how to understand sexuality can still exist 
without interference by the Court, as the Court would offer no definition or clarification on the 
nature of identity because it is not relevant to find protection for the rights of those in same-sex 
relationships under the right to intimate association.  
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Chapter 1 – The History and Development of the Equal Protection Clause 
Over the past 40 years, a multitude of cases have been filed, argued, and decided at the 
state and federal level in the United States concerning a range of discriminatory practices against 
gay citizens, including but not limited to employment discrimination, criminalization, speech and 
press protections, parental custody and adoption rights, and access to state-sanction marriage. 
While these cases have targeted different forms of discrimination and have had myriad different 
results, one of the primary commonalities among all of them is the basic guidelines of the 
parameters that each side has argued within and each judge has decided on. Those arguments fall 
within the judicial construct of tiered scrutiny, which is a system used by the courts to weigh 
Equal Protection rights claims for individuals who are discriminated on based on some 
characteristic of their personhood against government laws passed that have a discriminatory 
effect. (Holder 2011)
2
 With regard to cases involving the marginalization of gay individuals, an 
approach appealing to the levels of scrutiny is not the best jurisprudential doctrine to establish 
for a plethora of reasons.  
 This chapter describes how the doctrine of tiers of scrutiny developed, the judicial intent 
that motivated their creation, and how they have become the backbone of equal protection 
jurisprudence today. It evaluates how different identity categories, e.g., race, sex, sexual 
orientation, fit within this jurisprudential architecture, identifying the various qualifications of 
identity that the Supreme Court has held must be met if the highest level of judicial scrutiny is to 
                                               
2 While tiered scrutiny is most commonly associated with racial and gender discrimination, as I will get into more 
depth later on, this is not the limit of all arguments put forth in trying to have other persons granted equal protection. 
Some examples include alienage, education level, poverty, illegitimacy, medical practitioners, even lawyers. Many 
of these groups have gained traction in the courts for their minority, while others have not seen even the slightest 
affirmation by the courts in being granted protected status as a minority in need of judicial intervention to ensure 
equal protection. The main point is that the tiers of scrutiny have been applied by many different parties in many 
different cases, all with the intent on showing how a certain minority fits the framework established. 
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be applied to laws that classify on the basis of identify. Finally, this chapter explains the distinct 
factors that the Court has carved out and is intended to be applied when making determinations 
on whether to award heightened scrutiny
3
 to new minority groups. 
The Tiered System Introduced 
 In 1868, following the Civil War and marking the beginning of the reconstruction era, 
Congress passed the 14
th
 Amendment. Of particular note for this thesis is the amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause, which says that, “No State shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.” (14th Amendment) The original intention of the amendment 
was to extend political and economic equality to black citizens who had been enslaved and to 
provide a conscious dedication towards righting the wrongs provoked by slavery. (Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 1879)
4
 
 While the initial intent of the Equal Protection Clause was to be used to limit 
discriminatory legislation upon black citizens, the courts did not embrace the full scope and 
potential of the clause until much later. It wasn’t until the 20th Century when the Supreme Court 
interpreted the 14
th
 Amendment as providing a check against discriminatory majoritarian views 
that disenfranchised blacks. (Sunstein 1994, 12) While the first cases judged under the Equal 
Protections Clause were based on racial classifications, the scope of the clause soon grew to 
                                               
3 Throughout this thesis, I will refer to ‘heightened scrutiny’ frequently. As will become clear of the course of this 
chapter, there are three different levels of scrutiny, called strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis 
review. While many interchange intermediate scrutiny with heightened scrutiny, for the purposes of this thesis I will 
not be doing so. When I refer to heightened scrutiny, I mean both strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny. For 
example, if a group is petitioning for heightened scrutiny, then I am saying that they are trying to become recognized 
under either strict of intermediate scrutiny. The analysis about the tiers of scrutiny will become further elucidated 
throughout this thesis. What is important to take away at this point is the broader definition that I use for heightened 
scrutiny. 
4 Throughout this thesis, there will be many references to different courts and court decisions. So it is clear, when 
Court is capitalized, then I am referring specifically to the United States Supreme Court. If it is in the singular and 
lowercase (court) or in the plural (courts), then I am referring to the institution of the justice system and the legal 
decision makers on the whole. As an example, my stating “the courts have applied x law in y way, I am referencing 
the entire system, while if I stated “the Court has applied x in y way”, then I am referencing the Supreme Court. 
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include other groups experiencing discriminated that deserved judicial protection of their right to 
equality.  
 Today, in order to determine how to weigh Equal Protection claims made by 
complainants, the Court employs a system to weigh the competing interests in Equal Protection 
Cases, which has come to be called “tiered scrutiny”. In theory,5 tiered scrutiny is intended to 
give courts a standardized weighing mechanism to decide whose claim is most compelling: 
minority groups seeking equal protection or the government. This judicial doctrine is intended to 
articulate the extent of protections afforded to those who claim their right to equal treatment has 
been violated, and provide clarity for lower courts on how to weigh those competing interests.  
The fundamental premise of tiered scrutiny is that there are different levels. What this 
means is that the court weighs the interests of each side in a specific way depending on the level 
of scrutiny applied in the case. The reason that the different levels are necessary is because the 
Court has determined that different minority groups need their rights protected more ardently 
than others. In order to determine what minorities are protected by what standard, the Court 
employs a number of different factors that are intended to provide guidance in applying the 
correct amount of judicial protection to the specific minority. The three different levels are called 
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review.  
Strict scrutiny requires that in order for the government to facially infringe on an 
individual’s right, they must provide a compelling purpose that is narrowly tailored and one that 
is necessary to achieve that purpose. (Loving v. Virginia, 1967)
6
 This is the highest tier of 
scrutiny, meaning that it is the greatest form of protection the court offers individuals that are 
                                               
5 I say “in theory” because it is my position that there are many flaws to employing the doctrine of tiered scrutiny to 
Equal Protection claims. Those issues will be discussed later in this chapter.  
6 The precedent was further established in Palmore v. Sidoti (1984) and Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke (1978), among other cases 
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deemed worthy of receiving protection by the Court. While commonly linked with 14
th
 
Amendment analysis, strict scrutiny is used for more than just Equal Protection cases. Some 
examples include 1
st
 Amendment claims, such as the right to free speech, and 14
th
 Amendment 
Due Process Claims, such as the right to vote, (Dunn v. Blumstein, 1972) right to interstate 
travel, (Shapiro v. Thompson, 1969) or right to privacy. (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965)
7 8
 
Within Equal Protection cases, the Court has determined that individuals cannot be discriminated 
on the basis of their race, religion, and national origin. (Wilkinson 1975, 979) Groups that are 
protected under strict scrutiny are called suspect classes. So, if an individual is discriminated 
against on the basis of race, the government has discriminated against a suspect class.
9
 
The second tier the Court articulated is intermediate scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny states 
that laws will be upheld that appear to discriminate against individuals protected by this standard 
if they are substantially related to an important government purpose.
 
(Craig v. Boren, 1976) 
What this means is that the burden of importance in instituting and enforcing a discriminatory 
law is lower. (Strauss 2011, 137) The reason for this is that the Court has determined that the 
group being discriminated against does not deserve the same level of protection as individuals 
protected under strict scrutiny due to a number of reasons, which I will articulate throughout the 
course of this chapter. Members who are protected under this class are considered to be quasi-
suspect, meaning that they are entitled to some protection, but not all that are afforded to 
individuals protected by the higher standard of strict scrutiny. Those protected under 
                                               
7 The precedent was further established in Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) and Lawrence v. Texas (2003), among other 
cases. 
8 Fundamental rights, as defined by the Court, are rights that are essential to upholding the liberty of each individual. 
They are not specifically written in the constitution, but are rights that the Court has found to be essential to 
actualizing the liberty guaranteed in the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which states that “ nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”. (14th Amendment).  
9 How this determination is made will be addressed later on in this chapter. It is this determination where the 
doctrine of the tiers of scrutiny is most rife with problems, thereby leading me to search for other constitutionally 
grounded principles. 
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intermediate scrutiny are currently limited to gender (Craig) and illegitimacy. (Jimenez v. 
Weinberger, 1974) It is this standard that some courts have determined is the proper standard to 
adjudicate laws discriminating gays
10
, although there is far from a conclusive determination 
affirming this principle. (Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 2008; Windsor v. U.S., 
2012) 
 The final tier the Court relies upon is rational basis review. This standard is the most 
deferential to legislative bodies, in that the burden of importance for passing discriminatory laws 
is very low and allows lawmakers much more leeway in accomplishing legislative action. 
Because this standard is more deferential to the government, as opposed to the individual 
claiming discrimination, the burden is shifted to the party making a rights violation. The 
individual filing suit must be able to prove that the law passed is not rationally related to any 
legitimate government purpose. (Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 1955) In other words, 
all the government must establish is that there is some rational purpose for passing a law. If they 
can demonstrate that they do have a purpose that achieves a legitimate government aim, then the 
law ought to be upheld under this standard. Any persons that are claiming a form of 
discrimination on the basis of some characteristic the Court has not determined to be a suspect or 
quasi-suspect class has their claim adjudicated under this standard.(Wilkinson 1975, 951) Some 
notable examples of minority groups that have been denied suspect or quasi-suspect class status 
                                               
10 Throughout this thesis, I will be referring to gay, lesbian, and bisexual citizens as ‘gay’ simply for ease of 
readership. I am not claiming that protections would be extended only to gay men, but those who would identify 
with having same sex attraction and that this attraction is a part of their identity. I am purposefully not including 
transgendered individuals in my theory. This is not done out of any animus, but rather it is out of constitutional 
necessity. It is my contention that those that identify as transgendered face different issues and should be considered 
differently by the Court based on those different experiences. I would even contend that those who are 
transgendered are being discriminated on their gender identity, which is a settled area of law, in that gender 
classifications have already been formally protected by the Court. Gays, on the other hand, cannot claim that they 
have been protected. As such, it is for logical purposes that I separate the different identities that are commonly 
linked in social movements under the LGBT umbrella. 
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are the poor, the mentally handicapped and felons. (Strauss 2011, 141) The reasoning for doing 
so is varied, as the criteria for fulfilling suspect of quasi suspect class status is rather subjective. 
However, the Court ultimately determined that these groups did not merit the application of any 
form of heightened scrutiny, establishing a definitive precedence regarding the fate of these 
groups.
11
  
 Among legal scholars and court watchers, there are commonly held beliefs about how 
judges adjudicate equal protection claims under these tiers. Preeminent legal scholar Gerald 
Gunther famously stated that strict scrutiny was “strict in theory, fatal in application.” What he 
meant by this was that the burden established by strict scrutiny was so high that it was almost 
impossible for the Court to find the government justification for a law that discriminates against 
a suspect class constitutional. While later studies have shown that the burden is not 
insurmountable for the government,
12
 it is clear that the majority of laws adjudicated under the 
standard of strict scrutiny are struck down.  
On the complete opposite end of the spectrum, the perception is that the government has 
a very low burden to prove the legitimacy of the law passed. For groups claiming an equal 
protection violation, it is very difficult to prove that the government acted wrongly in 
discriminating against a group protected only by this standard, as all that is required is that the 
government demonstrates that they have some rational purpose for instituting that law. The 
                                               
11 While the Court has made it very clear that such examples, among many others, do not deserve a form of 
heightened scrutiny, and have substantiated such claims through some form of precedent, the way that the Court 
chose to weigh the different aspects that qualify a group for heightened scrutiny was highly subjective. It is this 
aspect that I take great issue with, as it is the Court’s burden to resolve ambiguity in the law, both for the purpose of 
making the law clear for the general public and for providing an understanding for how legislatures can and cannot 
act. When the doctrines in place provide for more ambiguity and less clarity, then that is where I see a need to fill a 
void in the Court’s jurisprudential decision making.  
12 In actuality, through empirical study, laws are upheld about 30% of the time when adjudicated under the theory of 
strict scrutiny. (Winkler 2006). The perception comes from high profile race-based cases, which are frequently 
struck down due to the Court’s wariness of justifying discrimination (Loving) 
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rational purpose either must be independent of discriminatory intentions or it must fulfill a 
government objective. (Strauss 2011, Page 137) The example of education demonstrates just 
how low the burden upon the government is under rational basis review. Currently, the majority 
of funding for public schools is based on local property taxes. Even though this could be seen as 
discriminatory towards those in poorer areas, the Court stated that doing so made the pragmatics 
of education funding more efficient. (San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
1973) By showing a purpose that was rational, the claim of discrimination does not continue to 
stand, even if the group’s claim appeared more compelling. What is key is the existence of a 
rational basis on the part of the government, not a countervailing purpose. 
Unlike rational basis review or strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny is less defined in its 
perceived outcomes. Because it seeks to strike a balance between the rigid burdens of the other 
two standards, its results are less conclusive in terms of preference for the individual or the 
government. Without demonstrated preference for one party in cases involving intermediate 
scrutiny, there appears to be more subjectivity among judges in which side is more successful. 
(Strauss 2011, 137)  
History of Equal Protection Claims 
 While the Equal Protection clause was enacted in 1868, the notion that groups of 
individuals were entitled to a specific form of higher protection by the courts was first conceived 
as late as the 1930s.
13
 Rather, the initial decisions made by the Court were much less sweeping in 
                                               
13 There is some literature that the ground work for the tiers of scrutiny began in FDR’s pre-New Deal Court. Some 
political scientists, most notably George Mason University Law Professor David Bernstein, have argued that the 
conservative courts of the 1910s and 1920s were much more amendable to exploring and instituting some policy that 
required the government to provide some formal justification that proved that some law was especially worthy of 
being upheld if it were to infringe on individual rights. David Bernstein, The Conservative Origins of Strict Scrutiny. 
While there is some credence to this belief that there were considerations for a system of heightened scrutiny, no 
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the protections extended. In the famed 1873 Slaughterhouse Cases the Court adjudicated a claim 
made under the 14
th 
Amendment for the first time. In answering a question about the powers of 
individual states to regulate economic enterprises, they held that the amendment’s Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, which stated that “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”, (14th Amendment) was 
restricted to claims that involved United States citizenship, and did not hold any authority over 
state action. This had the initial effect of limiting the scope of cases covered under the 14
th
 
Amendment, as rights claims could initially only be brought against the federal government, and 
infringements of rights at the hands of the states or other private individuals were not recognized 
under the 14
th
 Amendment. (Slaughterhouse Cases, 1872) This interpretation appeared to limit 
the protections that were intended to assist newly-freed slaves in their integration to American 
society. (Amar 2002, 26)  
 Because of the novelty of the 14
th
 Amendment in American Constitutionalism at the time 
of the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Court sought to provide some clarity as to how the Amendment 
ought to be read in its entirety. As such, they provided a definition of the Equal Protection 
Clause to read that, “the existence of laws in the States where the newly emancipated Negroes 
resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them as a class, was the 
evil to be remedied by this clause, and by it such laws are forbidden.” (Slaughterhouse) The 
intention of the Court at that time was to restrict the scope of Equal Protection to the political and 
economic rights of newly freed blacks. While this scope was eventually widened through further 
                                                                                                                                                       
metric was devised to assess these claims. The first clear instance that demonstrated precedent of a tiered scrutiny 
system was in Carolene.  
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cases,
14
 the importance of race being the first factor to receive heightened protection had many 
great impacts for the direction of the law. By having race protected first, all other Equal 
Protection claims in the future could be measured against the harms faced by blacks, as the Court 
would try to develop a clear line of precedence.  
 By relying on such a narrow interpretation, the Privileges or Immunities Clause was 
effectively rendered obsolete. While the Slaughterhouse Cases could have interpreted to 
substantially limited the scope of the 14
th
 Amendment, the Court began to find protections 
through other provisions within the Amendment, namely the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses. It was through these clauses that reinvigorated the 14
th
 Amendment by expanding its 
scope that led to the system of tiered scrutiny in use today. In 1880, the Court decided in 
Strauder v. West Virginia that individuals could not be excluded from serving on a jury on the 
basis of race. (Strauder v. West Virginia, 1879)
15
 In making this determination, the Court relied 
upon the Equal Protection Clause, stating that, “the 14th Amendment… denied to any state the 
power to withhold from them the equal protection of the laws.” (Strauder) Even though it did not 
formally recognize it as such, the Court relied upon a balancing mechanism between the 
protection of equal rights and deference to government legislation. At its core, the tiers of 
scrutiny are intended to clearly delineate how to balance individual rights against government 
objectives. Strauder was the first case to do so when deciding on the grounds of Equal 
Protection.  
                                               
14Cases highlighting this expansion include the expansion of social equality recognition under the 14th Amendment 
in Brown v. Board of Education (1972), and the creation of intermediate scrutiny for gender classifications in Craig 
v. Boren (1976), among other examples. 
15 The case was brought by an African-American defendant who claimed that he was not given the opportunity to a 
fair trial because of a law that stated blacks could not serve on juries, which deprived him of his right to a jury of his 
peers.  
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While cases such as Strauder served as foundation for what would become the tiers of 
scrutiny, the idea that specific minorities would need extra judicial protection was not introduced 
until the 1930s. Unlike Strauder, this notion was first formally introduced in a case that had no 
specific relevance to Equal Protection of minority rights. Rather, this idea was first broached in 
United States v. Carolene Products, a case about the powers of government to regulate interstate 
commerce. (Siegal 2006, 356) Carolene Products Co. had begun to replace milk fat with a 
skimmed milk combined with some other fat intended to replicate the milk fat, as the milk fat 
could be sold at a higher profit for use in other dairy products. Called filled milk, it was proven 
to cause adverse health effects. In response to the proliferation of the sale of filled milk, the 
federal government passed legislation banning the shipping of filled milk across state borders. 
(U.S. v. Carolene Products Co. 1938) The government claimed it was within its powers to 
regulate interstate commerce, and as the filled milk was being shipped and sold in states outside 
of its production location, the federal government was acting within its enumerated powers. 
Fearing a great loss in profits, Carolene Products sued, claiming infringement of the Commerce 
Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.16 Writing for an 8-1 majority siding 
with the government, Associate Justice Harlan Stone held that the government was operating 
within the bounds of their powers in regulating interstate commerce. More importantly, he 
determined that Congress had demonstrated a rational basis for passing this law, and 
subsequently outweighing any Due Process claim by the proponent, stating that the law sought to 
protect public health, as filled milk was substantially proven to pose significant health risks. 
(Carolene) 
                                               
16 The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment states that “nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.” Found in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3, the Commerce Clause states that 
“[The Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and 
with the Indian tribes.” 
Binder  22 
 
 What makes this seemingly mundane case so important is one footnote that Justice Stone 
added that has since been unofficially anointed as the most influential footnote in the history of 
American constitutional law. (Powell 1982, 1088) In discussing why rational basis review was 
utilized in finding that there was no due process violation, Stone included a passage stating how 
this standard cannot necessarily be applied for all due process and equal protection claims. In this 
famed footnote, Stone claimed there are groups of individuals who may require greater judicial 
protections of their rights than rational basis review accorded. Specifically, Footnote Four of the 
majority opinion states that: 
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of 
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific 
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which 
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. 
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those 
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of 
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under 
the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types 
of legislation. 
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review 
of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities, whether 
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which 
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be 
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more 
searching judicial inquiry. (Carolene) 
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This footnote does two very important things. First, it delineates that economic legislation should 
be adjudicated under rational basis review. Second, and more importantly for the purpose of this 
thesis, it claims that not all legislation impacting different individuals can be judged in the same 
way, which “may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry,” meaning a greater 
protection of minority rights. In stating that minorities needed extra judicial protection, Stone 
broached questions outside the scope of the case by introducing an outside approach to a separate 
issue.  
 Of particular importance is the intention of the way the footnote would be applied by 
future courts. It is unclear which groups would be protected by this greater form of scrutiny 
being proposed. The language of the passage suggests that the definitions of groups needing 
protection put forth were merely suggestions of areas of law that needed to be further scrutinized 
through future cases. Claims that the Court “may call for a… more searching judicial inquiry” 
and that they do not need to “consider now whether legislation which restricts those political 
processes… is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions 
of the Fourteenth Amendment” do not appear to be establishing a clear precedent as to how 
minority Equal Protection suits ought to be decided. (Carolene) Rather, they are merely 
suggesting that there is a deficiency in an important area of law that should be explored further. 
(Strauss 2011, 144) Louis Lusky, Justice Stone’s clerk who was the original author of the quote, 
confirms this as such. He claims that the purpose of the footnote was merely to highlight salient 
examples of discrimination that would demonstrate the difference between social rights of 
minorities and economic legislation affecting corporations. The specific wording chosen was not 
carefully crafted with the intention of becoming the bedrock of equal protection law. He even 
goes to say that discrete and insular are not even commonly defined in the way that they are used 
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in the footnote, further highlighting the intention to merely suggest an idea for the Court to 
consider in the future, not a binding precedent made in that opinion.(Lusky 1982, 1105) 
 What is important to remember about footnote four is which minorities were being 
treated unequally and how they were being marginalized. The group most discriminated against, 
African Americans, had their rights greatly infringed upon by local, state, and federal legislative 
means. (Ackerman 1985, 717) This was also during a time when the U.S. saw a mass influx in 
European immigrants, which led to a rise in anti-immigrant sentiments. Such sentiments were 
codified into law that targeted the country’s new immigrant population, highlighting a need for 
greater protection of immigrant rights. Given the prominence of those particular minority groups 
and the rampant discrimination upon them by the majority, it is easy to understand how the 
philosophy advocated for by Justice Stone was directed at protection for these groups.
 
(Ackerman 1985, 741) The fundamental problem, however, is that this was a philosophy written 
as a commentary on the state of society at the time of writing. It was not drafted to establish a 
clear precedent of how courts should interpret future discriminatory laws against other minority 
groups, such as gender, sexual orientation, or disability. 
 Even though footnote four of the Carolene Products decision was not intended to become 
the jurisprudential bedrock for Equal Protection law, such was the outcome. The examples 
provided by Justice Stone (individuals of religious, nation of origin, or racial minorities) all 
became suspect classes and adjudicated under the doctrine of strict scrutiny. In deciding if 
members of these groups should be considered a suspect classification, the Court relied on the 
factors articulated in footnote four. Great reliance in determining suspect class status was placed 
upon the language of footnote four, in weighing “whether prejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities may be a special condition… to a more searching judicial inquiry.” This definition has 
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become fundamental to equal protection litigation. It is this definition, however, that has created 
both additional ambiguity of the law and misrepresentation of different minority groups. 
(Ackerman 1985, 717-718) 
 Following the enumeration of footnote four into the Court’s line of precedents, there was 
not a great rush of underrepresented groups seeking judicial protection to provide redress for the 
wrongs committed against them in society. Rather, Carolene was initially only sighted sparingly. 
The most notable citation of the footnote, prior to the Warren and Burger Courts of the 1960s-
70s, was in Korematsu v. United States, in which the Court was presented the question as to 
whether Japanese internment during World War II was allowed under the Equal Protection 
Clause. While the Court found that the internment of all Japanese citizens constitutional on the 
grounds that the Executive was correctly exercising his constitutionally enumerated war powers, 
Associate Justice Hugo Black used the standard of strict scrutiny to weigh whether members of 
the Japanese race had been unjustly discriminated against, (Korematsu v. U.S., 1944) marking 
the first time the standard had been used in practice. (Robinson and Robinson 2005, 30) In his 
decision, Black claimed that the president’s goal of internment was compelling and was as 
narrowly tailored as possible, which are the requirements for upholding a law that infringes a 
suspect class’s right to equality. It has subsequently been debated at length whether this was 
actually compelling or narrowly tailored. Regardless, the lasting impact was the reliance on strict 
scrutiny for discrimination of racial classification. 
 Korematsu also had the effect of protecting all citizens from discrimination based on their 
race. It formalized that the protections were not only extended to blacks, which contradicted the 
belief that the 14
th
 Amendment was only to be applied to blacks, as the Amendment was passed 
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in response to the ending of enslavement of African Americans. Justice Black articulated this 
distinction by saying that:  
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of 
a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions 
are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. 
Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial 
antagonism never can. (Korematsu) 
What is important about this distinction (that racial classifications were protected, not just 
African Americans) was that all individuals were protected from discrimination on the basis of 
their race. Thus, it is a specific quality that all individuals possess that can’t be discriminated, as 
opposed to one specific group (blacks). This created the precedent that a fundamental element of 
one’s personhood and identity could not be discriminated against. This particular distinction 
opened the door for other groups to petition that a fundamental element of their personhood that 
similarly bore little to no relation to their contributions to society was also discriminated against.  
 Over the next 30 years, the tiers of scrutiny became further entrenched into the 
understanding of Equal Protection adjudication. Through cases such as McLaughlin v. Florida 
(1964)
17
, Loving v. Virginia (1967)
18
, and Bakke v. Regents of University of California (1978)
19
, 
the Court continued to reaffirm that racial classifications were examine through the lens of strict 
scrutiny. The Court also began to expand the scope of the Equal Protection Clause by hearing 
many cases of sex discrimination, primarily led by then-attorney and current Supreme Court 
                                               
17 Held that Florida’s ban of interracial cohabitation was unconstitutional on the basis that discriminated against 
individuals based on their racial classification.  
18 Followed McLaughlin’s precedent in finding that Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage was unconstitutional on 
the basis that discriminated against individuals based on their racial classification. 
19 Held that affirmative action in college admissions was constitutional, yet quota systems stating exactly how many 
minorities could be admitted was unconstitutional 
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justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg. Through a series of cases, Ginsberg advanced a race-sex analogy 
that sought to demonstrate the parallels between race and gender. It was Ginsberg’s belief that 
race and gender were similar both in the way they contributed to one’s conception of their 
identity and in how the government has discriminated against this trait. Developing the analogy, 
Ginsberg presumed, would force the Court to find gender classifications as protected in the same 
way as racial classifications. (Hoyt v. Florida, 1961; Reed v. Reed, 1971; Taylor v. Louisiana, 
1975)    
Ginsberg achieved a minor victory in Frontiero v. Richardson, which weighed the 
constitutionality of a provision that did not give equal military benefits for husbands of enlisted 
women as it did for wives of enlisted men. (Frontiero v. Richardson, 1973) The Court decided 
that the provision was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. However, no binding 
majority opinion was written, as the justices finding the statute unconstitutional could not agree 
upon a rationale. The majority was divided over whether or not to apply strict scrutiny to gender 
classifications, which prevented a clear majority around one rationale to apply and establish a 
precedent around. (Frontiero) Arguing for awarding suspect class status for gender 
classifications, Justice William Brennan attempted to clarify the necessary factors that would 
trigger the application of strict scrutiny. Any group that has experienced a history of 
discrimination or have had their political power marginalized on account of the trait being 
discriminated against were relevant factors in the decision to award heightened scrutiny. 
Additionally, the Court takes into account whether the trait being discriminated against does not 
rationally relate to their contributions to society, and if the trait is biologically determined. 
(Frontiero) It was Brennan’s view, shared by three other justices, that gender classifications 
fulfilled these prongs, yet he could not generate a majority of the Court to endorse this 
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viewpoint. Absent a majority, the question about which tier to apply to gender classification was 
left unanswered. 
As the ultimate determination of what tier gender classifications fell under remained in 
flux after Frontiero, the Court revisited the issue in later cases, most notably in Craig v. Boren. 
Deciding whether a law that restricted the sale of beer to men over 21 but to women over 18 
discriminated against men, the Court officially established the new tier now known as 
intermediate scrutiny, which found a middle ground between the strength of strict scrutiny and 
the leniency of rational basis review. (Craig) Finding that gender was immutable and not 
relevant to one’s ability to contribute to society, the Court determined that there should be some 
extra protection. However, even though women had historically faced prejudice, the 
discrimination faced by women was not as great as the discrimination of those marginalized on 
the basis of their race. Additionally, the intent of discrimination against women was not to 
oppress, but to protect them, which was based on a social construct that women were more 
fragile than men. Even though the protection of women was offensive and still led to 
marginalization that required some judicial intervention, the intentions behind gender 
discrimination were not as malicious as the intentions of lawmakers discriminating against 
blacks.  
Since Craig v. Boren, the only other group to receive some form of heightened scrutiny 
was illegitimate children, meaning individuals who were born out of wedlock. (Mathews v. 
Lucas, 1976; Trimble v. Gordon, 1977) Other minority groups, such as the mentally retarded 
(City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 1985) and the elderly (Gregory v. Ashcroft, 1991; 
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 2000), have petitioned the Court to hear their claims of 
deserved heightened scrutiny to no avail. The question of sexual orientation and where it fits 
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within this jurisprudential model is the latest, and most highly publicized, group to petition for 
heightened scrutiny. However, even though the Court has had the opportunity numerous times to 
render an opinion that would definitively formalize the tier to be applied to gays, they have not 
taken those opportunities, and the law remains in the ambiguous limbo that we see today. 
Explaining the Factors Used in Equal Protection Cases 
There are many different factors that the Court refers to in order for a group to receive 
heightened class status.
20
 They must be considered a discrete and insular minority, meaning the 
quality being discriminated against must be visually apparent and such minority must be insular 
within itself. The Court has placed an emphasis on protecting those who are discriminated 
against based on a trait that is immutable, meaning the individual does not decide if they are 
possessed with the characteristic, such as one’s race. (Frontiero) The group must have faced an 
amount of prejudice inflicted by others in society, primarily the majority. (Carolene) This 
prejudice takes form in two different ways: historical discrimination faced by the group (Loving) 
and the political powerlessness of the minority group that would impact the ability the group has 
to affect change through legislative avenues. (Frontiero) The trait that is discriminated against 
must not be relevant to the individual’s ability to actualize within society, be it politically, 
economically, or socially. (Craig) For example, an individual’s race does not affect their ability 
to perform their job, and as such the legislature should not codify law that discriminates against 
traits that have no rational relation to the individual’s contribution to society. The final factor that 
the Court has considered is the intent of the lawmakers in passing discriminatory laws, and 
                                               
20 When I say “factors”, I mean different elements that would support an application of a tier of scrutiny upon a 
distinct group petitioning for heightened class status. Such elements all are relevant reasons that would signal that 
such protection is necessary. Throughout this note, I will continue to refer to the different reasons primarily as 
factors or elements, and will use them interchangeably.  
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whether or not such intent is necessary for finding laws to be discriminatory and thereby in 
violation of the 14
th
 amendment. (Ely 1980, 151)  
The way in which the factors have been applied has been far from clear. This lack of 
clarity has created many issues for the Court and produced contradictory decisions. In short, the 
Court has stated that these different factors can be employed in order to determine if a group is 
entitled to suspect or quasi-suspect class status. They are to be used as guidelines for the Court 
when presented with a new group. While they are fairly well delineated and must be considered, 
not all must be consulted and weighed equally. It is within the judge’s discretion as to how 
strongly each factor ought to be employed in awarding heightened protection to new groups. 
(Bakke) It is this subjectivity in how judges weigh the factors, combined with the perniciousness 
of the factors to be considered, that contribute to the fundamental problems with Equal 
Protection precedents. It is due to these issues that I advocate for a break from such strong 
reliance on this doctrine, which is the basis of the subsequent chapter. 
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Chapter 2 – Vulnerabilities of Equal Protection Jurisprudence 
Throughout the 20
th
 century, the Court frequently relied upon the Equal Protection Clause 
to extend the protection of rights to many different classifications, most prominently race and 
gender. To establish the protections in place today, the Court substantiated its newly formed tiers 
of scrutiny though the use of different factors to be used exclusively for Equal Protection 
analysis. While the intentions of the Court were good, the reliance on factors is, by nature, 
problematic because in order to grant rights to different classifications, judges must apply the 
different standards that are vulnerable to charges of subjectivity. Over the course of this chapter, 
I will explain each of the different factors that use in order to determine whether or not a group is 
entitled to heightened scrutiny, as well as the reasons behind recognizing each factor as 
necessary for Equal Protection jurisprudence. I will also highlight the many issues that exist in 
each factor. This chapter will show how the Court’s methodology for Equal Protection cases is 
rather flawed. In the next chapter, I will explain how the flaws inherent to this line of precedents 
affect the claims made by gay rights groups in their petitions for heightened scrutiny.   
The Factors in Deciding Suspect Class Status 
 Since Justice Stone’s seminal footnote in Carolene Products, the Court has continued to 
refine how they decide which minority groups deserve suspect class and quasi-suspect class 
status, and which groups deserve no extra judicial protection at all. The factor suggested in 
Carolene of protecting discrete and insular minorities has stood with surprising strength. An 
element of prejudice against the discrete and insular minority must also be present in order to 
receive heightened class status. Through later cases, the Court determined that if the 
characteristic being discriminated against had no rational relation to their ability to function in 
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society, then it suggested a need for protection. They also placed an increased importance on the 
immutability of the characteristic that was being discriminated against.  
Classifying a Minority 
 In determining who is entitled to suspect classification, the Court determined that groups 
that consist of a minority of the populace need extra judicial supervision to protect their rights. 
This idea was first broached in Carolene, presumably due to widespread vitriol and 
marginalization of blacks. As is clear by looking at census data, black citizens consisted of a 
notable subset of the population, yet clearly made up a minority subset of the population.
21
 The 
reason as to why the Court determined there was a need to protect groups of minority status was 
fairly simple. Blacks consisted of a substantial portion of the population, yet were greatly 
outnumbered by their white counterparts, whose power allowed them to infringe the rights and 
opportunities of blacks. So, if a substantial portion of the population was greatly affected by the 
majority, and the marginalized group could not create the political change they desired because 
of their lack of numbers, then it is the role of the judicial authorities to try to foster opportunity 
that does not occur through typical political avenues. (Ackerman 1985, 722) The argument 
boiled down to the fact that minorities were notably present groups in society, yet they were not 
powerful enough to affect change without judicial protection of discrimination.  
 There are two main problems with considering whether or not a discriminated group 
consists of a minority in society. First, the Court weighs the importance of protecting a minority 
group’s rights in part based on the size of the minority group’s population. The issue with this is 
                                               
21 In 1938, citizens identifying as black made up about 10% of the population. This number has gradually increased, 
albeit not that substantially, as today only 12.5% of the United States’ population is black. (Statistical Abstract of the 
United States: 2003) 
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that the Court never directly says how big the minority should be within society, yet it clearly has 
an effect in their decision making. The minority group must be a substantial portion of the 
populace. (Ackerman 1985, 720) For instance, blacks consisted of approximately 11 percent of 
the population during the 1960s, when the levels of scrutiny were first being formulated and 
applied to equal protection cases. (Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2003) More than one 
in ten of all citizens were experiencing great political and social marginalization. However, 
blacks were not a large enough population that they could have a real impact upon normal 
legislative processes to combat discriminatory policies. The Court prefers to not involve itself in 
deciding constitutional issues when the people can exercise their will and have laws passed that 
achieve the same end.
22
 But when a large portion of the population has those avenues blocked to 
them because of discrimination, then it justifies Court intervention. 
 The issue is that this analysis is premised upon the size of the minority. If blacks had 
comprised 35-40 percent of the population, but still were discriminated against in the same way, 
would they be less entitled to protection?
23
 They would in theory have more agency to change 
the laws, because they comprised a larger voting bloc. At best, this logic appears odd for the 
Court to pursue, considering how the Court tends to view individual rights. The Court is 
extending rights to individuals based on the size of the group they are a part of. This represents a 
clear break from the common way of extending rights to individuals, which are allocated based 
                                               
22 The purposes for this run deep. As the only unelected branch of the government, the Court does not like to act 
contrary to the widely held social sentiments of society. That is not to say they won’t decide cases that have a large 
impact upon the country (Brown v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade to name a couple), but if avenues on certain 
issues can be taken that involve bodies that were elected by the people, and better reflect the will of the people, then 
the Court prefers to allow those to be taken given that similar ends would be achieved. 
23 I understand the expected objection to this. If they had comprised that much of the population, then they would 
have been able to better change laws that were discriminatory. However, this point is not just rooted in this example. 
As I will discuss in greater length, women comprised a majority, yet were still discriminated against.   
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on the simple fact that one is a citizen of the country.
24
  It begs the question: is an individual 
more entitled to judicial protection of their basic individual rights because of the size of the 
population that that individual identifies with? This principle would seem to make individual 
rights premised on the existence of other like individuals, instead of on the basis of the upholding 
the interest of protecting each citizen from majoritarian discrimination. (Ely 1980, 165) 
 When looking at how minorities are viewed by the Court, we must also recognize the 
other side to the size argument: that if a group is too small, they are not as entitled to judicial 
protection. (Ackerman 1985, 720) The Court is much less likely to come to the defense of 
individuals who consist of a very small portion of the electorate. For the sake of argument, let’s 
look at a time in which a minority group was marginalized prior to the application of Equal 
Protection safeguards. If American Indians, who represent a much smaller subset of the 
population than blacks do, were the first minority group to claim that their right to Equal 
Protection was bring infringed due to discriminatory laws, it is likely that the Court would have 
less concern for their plight because of their size and lack of potential to impact the political 
system through other avenues. (Ackerman 1985, 720) American Indians are such a small 
percentage of the population that they have little impact on wielding political influence. Because 
they are not like blacks, who are a larger voice that is being suppressed, the Court would be less 
likely to grant Equal Protection.  
This only further illustrates how the Court’s duty of weighing the protection of individual 
rights versus governmental interests is premised on a fact that is out of the control of the 
individual or the government, yet wields a great amount of influence in deciding the scope of 
                                               
24 You can look to almost any other example of a rights claim. While one person has been affected, the right is 
extended to all. 
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rights. The rights of the individual are only to be protected if that individual was arbitrarily born 
into a group that is large enough to have a realistic expectation of political influence if they had 
not been discriminated against, yet is not too large that they wouldn’t need judicial protection. 
This will prove to be especially problematic for the adjudication of cases involving gay rights, 
which I will discuss further in Chapter Three, because it is unclear exactly how what percentage 
of the country is gay. Overall, however, the notion of what constitutes a minority, and how 
individuals are protected based on how many people are also of that group, poses many problems 
of judicial arbitrariness. 
Understanding Discreteness  
 Another aspect of footnote four of Carolene that has become a foundation of Equal 
Protection precedence is the reliance on the discreteness and insularity of the minority. 
Currently, there is no set definition of what constitutes discreteness and insularity. (Hoffman 
2003, 1235) While some scholars have argued that these concepts ought to be defined together 
(Strauss 2011, 149), there is a large contingency who see them as being distinct factors, 
(Ackerman 19985, 721) with the most notable individual seeing them in this way being Louis 
Lusky, the clerk for Justice Stone who wrote the first draft of footnote four in Carolene.(Lusky 
1982, 1105) Given that we know the drafter of the footnote intended for these two qualities to be 
considered separately, I am choosing to proceed by analyzing them as distinct, and that the Court 
takes each into account separately when deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to different 
groups.  
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 Since Carolene, the Courts have lacked a clear definition as to what discreteness actually 
is.
25
 One clear definition that has been provided and cited many times is provided by Bruce 
Ackerman in his piece Beyond Carolene Products. He states that a minority is discrete “when its 
members are marked out in ways that make it relatively easy for others to identify them.” 
(Ackerman 1985, 730) This definition is important because it attempts to provide a clear way of 
trying to understand how this factor has been understood, and does an effective job in doing so. 
Discreteness was originally used as a factor in awarding heightened class status to groups 
because this was prevalent in discrimination in 1938. Blacks were being discriminated solely on 
the basis of a discrete characteristic. It was this public characteristic that was easily identifiable 
that created bigotry and subsequent legislation enacting this bigotry into law. (Wilkinson 1975, 
981) 
 For many different politically disadvantaged groups, it was important to recognize how 
the discreteness of a characteristic led to discrimination. The public nature of race and gender 
was the basis for legislative marginalization. In this respect, the trait’s discreteness was directly 
correlated with the purpose for discrimination.(Ackerman, 730) However, the reliance on 
discreteness as a standard for granting suspect classification, or even quasi-suspect classification, 
creates a premium on demonstrating a quality that may not apply to all citizens who have been 
discriminated against. By focusing so intently on discreteness, the Court has overlooked the 
possibility of prejudice on the basis of an anonymous trait. (Ackerman 1985, 729) Traits not 
visually apparent are considered to be not as worthy of protection as traits that are publicly 
displayed. The best example is sexual orientation. As I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 
                                               
25 This is one of the primary reasons why it has been so difficult to distinguish whether or not discreteness and 
insularity are inextricably linked definitionally or not. The only sources that we can rely upon are the interpretations 
different courts have taken of this written precedent, and the understanding of the writer. This ambiguity is yet 
another element that shows the shoddiness of the tiered scrutiny doctrine.  
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Three, sexual orientation is not public to others in the way that gender or race is. To illustrate this 
point, if you were to see a child being born, you would know both the gender and the race of the 
child.
26
 However, you would not be able to determine the orientation of that child just by 
appearances. 
 Anonymity is important to recognize because people possessing these traits should not be 
less entitled to judicial protection simply because the fact about themselves that is discriminated 
against happens to not be visually apparent. There are many examples of individuals being 
discriminated due to non-discrete traits, such as sexual orientation or mental illness. Persons 
possessing anonymous traits that are discriminated against can easily hide that aspect of who 
they are. (Ackerman 1985, 729) This has the effect of both misrepresenting how many people 
possess that trait, which as discussed earlier is an important consideration in the Court’s 
determination of who to extend protection to. Gays, for example, can hide their orientation from 
the public, which skews the total population of homosexual citizens. When persons choose to 
hide a trait about themselves that can be discriminated against, this choice also demonstrates the 
depth of that discrimination, as individuals are made so afraid that their rights and privileges will 
be taken away due to prejudicial laws that they hide that aspect of themselves. This has the effect 
of making it even more difficult for regular political avenues to be taken to extend rights for 
groups possessing anonymous characteristics, because those who could be active in gaining 
rights for themselves are afraid to publicly affirm that they are a part of a group subject to 
animus. 
                                               
26 I recognize that there are some abnormalities that affect this from being a fool-proof test. Things like being born 
intersex or albinism would cloud the clarity of the gender or race. However, these extreme examples don’t nullify 
the point that characteristics like race and gender are, for the vast majority of individuals, easily discernible upon 
appearance. 
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Understanding Insularity 
 Insularity refers to the bonds of persons among a discriminated group and the strength of 
those bonds. A group is insular if its members are unified together through many different 
political and social bonds, such as political affiliation, church membership, and residential 
communities. (Ackerman 1985, 726) The Court determined that insularity of a group was 
something to be protected due to the rampant segregation that bred insularity among those who 
were disenfranchised. The thought was that it was the discrimination that caused the insularity. 
(Carolene, 1938)  Given the realities that resulted from this insularity, it made it that much 
harder to break from the bonds and communities that were imposed upon minority groups. This 
is apparent through all three examples of discriminated groups provided in footnote four. 
Immigrants tended to live among fellow immigrants from the same nation of origin, racial 
communities were highly segregated, and members of minority religions tended to exist within 
the same social sphere.  
 The issues with insularity are similar to those arising from discreteness. Insularity may 
have been a product of the inequality imposed upon restricted groups. However, like 
discreteness, insularity is not an aspect that applies to all groups who have found themselves 
discriminated against. The counter to insularity, diffuseness, is an aspect of discriminated groups 
that can impede the group from gaining political influence to advocate for equal treatment. 
Members of diffuse groups, such as women, do not experience the benefits of insularity, 
including ease of political organization, common shared experiences, and unified social bonds. 
(Wilkinson 1975, 982) They consequently have a more difficult time in creating these bonds, and 
thereby have a more difficult time in creating lasting political change. By this logic, it seems that 
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the Court protects individuals who are more likely to be able to use the political channels that the 
Court is seeking to open up through extra judicial protection, while overlooking the groups that 
do not have the natural advantages of insularity. (Ackerman 1985, 726-28) 
Prejudice as a Metric 
 An individual who is a discrete and insular minority is not automatically entitled to strict 
scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny. If that were the case, then bald CEOs would be a protected 
class, as they would fulfill all of the necessary components of being a discrete and insular 
minority. Essential to finding a group to be worthy of heightened scrutiny is the existence of 
prejudice against members of a group. Among all protected groups under the Equal Protection 
Clause, all have faced some form of societal prejudice.
27
  This realization is reflected in footnote 
four of Carolene, and has been consistently cited as a necessary factor in order to grant suspect 
or quasi-suspect class status. (Ackerman 1985, 731) However, even though there is consistency 
about the importance of societal prejudice, the way in which to measure such prejudice has been 
a source of great ambiguity. (Strauss 2011, 150) The Court has analyzed prejudice in two 
different ways: analysis of historical discrimination against the group, and analysis of the 
political power the group currently wields to combat discrimination. (Frontiero, 1973) 
 There are many different ways the Court could interpret historical discrimination. The 
Court could look to past legislation that intentionally or unintentionally yet disproportionately 
discriminated against a minority. The Court could look to the social stigmas against certain 
groups, and how those stigmas prevented individuals of the affected group from being able to 
                                               
27 Adarand Constructors Inc v. Pena (racial minorities); Frontiero v. Richardson (women); Graham v. Richardson 
(aliens); Jimenez v. Weinberger (illegitimacy of birth);  
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actualize many of the rights and privileges that have been afforded to those who have not been 
discriminated against. (Wilkinson 1975, 981) As such, it is the duty of the Court to recognize the 
de facto discrimination and provide redress for this historical marginalization. Historical 
discrimination could also be seen through inadequate governmental representation. For instance, 
women consisted of a large subset of the population.
28
 However, the cultural expectations for 
women did not allow them the same opportunities in government as it did men.
29
 When a group 
of individual cannot gain political representation for themselves due to widespread societal 
bigotry, judiciary intervention is consequently necessary. 
 Current political participation, or the lack thereof due to prejudice, is the other way in 
which Courts have interpreted the effects of prejudice and their role in determining judicial class 
status in equal protection cases.
30
 Legal theorist Marcy Strauss has effectively condensed the 
approaches judges have taken to understanding political strength and the factors that restrict the 
exercise of political will. She writes that the four factors are the group’s ability to vote, the 
numbers of individual of that minority, the existence of favorable legislative enactments that 
might demonstrate political power, and whether members of the group have achieved positions 
of power and authority. (Strauss 2011, 154) Each one of these different modes of analysis have 
been used at various points throughout the Court’s jurisprudential history, with some being more 
                                               
28 Depending on the year, women actually were a majority, and men were the minority. 
29 Justice Brennan emphasized this point through many gender discrimination cases, when he was advocating for 
suspect class status for women. He claimed that even though women were actually the majority, they had such little 
representation to show for their demographical presence. He cited the fact that, up until the 1970s, no women had 
been elected president (which remains true today), no woman had sat on the Supreme Court, no woman had served 
in the Senate, and only 14 women had been elected to the House of Representatives. 
30 By judicial class status, I mean how the group is classified with regard to the tier of scrutiny that their claims are 
adjudicated under. For example, race would have a judicial class status of suspect class, while gender would be 
considered quasi-suspect class status. Another term for this is heightened class status. 
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relevant to today’s debate than others. 31  Strauss highlights the issues of trying to measure 
political power, because the different elements of political power can all be manipulated to fit the 
intended decision of a judge. For example, a judge can point to a few select examples of women 
in power, and claim that women therefore have political capital and do not need judicial 
protection. This does not mean that women are properly represented or that this instance 
correlates to the existence of meaningful political power. It merely means that there is great 
power in the hands of the judge, and there is no clear way that a judge should act when presented 
with these questions.   
 Like the many other aspects of Equal Protection precedence, the analysis about prejudice 
is not without error. The problem with measuring prejudice is that there is a real lack of 
consistency among courts in analyzing prejudice. Without a proper metric to measure prejudice, 
there is no direction for lower courts as to how they should understand the history of prejudice 
and how that relates to the opportunities for members of that group today. (Bhagwat 1997, 307) 
One primary example of this schism in how to best weigh the two different elements of prejudice 
comes from the Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision legalizing gay marriage, Kerrigan v. 
Commissioner of Public Health. Writing for the majority, Justice Richard Palmer emphasized the 
history of political and social discrimination against gays that has greatly contributed to the 
stigma that sees them as second-class citizens. However, for the dissent, Justice David Borden 
claimed that judicial intervention on behalf of gays and lesbians was not necessary, as they were 
a politically powerful group who, at that time, had the capital and the influence to take advantage 
                                               
31 The point that I believe is of less concern is the right to vote, as everyone in society has the right to vote, with the 
exception of some individuals who are restricted given a greater government interest in restricting their ability to 
vote (most notably children, felons, and illegal aliens). With regard to the sheer size of the group, I have adequately 
addressed both the importance the courts place on the size of the group, as well as the problems associated with this 
emphasis. To do so again in this section would be simply redundant.  
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of other political avenues. Instead of focusing on how gays had been historically marginalized, 
he analyzed the rise of influence that gays were continuing to gain at a rapid rate. As such, he 
believed that the political system was not marginalizing these groups, but rather was adapting to 
their increasing political capital, which lessens the need for judicial intervention. (Kerrigan, 
2008)  
 Kerrigan provides a great example for when two judges can each follow the same 
precedents yet come to drastically different results. Both recognized the prejudice leveled against 
gays. They each placed greater weight on differing elements of this principle, leading to the 
opposing viewpoints. What this shows is how there is no way to clearly incorporate these 
separate ideals into one cogent understanding of prejudice that can be applied in future cases. 
The result is less opportunity for judicial objectivity, and it allows judges the opening to justify 
decisions with their own self-selecting history. 
 This leads us to another important question about prejudice: How would we ideally 
measure past prejudice? Can it even be done at all? (Wilkinson 1975, 981) These are both valid 
criticisms, ones that may we may never be able to answer. The primary issue is that the levels of 
scrutiny are trying to fit different groups with different histories and forms of marginalization 
under one model of interpretation. What this does is makes the actual prejudice even harder to 
understand, because it is not being interpreted for its own sake. (Ackerman 1985, 737)  
 Having recognized that there is no objective way to measure history, and seeking to 
minimalize their own subjectivity, judges have tried to find clearer ways to understand prejudice 
of new groups petitioning for equal protection by looking to the groups that the tiers were based 
around. For strict scrutiny, that would be race, while for intermediate scrutiny, the archetype is 
gender. Judges and legal advocates have tried to understand the history of these two groups that 
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led to those courts deciding which standard to implement, and then analogize others groups to 
these two archetypes. For strict scrutiny, judges have tried to understand the history of different 
groups based on a comparison to the history of discrimination on the basis of race. (Graham v. 
Richardson, 1971) When looking at the history of blacks in the U.S., they were enslaved on the 
basis of race, and restricted to living and interacting only with members of their own race. While 
being greatly under represented and marginalized, women never experienced the level of 
hardship that blacks did. Additionally, the intent to oppress women was not nearly as vitriolic as 
the intent to restrict the autonomy and basic political rights of blacks. The comparison of 
respective past discrimination was a basis for establishing intermediate scrutiny for gender 
discrimination, because the history of discrimination women faced was not equal to the 
discrimination of blacks. (Craig v. Boren, 1976) The process of comparison became an unwritten 
precedent, in that later courts have used this strategy of analogy to understand other group’s 
place with equal protection precedent. 
 The issues of analogizing are exactly the same as trying to measure prejudice without any 
sort of metric. It allows judges to subjectivity determine the nature of a group’s history of 
discrimination, due to their being no proper way to understand the history of discrimination. The 
only difference is that subjective comparisons are drawn between groups, instead of just 
subjective assessments being made about the marginalization of the group for their own sake. 
What this does is cloud the understanding of prejudice for individual groups because they are 
being understood only by comparison to another groups’ hardships. (Ackerman 1985, 744) This 
has the effect of misrepresentation and a lack of clarity. For example, women were restricted 
from voting for over 100 years, they had much less ability to effect political change, and were 
expected to remain subservient to men in intellectual, physical, social, and economic ways. It 
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would be very hard to claim that women have not been marginalized when compared to the 
opportunities extended to men. Now, assume for the sake of argument that there never was any 
racial discrimination and subsequent issues stemming from this discrimination. Would women 
then have a stronger claim to greater protection, because they would appear to be the group most 
greatly oppressed? The rights of women, and the judicial protection of those rights, were 
dependent on greater rights atrocities inflicted upon a completely independent group, instead of 
being interpreted for their own sake.  
There is general agreement that blacks have been one of the groups experiencing the 
greatest form of prejudice.
32
 But let’s look at another hypothetical, one that would call this line 
of thought into question. Let’s say our country, at one point, had a nationwide policy, greatly 
supported by the vast majority of people, stating that any child born with red hair should be 
instantly executed. They have no right to life whatsoever. Now, if this were to have happened, 
we would probably see the plight of blacks as less severe than that of redheads, who never even 
got to experience the pleasures of life at all. Does this then mean that blacks, based on their 
history of discrimination, would have less of a need for judicial protection? I contend that it 
should have no bearing, because when looking at the prejudice simply for blacks, there was a 
need for judicial oversight in protection of basic rights that had been stripped. However, in the 
approach that some courts have taken in trying to understand history of prejudice, blacks would 
presumably receive a lesser form of scrutiny than redheads because their history of 
                                               
32 I refrain from saying definitively that they have experienced the greatest form of prejudice because I would be 
falling into the exact trap that I criticize the courts for falling into. I cannot say that the courts are misrepresenting 
and misunderstanding history by making these subjective classifications while then making one myself. There are 
valid arguments to be made that other groups have suffered greater rights infringements, such as Native Americans. 
I am not making a value judgment one way or another. That being said, I don’t believe that I am going too far out on 
a limb to recognize the atrocities committed against blacks on the basis of their race was one of the strongest forms 
of prejudice.  
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discrimination was less severe, even if they did not deserve protection of a lower tier. This 
highlights the fundamental issue with drawing parallels that shouldn’t be drawn. It does not 
allow for understanding prejudice in its own right, and only seeks to compare that prejudice to 
the animus faced by other groups in different times and social contexts. 
Relevance of Trait in Discrimination 
 Another factor in determining the level of scrutiny for groups is whether or not the trait 
being discriminated against is related to the individual’s ability to participate and contribute in 
society. It is the test of the relevancy of the characteristic being discriminated against. For 
example, education opportunities could not be restricted to whites only, because one’s race was 
not relevant to whether that individual should or should not receive an education. If the trait does 
not reflect the person’s abilities or capabilities, then it could be considered irrelevant, and 
thereby not a justified reason by the government to impose a law with this discriminatory impact. 
(Goldberg 2004, 481) The Court has used this logic to reject age as a suspect or quasi-suspect 
class, as they claim that legislative actions that facially restrict the opportunities of some based 
on their age are not discriminatory because the trait bears a direct relation to a government 
interest, most notably that of workplace productivity. (Kimel v. Board of Regents, 2000) 
However, there is no relevant reason for capping the number of female workers, as one’s gender 
does not have a rational relationship with the ability to work productively.  
Similarly to many of the other factors, relevancy suffers from the same ambiguity that 
does not provide clear precedents. Firstly, how can relevancy really be determined? This 
question again gets left up to the interpretation of the judges. Secondly, and perhaps more 
importantly, does the trait have to be highly irrelevant to a government purpose for a group to 
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accrue judicial protection?(Aukerman 2005, 37) Many have argued that the poor deserve 
heightened protection of some sort, instead of having their cases of discrimination only 
adjudicated under rational basis review. There are many different factors that contribute to this 
line of thinking, with the chief among them being that poor individuals are at a greater 
disadvantage for many different opportunities compared to their wealthier counterparts.
33
 
However, the fact that persons are poorer can be directly related to their marginalization and not 
being afforded equal protection. (Strauss 2011, 167) The best example of such was in the case 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, when the Supreme Court determined that 
education could be funded by local property taxes, even though persons living in poorer 
neighborhoods were guaranteed to have schooling of much lesser quality. Because schooling is 
funded through property taxes, poorer citizens have less valuable pieces of property and 
therefore pay less in property taxes, which then results in less money going into the school 
system. With less money in the school system, the quality suffers greatly compared to districts 
with higher property values. In this case, the fact that the individuals affected were poor was 
directly relevant to the case at hand. (Rodriguez, 1973) Their economic status directly led to 
worse education and the harms that are associated with this worse education. Does that mean, 
because a lack of wealth was the cause of the problem and the cause of the discrimination, that 
we should not recognize it? 
This example of the poor elucidates the need to call into question whether or not this is a 
constitutionally responsible principle to uphold as one of the bedrock of equal protection cases. 
Individuals can be discriminated against for things within their control, and which have 
                                               
33 Examples of such include ability to influence the political process through campaign donations, restrictions on the 
right to vote through tougher voter ID laws and shorter voting hours, poorer education, lack of social mobility, lower 
quality of property ownership, among many other issues.  
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relevance to government measures. That does not mean that they do not deserve heightened 
protection in any form. 
Immutability 
 The concept of immutability is one that has slowly developed to become arguably the 
single greatest consideration in the court’s determination of who receives suspect classification. 
It is this concept that has been the primary justification for heightened classification for race and 
gender, while it was one of the reasons that prevented social class or age from gaining similar 
recognition. It is also a very large point of contention, both among scholars and the courts, as to 
whether one’s sexual orientation fulfills these factors. 
 In Frontiero v. Richardson, the landmark case that first introduced the idea of some form 
of heightened scrutiny for women, Justice Brennan attempted to try to clarify the factors of equal 
protection cases, including immutability. In doing so, he claimed that immutability was a trait 
that one was born with and was biologically determined. (Frontiero, 1973) Over time, this 
definition has shifted a bit, and there is some dispute about the true definition of immutability. 
Some courts have claimed that immutability is simply a characteristic about oneself that is 
essential to their existence and trying to change it would provide for so much strife and difficulty 
that it cannot be reasonably expected that they would change of alter its existence. (Watkins v. 
United States Army, 1989)
34
 Others continue to rely upon the Frontiero precedent that 
immutability is biologically determined. 
                                               
34 This line of argumentation was advanced for two reasons. First, it provided justification for providing suspect or 
quasi suspect class status for gays, as it was proving difficult to prove orientation was linked to biological processes. 
The second reason was that even immutable characteristics determined by biology could still be altered through 
advances in medical capabilities, such as gender reassignment or racial transformation surgery (in which one 
undergoes treatment to change their skin tone). Additionally it is important to be clear that this definition has been 
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When looking at either of these two definitions, they both rely on a quality that can’t be 
changed, regardless of the why this quality exists in individuals. If somebody possesses some 
trait that cannot be changed, and the government discriminates against this trait, then the 
government has passed law that an individual has no method of recourse in which to remedy the 
situation. (Strauss 2011, 163) Restrictions placed upon blacks in public places like restaurants or 
bathrooms, for example, were commonplace. Because one cannot change their race, blacks had 
no opportunity to earn the privileges of whites. By recognizing the immutability of a 
characteristic, the Court is acknowledging the limitations upon people, and that the government 
should recognize that these limitations exist. They should therefore protect the autonomy of such 
people when they are restricted from doing so based on some immutable characteristic, because 
they cannot provide the change that would be necessary for the full realization of privileges 
afforded to the majority. (Frontiero, 1973) 
There are two main objections to the use of immutability in determining suspect class 
status. First, the premise of immutability confuses the effects of discrimination by placing a 
premium on an individual being discriminated for the rest of their life, instead of simply 
accepting the existence of discrimination for the point that they are at in their life. 
Hypothetically, let’s say one’s gender switched every ten years, but men still held an inherent 
and historical privilege that women did not experience.
35
 Would women not be entitled to 
heightened protection, because their gender was not immutable? The discrimination would still 
                                                                                                                                                       
used by certain courts, such as the deciders in Watkins. However, there is far from any conclusive agreement to use 
this new definition of immutability, as many courts continue to place a premium upon a trait being biologically 
determined. 
35 I understand that if everyone experienced life as both genders, there would presumably be much more equality, 
both procedurally and substantively. However, for the sake of argument, maintaining social constructs around 
gender while manipulating immutability seeks to highlight the issue with immutability as a concept. 
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exist for that individual, and at that point in time, they would not be able to exist equally to men. 
However, the fact that they do not remain that gender would then determine that women should 
not be entitled to benefits at that time, because they have the potential to not be subjected to that 
harm in the future. 
Now, apply this logic to a more tangible example: the poor. The Court has stated that 
those in poverty are not members of a suspect class because they have the ability to progress and 
develop greater wealth and experience class mobility. Because they have that ability, the Court 
has said they are less entitled to heightened protection, because other protected minorities do not 
have the ability to ever change the basis of why they are being discriminated against. However, 
this overlooks the discrimination in the present that poor individuals experience. In the case of 
education funding, the families negatively affected may in the future be prosperous enough to 
move to a district where they can receive better schooling. However, in that moment they do not 
have that opportunity. By placing a premium on immutability, what the Court is saying is that the 
potential to change an aspect of oneself in the future is a greater consideration than the very real 
and tangible forms of discrimination that poor individuals experience at that very time. 
Another example that illustrates the problem with immutability is age discrimination. 
Obviously, people who are old have not always been old. Rather, they grew up and developed as 
people with qualities and capabilities that have evolved since they were of a younger age. Along 
with this self-development, the individual becomes subjected to new feelings animus directed 
towards them, due to the public’s treatment of the elderly. That individual had never had to 
experience this form of prejudice before, but with their advanced age comes this new form of 
discrimination. Does the fact that they were young once mean that they do not experience 
discrimination? Or is the discrimination of these individuals less than that of other individuals 
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discriminated against due to an immutable characteristic simply because they weren’t born with 
it? 
The second issue with immutability as a factor is the strength that it possesses when 
weighed against other factors. All other protected classifications rely on the fact that the group 
receiving suspect classification had some history of discrimination or was currently being 
discriminated against. Even if the courts have not conceptualized how to measure prejudice 
effectively, the mere existence of some form of prejudice has always been a primary factor in 
whether or not to grant suspect or quasi suspect classification to a distinct group. However, 
through the rise in importance of immutability, the courts have decided that laws discriminating 
against anyone on the basis of race, gender, religion, or any other protected class are subject to 
the level of scrutiny determined by the Court. (Strauss 2011, 170) What this means is that whites 
are entitled to strict scrutiny to protect their interests, even though they have suffered none of the 
harms that were used to justify greater judicial protection for blacks in the first place. The 
immutability of race has overshadowed all of the other reasons for the tiers of scrutiny.  The 
same goes for gender, where men are given quasi-suspect classification. (Craig, 1976) The effect 
is that it clouds the history of the precedents established. The reasons for establishing tiers of 
scrutiny were the existence of a trait combined with other factors that led to marginalization, 
such as prejudice experienced. By extending the same level of protection to the majorities who 
were the oppressors, the factor of immutability becomes the only factor and the other factors that 
were originally used to create the tiered system are rendered moot.  
By this logic, all of the other factors in determining suspectness, with the possible 
exception of relevancy, are either lessen in their importance or simply unnecessary. Therefore, 
under this interpretation and reliance on immutability, anybody with any immutable 
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characteristic would be entitled to judicial protection, even for things as trivial as eye color or 
amount of freckles. The easiness of looking at whether or not a trait is immutable has superseded 
the other considerations that the Court must take to the point that the original purposes of judicial 
supervision over rights claims are completely misappropriated. 
Weighing all of the Different Factors 
 Among all of the different factors used by courts in equal protection cases, there is one 
common problem that affects the application of each of these factors. Each of these factors, in 
their own right, require a great amount of weighing of the different considerations on the part of 
the judge. The judge must weigh whether a group has been made politically powerless, or if they 
have been marginalized through social spheres, and how to weigh the importance of those 
different aspects. She must weigh how relevant the trait of the individual is to their ability to 
function in society, or how relevant that trait is to the government purpose aimed to be fulfilled 
in the legislation passed. Within each of these factors, there are many considerations that could 
be interpreted very differently depending on the judge. 
 Now, take that analysis about weighing different aspects of singular factors, and expand 
it to consider all in conjunction with, or competing against, one another. There are so many 
factors that are necessary to review and analyze under the tiered scrutiny doctrine. As such, there 
are so many different ways in which judges can interpret and weigh the importance of the 
different factors. Coupled with the many different factors that judges must weigh is the lack of 
precedent or guidance that would convey how to value the different factors. Individual judges are 
then left to both determine how to properly define each of these factors, and then judge the merit 
of each of them in comparison to the others. 
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 At this point, it may seem as if I am merely articulating the duties of judges, and am 
criticizing the ways in which jurisprudential models and precedents are established. However, 
the potential harms amplify the caution that should be taken within this line of constitutional 
development. In no other area of law are there so many factors that judges must both individually 
measure and simultaneously weigh against each other in the way that has been enumerated for 
these cases. The reason we have not seen such multifaceted judicial doctrines is because it 
prevents clarity for how judges ought follow and apply the law. This consideration has not been 
properly met, and serves to provide the opposite harms that result from a lack of such clarity.  
 Relying on so many subjective factors gives judges a license to make decisions based on 
personal feelings while giving the illusion of grounding that decision in the precedents. The 
system in place has so many different elements that can be taken into account, that it frequently 
goes unnoticed when judges don’t consciously take into account every factor that previous courts 
have deemed necessary. The purpose of strongly following precedent is to provide a check upon 
judges from being able to “legislate from the bench” by effectively making policy decisions from 
their position on the court. However, when the precedent to follow is so extensive and as 
muddled as it is within this area of law, it does precisely the opposite of what it intends to do. 
(Ackerman 1985, 744) By having so many different factors all supported by precedent, then 
almost any justification can be drawn for any decision. A prime example involves laws of gender 
discrimination. There have been many cases in which various judges have all come to 
completely different outcomes, with some finding gender discrimination worthy of strict 
scrutiny, (Frontiero, 1973 others determining that it deserves the lesser form of intermediate 
scrutiny (which it is currently adjudicated under), (Craig, 1976) and some even saying that 
women should not receive any heightened protection at all. (Geduldig v. Aiello dissent, 1974) 
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That is not to say that any of these judges are categorically wrong; actually, it shows quite the 
opposite. This example shows how each judge can come to sound decisions based on the 
available precedent, yet seriously diverge from their colleagues.  
 Furthermore, the weighing of the different elements of equal protection raises issues of a 
new tension of constitutional principles. There are questions as to whether the Court should be 
extending rights to some individuals and not others, which is what judicial protection of 
minorities effectively does, or if the Court should be concerned with rights that can be applied to 
all citizens. The specific precedents enumerated create a tension between these principles. When 
looking at the role of historical discrimination or political powerlessness, the Court seems to 
prefer identity based rights analysis, focusing on the specific groups within society. However, 
through the application of immutability, the Court extends Equal Protection considerations for 
classifications on the whole, as opposed to specific groups, meaning that all are protected from 
discrimination on the basis of their race or gender. This signals that the rights being extended are 
extended to all. This schism in the direction in which the Court directs their rights analysis 
highlights the lack of clarity and depth of understanding that those operating within the judicial 
system genuinely have over the animal that has grown out of the haphazard assortment of cases 
decided. It is due to unresolved issues such as these that I seek to move away from this line of 
penumbra, rather than continue to prop up an ineffective understanding of the law simply 
because others in the past have done so as well.
36
  
                                               
36 I recognize that this may come across as if I am seeking to just disregard all precedents the Court has developed 
simply because I do not care for the way they have handled them. That cannot be further from the truth. As will be 
developed throughout this paper, I am advocating for the search of other constitutional principles to see if there are 
any other potential constitutional violations of homosexual discrimination. Presumably, these other avenues would 
not have nearly as many issues with the penumbral line as does Equal Protection cases possess. I am not seeking to 
change law. Rather I am seeking to find an avenue that provides the most clarity and ease of understanding, which is 
not possible through the 14th Amendment given the way the law had been developed.  
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My purpose in showing the issues of tiered scrutiny is not to propose an entirely different 
alternative. At this point, I am trying to show how the system of tiered scrutiny is a precedent 
that is inefficient and problematic, regardless of the group petitioning the Court seeking equal 
protection. In the next chapter, I will analyze the different ways in which gays specifically have 
tried to use the tiered approach to gain greater judicial protection, and by extension equal rights. I 
will discuss further how the tiered system does not adequately represent gay citizens. Through 
this analysis, I will show how the tiered system does not provide guidance for a clear 
jurisprudential model to clarify the ambiguity about how gays should be protected in the face of 
a discriminatory law. However, in order to show how the tiered system is flawed for gays 
specifically, thus laying the necessary groundwork to introduce a new way to adjudicate such 
laws, it is imperative to show that the entire line of precedence is flawed and should not be 
pursued at all. Otherwise, it makes my arguments vulnerable to the claim that I am merely 
seeking to gain the greatest amount of rights for gay citizens, instead of trying to provide the 
clearest jurisprudential doctrine for judges to easily follow in future cases regarding laws with a 
discriminatory impact upon gays. To effectively counter any potential claim that I am merely 
forging my own unsubstantiated path, I must, and have, clearly articulate the reasons for 
breaking from a precedent that has become strongly rooted but is not so fundamentally essential 
to the decision making processes that it cannot ever be abandoned.   
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Chapter 3 - Equal Protection Law Applied to Sexual Orientation 
As I demonstrated throughout the course of the previous chapter, the precedents that have 
been developed to elucidate the purpose and protections of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
14
th
 Amendment have proven problematic. Even with the great multiplicity of issues that have 
arisen, the strength of the precedents continues to grow, even if it does so haphazardly. It is my 
contention that the entire structure of the interpretation of the 14
th
 Amendment is problematic. 
These issues are especially apparent when trying to answer the question of which tier of scrutiny 
should be applied to sexual orientation classifications. In the previous chapter, I sought to 
demonstrate the extent to which this model is problematic. Throughout this chapter, I intend to 
focus my analysis by looking at sexual orientation within this error-filled model, and highlight 
how any tier applied to gays would be misrepresentative of sexual orientation and the way 
society views this trait.   
  I will explain in detail the cases that the Supreme Court has decided involving the rights 
of those identifying as gay. While the questions posed to the Court differed depending on the 
circumstances of the cases, there was a common theme that ran throughout each of these cases. 
Even though there was a clear need, the Court consistently ducked the question of which level of 
scrutiny to apply to sexual orientation classification. The Court has given unclear precedents in a 
haphazard manner without much direction in how to decide future cases, leaving in its wake a 
plethora of lower court decisions, in which all can be seen as constitutionally legitimate yet are 
highly contradictory. Additionally, I will explain how sexual orientation poses new dilemmas for 
the Court, in that the hardships faced by gays in America do not align with the set of precedents 
that are necessary to grant heightened scrutiny. 
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Sexual Orientation and the Supreme Court 
 As the tiers of scrutiny became more firmly entrenched in the law, different groups were 
formally given different class statuses. Along with many other overlooked minorities, interest 
groups seeking gay rights pursued claims asserting that their right to Equal Protection had been 
violated do to their sexual orientation in ways similar to that of blacks or women, two groups 
who had earned classifications of higher protection (suspect class status for race, quasi-suspect 
class status for gender). The first case pursued by gay rights activists seeking heightened scrutiny 
was Bowers v. Hardwick, decided in 1986, in which a Georgia resident, Michael Hardwick, was 
arrested on the charge of sodomy, due to the police witnessing Hardwick and another male 
engaging in consensual oral sex.
37
 With the aid of notable interest groups, such as the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, (Anderson 
2006, 37) Hardwick claimed that Georgia’s anti-sodomy law discriminated against him on the 
basis of his sexual orientation, because the law was written so that any homosexual sodomy 
would be prosecutable. Any sexual conduct borne out of the identity of one’s sexual orientation 
was discriminating against the underlying identity, which would be a violation of the 14
th
 
Amendment, so Hardwick claimed. It was this identity that was similar to one’s race or one’s 
gender, as it does not rationally relate to one’s ability to contribute to society.  
 However, in a 5-4 decision, the Court determined that it was the conduct that was at issue 
in this case, not the underlying identity of the individuals engaged in the criminalized conduct. 
What is especially notable about the majority opinion was how the ultimate constitutional 
question at issue was whether or not there is a fundamental right allowing individuals to engage 
                                               
37 Sodomy is defined as sexual conduct that does not serve to procreate. This means that individuals are not allowed 
to conduct oral or anal sex under laws banning sodomy. 
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in sodomy.
38
 Writing for the majority, Justice Byron White stated that the “Federal Constitution 
does not confer fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.” (Bowers v. 
Hardwick 1996) Never in the majority opinion are the Equal Protection claims asserted by 
Hardwick given any consideration, demonstrating a clear lack of awareness or care for the 
argument that gays possess an identity which has the effect of causing certain conduct. What 
Hardwick sought was recognition of that identity and a heightened level of judicial protection 
that came with it. With a higher level of protection, gay rights activists wanted for the Court to 
weigh whether the government’s purpose of protecting morality by criminalizing sodomy was 
either compelling (the standard for strict scrutiny) (Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 1995) or 
important (the standard for intermediate scrutiny) (Craig), instead of whether or not it was 
rational (the standard for rational basis review) (Williamson). While he never said so explicitly, 
White’s opinion had strong implications that Georgia was rationally exercising its police power 
in maintaining common standards of decency by enforcing this law. The rational exercise of this 
enumerated power fulfilled a prima facie rational purpose, thereby justifying the constitutional 
legitimacy of the law. (Sunstein 1994, 9)  
 In response to the Court’s holding in Bowers, gay rights activists began pursuing an 
approach to satisfy a prong that they saw as being the key to triggering some form of heightened 
scrutiny: proof of immutability of sexual orientation. (Halley 1994, 511) 14 years earlier, Justice 
Brennan had claimed in Frontiero that immutable traits ought to be protected under a higher 
                                               
38 The relevance of pursuing an answer as to whether or not there was a fundamental right resides within the 14th 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the precedents stemming from this text. The Due Process Clause states that 
“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Among other 
purposes, the Due Process Clause protects the substantive due process rights of citizens through protection of 
unenumerated rights that are essential to functioning within and contributing to the democratic republic. The 
definition of liberty has been interpreted to be viewed as a rational continuum of freedom through which every facet 
of human behavior is safeguarded from arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints. (Griswold v. Connecticut). 
It is through these grounds that the Court justifies its substantive due process holdings.  
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standard because they are not chosen under one’s own volition, yet have been the basis of the 
individual’s marginalization in society. (Frontiero) In trying to follow this precedent, gay rights 
activists figured that the missing lynchpin that would guarantee heightened scrutiny was proof 
that sexual orientation was biologically determined. Known as the search for the “gay gene”, 
activists sought out to demonstrate the biological source of sexual orientation, with varying 
degrees of success.(Halley 1994, 507,512) While some studies prove substantial differences 
between gays and straights,(Balog 2005, 563) the research was far from conclusive in 
definitively proving that orientation was immutable.(Halley 1994, 514)
39
 
 The Bowers decision may have provided an initially unfavorable decision for gay rights 
advocates. After Bowers, gay rights advocates were certainly hampered in their quest to gain 
greater protection under the Equal Protection clause. However, this setback did not mean that the 
legal movement was dead. It only meant new cases, combined with new legal strategies (such as 
proving immutability), were needed to show different forms of discrimination that needed to be 
argued in a court of law. Many cases were argued involving gay rights, both at the federal level 
(Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 1997)
40
 as well as at the 
state level. (Baehr v. Lewin, 1993) However, the Supreme Court didn’t take up the issue of 
sexual orientation discrimination again until 1996, when they granted certiorari
41
 to hear Romer 
                                               
39 I will discuss the search for and the importance of immutability later on within this chapter. In short, there are two 
primary issues with the search for immutability. Firstly, there is no conclusive scientific evidence determining that 
orientation is biologically immutable. Secondly, assuming for the sake of argument that orientation is immutable, 
the established precedents provide a lack of clarity that would allow for heightened scrutiny to be automatically 
applied if the trait were immutable. There must be other considerations taken into account in order to find for the 
application of a heightened tier that work in tandem with immutability of a trait, as opposed to immutability simply 
being a trump card that outweighs all other considerations needed to find for a higher tier of scrutiny 
40 Other federal courts that have decided cases on gay rights include the decisions U.S. Department of Agriculture v. 
Moreno (1973) and Watkins v. U.S. Army (1989) 
41 The definition of granting certiorari means that the Court has agreed to hear and render a decision on a case. Cases 
petition decisions made by lower Courts, yet the Supreme Court does not have to grant certiorari. (In fact, the vast 
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v. Evans. Unlike Bowers, which specifically dealt with sexual conduct, the discrimination present 
in Romer dealt specifically with the identity of sexual orientation. Throughout the early-mid 
1990s, various municipalities across the State of Colorado passed city ordinances that protected 
gays under existing employment discrimination protections. All employment protections 
extended to racial, gender, and age classifications were now extended to sexual orientation. In 
response to this proliferation of equal right expansion, the citizens of Colorado passed a 
statewide referendum known as “Amendment 2” to be added to the State Constitution, which 
prevented any legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government 
that was designed to protect the status of persons based on their “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual 
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.” (Romer) Affirmed with 53% of the vote, the ban 
overturned any local ordinance seeking to protect gays from employment discrimination. 
(Romer) 
 While the facts differed greatly between Romer and Bowers, the ultimate question facing 
the Supreme Court appeared to be fairly similar, as they both forced the Court to consider the 
rights of homosexuals. However, the point at which they differed was in the way gays were 
being targeted by their respective state governments. In Bowers, the Court could avoid the 
question of whether being gay was an identity that one possessed and was fundamental to their 
existence, which would raise larger questions about the discrimination they faced. In Romer, the 
Court had no such avenue to avoid that quandary. There was no question of upholding public 
morals, which was the foundation of the Bowers decision. (Bowers) Amendment 2 specifically 
targeted those who identify as gay, and discriminated on this basis for an area of civic life that 
                                                                                                                                                       
majority of cases are not granted certiorari.) Hereinafter, any references to the term ‘cert’ simply mean certiorari, as 
it is a common shortening in the legal profession. 
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was not related to the way in which they actualized their sexual orientation. While Bowers 
certainly affected the lives of gay citizens, Romer was the first case heard by the Supreme Court 
that required a real analysis about whether sexual orientation was an element of one’s identity. 
This question about the understandings of orientation naturally led to analysis about whether 
discrimination on this identity was discrimination against a form of personhood, as opposed to 
regulation of conduct, which was the ultimate issue in Bowers.  
 In reviewing the decision of the Colorado State Supreme Court, which found that 
Amendment 2 was unconstitutional and that gays should be protected under strict scrutiny,
42
 
(Romer) the majority opinion, written by Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy, came to the same 
result but adopted a different rationale. Rather than determined that gays are protected by a 
higher form of scrutiny, Kennedy found Amendment 2 unconstitutional under rational basis 
review. Writing about a basic reading of the Equal Protection Clause, Kennedy stated that “if 
constitutional conception of “equal protection of the laws” means anything, it must at the very 
least mean that a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate 
governmental interest.” (Romer) Having made the determination that animus against a group of 
persons cannot be considered a legitimate government interest, he determined that the State of 
Colorado did not possess a rational motivation that achieved a legitimate state objective. Given a 
lack of a legitimate purpose, the Court was given no reason to uphold the Amendment. (Romer)
43
  
                                               
42 Romer v. Evans; stating that “the State Supreme Court held that Amendment 2 was subject to strict scrutiny under 
the Fourteenth Amendment because it infringed the fundamental right of gays and lesbians to participate in the 
political process.” 
43 The primary justification for the Amendment provided by the state was that it sought to maintain equality among 
all citizens by not creating special privileges for certain individuals that were not extended to all. The provision 
protecting gays, according to the state, served to give special protections that their straight counterparts would not 
have access to. Therefore, the Amendment was passed to ensure that equality for all individuals, regardless of their 
sexual orientation. The majority did not endorse this analysis, claiming that Amendment Two allowed for 
discrimination to occur against gays (as gays would be exponentially more likely to be discriminated against on the 
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 Seven years later, the Court heard another homosexual sodomy case very similar to what 
they heard in 1986 in Bowers when they granted cert in the case Lawrence v. Texas. After a night 
of socializing, Michael Lawrence and Tyron Garner decided to spend the night together, during 
which they engaged in consensual sexual activity, including oral and anal sex. Having received a 
false notification alleging violence at Lawrence’s residence, the police arrived to find Lawrence 
and Garner engaged in said consensual sexual activity. They were both arrested under the 
“homosexual conduct” provision of the Texas anti-sodomy law. In response to their arrests, they 
filed suit claiming their 14
th
 Amendment rights had been violated, namely their Due Process 
Right to liberty and their right to Equal Protection. (Lawrence) The case, both in the facts and the 
legal questions being asked, was almost parallel to Bowers v. Hardwick. The only real difference 
between the cases was that the Texas law was written to target gays, (Lawrence) while the 
Georgia law was disproportionately enforced against gays, even though it criminalized all 
sodomy, regardless of the genders of the participants. (Bowers)  
 In a 6-3 opinion, Justice Kennedy again wrote for the majority, finding that Texas’s law 
criminalizing sodomy violated Lawrence’s privacy rights, enumerated under the liberty provision 
of the Due Process Clause. Claiming that privacy had a well-established history as a fundamental 
right,
44
 Kennedy wrote that “liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how 
to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.” (Lawrence) What the decision did not 
do was establish a clear understanding about the way in which to adjudicate sexual orientation 
under the tiers of scrutiny. Instead of making that determination, Justice Kennedy affirmed that 
                                                                                                                                                       
basis of their sexual orientation), as opposed to ensuring equality for all citizens and not allowing for preferences of 
certain citizens over others.  
44 Cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), Roe v. Wade (1973), and Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters (1925), among others, have entrenched the right to privacy in the history of the Court’s decisions. 
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the holding in Romer was correct, but did not apply in this case.
45
 The questions posed to the 
Court by Lawrence did not require a decision on Equal Protection grounds. Rather, the decision 
could be made through another avenue, that of Due Process. Because all the Court needs is one 
justification in order to come to some legitimate rationale, Kennedy decided that the fundamental 
issue facing the Court was whether Lawrence’s privacy rights had been violated. This decision to 
focus on privacy rendered questions about the tier to be applied to gays and equal protection 
purposes moot. (Lawrence) 
 This past June, the Supreme Court heard and decided the famed marriage cases of the last 
term, U.S. v. Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry.
46
 In U.S. v. Windsor, female New York 
resident Edie Windsor sued the federal government claiming discrimination on the basis of her 
sexual orientation.  Windsor had been married to Thea Spyer, another female New York resident, 
and their marriage had been recognized as valid by the State of New York. (U.S. v. Windsor, 
2013) The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which stated that “the word 'marriage' means only 
a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers 
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife,” prevented equal recognition of 
their marriage. (H.R. 3396, 1006) Even though the states were entitled to create their own 
definitions of what constituted marriage, DOMA prevented any federal recognition of the states’ 
definitions and instead relied upon its own definition of marriage. (H.R. 3396, 1006) As such, 
lawfully wed same-sex couples did not receive many of the same financial benefits as their 
                                               
45 The circumstances of Romer that made the Equal Protection determination needed was due to the identity of 
orientation needing protecting, as opposed to the conduct, which was at issue in Lawrence 
46  While both cases had far reaching impacts, only U.S. v. Windsor is relevant to my research in this note. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry reestablished gay marriage in California. However, it did so on standing grounds, meaning 
that petitioners defending the law did not have standing to bring the suit because they had not been directly harmed. 
While the ramifications going forward as to how standing is determined for laws passed by ballot initiative, it is an 
area in which I am not concerned for the purposes of this thesis.  
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straight counterparts. It was on this basis that Windsor filed suit, as she claimed she was forced 
to pay estate taxes on her deceased wife’s estate that she would not have had to pay had she been 
widowed by a husband instead of by a wife.  
 On the last day of the Court’s session, the Court announced it had found in favor of 
Windsor, rendering section 3 of DOMA (the section creating a federal definition of marriage) 
unconstitutional on Equal Protection grounds. Once again, the Court refused to clearly establish 
the level of scrutiny applied, and did not definitively state what tier other courts are bound to 
when adjudicating  cases with similar constitutional questions. All the Court did was reaffirm the 
principle established in Romer, stating that “the Constitution's guarantee of equality ‘must at the 
very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot’ 
justify disparate treatment of that group.” (Windsor) Furthermore, they reiterated the principle 
that animus directed towards a certain group cannot be the basis for justifying a law’s legitimacy. 
Like in Romer, the Court found the motivations of the legislature who passed DOMA to be borne 
out of animus and not some other interest in achieving a legitimate state aim. 
 Again, similar to the criticisms of the Romer  and Lawrence decisions, what is most 
notable about Windsor is what was not addressed. It is not clear what standard lower courts 
should follow going forward. This is especially problematic when considering that the lower 
court, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals came to the same ultimate result, yet it found that 
gays were entitled to intermediate scrutiny. (Windsor v. U.S., 2012) The District Court decision 
also came to the same ultimate result, but did so under rational basis review. (Windsor v. U.S. 
Dis., 2012)
47
 Typically, when lower courts have split decisions or rationales, the Supreme Court 
                                               
47 The three levels of judicial review are the District Court, The Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court. Unless 
granted special circumstances, all federal cases go through these three different Courts, assuming they are granted 
cert.  
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seeks to resolve the paradox that was created in the opposing decisions. Instead of seeking to 
clarify exactly what standard was to be applied, the Court stated that rational basis review could 
be applied. It did not say that it had to be applied. What is clear is that the Court did not claim 
the Second Circuit was wrong in finding gays to be entitled to intermediate scrutiny. All that was 
stated was that the law would be found unconstitutional under rational basis review. Without an 
explicit rejection of the Second Circuit’s rationale, it is unclear if gays residing within the 
Second Circuit’s jurisdiction are entitled to intermediate scrutiny while all other gays across the 
country are still only protected by rational basis review, or if the Second Circuit was wrong in 
their analysis. All that was said was that this case required rational basis review, not that gays 
were entitled to rational basis review.  
The problem with this is that until the Supreme Court decides to establish a standard, it 
creates a precedent for lower courts to come to their own determinations without any recourse,. 
This means that the federal government, through the judicial system, treats citizens with exactly 
the same characteristics as fundamentally different based on their location of residence.
48
 This is 
problematic because the purpose of the federal court system is to make areas of law clearer for 
the other branches of government and the general public. By allowing different federal courts to 
make different determinations regarding the status of gays, instead of clearly laying out how 
those lower courts should proceed, individuals are consistently left in a state of flux without clear 
understanding of the law. This is especially problematic for Equal Protection precedence, as this 
                                               
48  This is especially problematic for the federal government, as the federal government is one entity that is 
advantaging and disadvantaging some citizens over others based purely on where they happen to live. While it 
would appear that this is the exact same problem with maintaining states’ rights, there are larger interests in 
protecting the rights of different states to act autonomously (greater forms of representation, ease of extending and 
protecting rights due to a smaller scope of persons to represent, etc) that ultimately outweighs the need for equal 
application of law to all citizens. The federal government, on the other hand, does not have a countervailing purpose 
to allow for disparate treatment of citizens based on location of residence.  
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area of law is already so reliant on judges’ subjectivity, as was discussed in chapter two. With so 
many factors in determining level of scrutiny under the judge’s discretion, unequal application of 
the law only serves to complicate the issue further, doing the exact opposite of what should be 
occurring.   
The Windsor decision left open the question about what tier should be applied for 
discrimination of gays. However, even if one were to interpret that rational basis review must be 
adhered to, it is also not clear whether or not rational basis review has been followed in the way 
that it has been traditionally understood, or if Romer’s definition of rational basis review, which 
is considerably different than traditional rational basis review ought to be applied. In theory and 
practice, rational basis review has been highly deferential to the government. All that is needed is 
for the government to  prove that in order to be “valid under equal protection clause, a law must 
bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.” (Cleburne) What this has 
meant is that all the government must do is prove that they have a rational purpose to achieve a 
legitimate interest. As long as it does that, then any equal protection claim cannot outweigh the 
government purpose. (Sunstein 1993, 4) However, with Kennedy stating that animus cannot be 
the justification for any law, he is implying that a higher tier is in effect. Such can be rightfully 
implied because animus for a group can have a rational purpose that achieves a legitimate 
government end.(Smith 2005, 2806) When looking at the example of DOMA, animus against 
gays was the motivator for the passage of the law. Yet the government could say that the law 
raised tax revenues because fewer individuals receive tax breaks. Raising capital would appear to 
be a legitimate interest of the government. (Windsor) Furthermore, if traditional rational basis 
review is not to be followed and the Romer decision is to be followed, does that mean that the 
analysis borne out of that decision holds precedent for future groups making equal protection 
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claims? Are the old tiers and factors to determine tiers being rendered obsolete? Or has a new 
tier been introduced similar to the way the Court introduced intermediate scrutiny to protect 
gender? The complete lack of clarity about the direction the Court intends to pursue is glaring, 
and continues to go unfixed. This has the effect of creating a strange hybridization of the 
different tiers without delineating why certain elements of each tier are present in the 
rationalization of the decision. Without this clarity, the precedent can be interpreted and applied 
in so many different ways, resulting in decisions that are wholly contradictory. Even with 
contradictory decisions, each can be seen as legitimate when understood within the context to the 
guidance that the Court has provided.  
These lower courts have understandably lacked a sense of direction on how to proceed in 
cases calling upon similar questions. This claim about the lack of clarity is not one only rooted in 
academia. It has already begun to happen to lower courts. Some courts have patterned their 
decisions within the new form of rational basis review created specifically for gays (Kansas v. 
Limon, 2005), claiming that there existed a level of animus directed at gays that violated the 14
th
 
Amendment. However, other courts read the decisions as holding gays to rational basis review in 
the way it was previously understood, merely looking for a rational purpose to achieve a 
legitimate government end. (Schroeder v. Hamilton School District, 2002) Without the Supreme 
Court clarifying exactly how to interpret, lower courts have no definitive precedent to follow. 
(Smith 2005, 2807) 
In these conflicting forms of rational basis review, the issue of what becomes a rational 
purpose for achieving a legitimate state interest becomes highly murky, to say the least. (Ludwig 
2006, 519) For many judges, there are rational purposes for upholding laws with a discriminatory 
impact against gays. More specifically, the consistent line of analysis defending forms of 
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discrimination against gays is that the state is exercising its police power that allows it to uphold 
public morals of decency. (Massey 2005, 961)
49
 It was this argument of protecting morality that 
was used to justify restrictions on pornography, even though those restrictions constituted a First 
Amendment violation on the right to free speech. Traditionally, the Court has protected the 
individual’s First Amendment rights much more fervently than they have for individuals who are 
members of classes protected only by rational basis review for their equal protection claims. 
Even with a greater awareness for protecting the right of the individual, protecting morality is 
still seen as a legitimate government interest for First Amendment. If the Court is willing to find 
morality to be a compelling enough point to restrict a basic right of individuals that has been 
accorded very strong protection, then it is very reasonable to believe that upholding standards of 
morality that discriminate against groups viewed under rational basis review would be allowed. 
This point is not just a logical conclusion drawn through academic research. It was the 
accepted justification in deciding Bowers, as Justice White claimed that the “presumed belief of 
majority of Georgia electorate that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable provided 
rational basis for Georgia's sodomy statute.” (Bowers) For many courts, protecting historical 
norms that have been proven to allow for stability are justifiable reasons for upholding bans 
against gay citizens, as there is no pattern demonstrating that society will remain stable in the 
way in which it has when the only recognized relationships are of the heterosexual nature. 
(Ludwig 2006, 534)  The strength of the argument for protecting the morality of society varies 
                                               
49 Police power is a privilege extended to the states through the 10th Amendment that allows them to enforce laws 
for the betterment of the health, safety, morality, and general welfare of the citizens of that state. The Court has used 
this provision to justify a state’s decision to pass laws restricting certain actions that would harm the morality of the 
community. The most notable example of the Court recognizing its police powers is through the Court’s analysis of 
the state’s restrictions upon pornography, in which they weighed the autonomy states should have in protecting the 
morals of the community in comparison to the rights of the individual to freely dispense a form of speech. (Roth v. 
U.S  (1957); Miller v. California (1973)) 
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greatly among courts. It is presumed that Kennedy and the Supreme Court’s majority did not 
endorse this view of morality. (Ludwig 2006, 518) However, there are many courts that have 
claimed that the protection of heteronormativity as a moral one is so strong, it would be reason 
enough to uphold laws discriminating against gays even if gays were protected under 
intermediate scrutiny. (Lofton v. Secretary of Dept. of Children and Family Services, 2008)  
Problems within Precedents for Equal Protection 
 One of the primary reasons that the Court has  been unwilling to assign a tier of scrutiny 
to gays that are necessary to fulfill are highly problematic because gays do not fit many of the 
qualifications previously implemented into the precedence, making it difficult to justify 
heightened scrutiny when they are analyzed within the context of the precedents. Gays have also 
experienced different forms of hardship than other minority groups that is not reflected in the 
current model used for Equal Protection analysis. Much of this can be attributed to the nature of 
sexual orientation. Due to the differences between sexual orientation and traits such as race or 
gender, the understanding of the identity as well as the discrimination stemming from that 
identity marginalizes gays in different ways than it marginalized women or blacks, for example. 
Given these differences, the current factors are not established to represent these differences, 
even if those differences have produced additional harms not experienced by other classifications 
afforded a higher tier. In this section, I will articulate both where gays do not meet established 
criteria, and how the law’s established criteria does not reflect the nature of being gay and the 
hardships experienced by gays. The culmination of this will be to demonstrate that the way the 
Equal Protection Clause has been understood and applied does not properly equip the Court to 
render a sound decision on how to understand discrimination of sexual orientation. 
Binder  69 
 
The Nature of Orientation 
 Since Justice Stone articulated in Carolene Products that in order to receive suspect class 
status, a minority must be both discrete and insular, the Court has continued to adhere to these 
qualifications. This is in spite of the fact that being discrete and insular does not provide any 
clear causation for discrimination, or even a correlation of a pattern of discrimination.
50
  When 
attempting to understand  gays under this definition, two main problems arise. First, it is 
incredibly difficult to determine whether gays are to be considered discrete and insular. Second, 
the issue arises that being discrete and insular provides benefits that the opposite qualifications, 
anonymity and diffuseness, do not. If this is true, then being discrete and insular is actually a 
benefit, and not an impediment, to equality. 
 When examining the discreteness of homosexuality, there have been a multitude of 
different interpretations regarding how gays should be understood in this context. Some courts 
have claimed that gays are discrete. (Nabozny v. Podlesny, 1996) Consequently, there have been 
many to say that because orientation is not visibly apparent, the trait should be considered 
anonymous. It is not something that is easily discernible simply by looking at a person in the way 
race or gender are easily discernible. (Ackerman 1985, 729) This debate elucidates the issue with 
discreteness: how is it both measured and applied? In Nabozny v. Podlesny, which posed the 
question whether a school’s lack of protection of a student who was bullied on the basis of his 
sexual orientation was permissible, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals said that being gay is 
clearly identifiable. This is demonstrated through discrimination passed in retaliation to the 
                                               
50 I recognize that being discrete and insular can be the basis for discrimination, as it most certainly was for blacks, 
as the basis of the discrimination was an obvious characteristic (skin tone) and the discrimination created segregated 
communities that made it difficult to affect real change because of a lack of interaction with their oppressors. 
(Balog, 556) However, simply because these characteristics were the basis of discrimination against blacks does not 
mean they establish a clear model for all discriminated groups and the characteristics that caused the discrimination.  
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visibility of gay citizens, and that the student (Nabozny) was discriminated against because his 
orientation was identifiable. (Nabozny) While this analysis may be applicable for understanding 
some discrimination against some individuals, it does not properly cover all who identify as 
some orientation that faces discrimination. If Nabozny had chosen to hide his sexual orientation 
and stayed within the metaphorical closet, would he no longer be seen as identifiable, and 
therefore not entitled to protection? 
 The case of Nabozny v. Podlesny provides a perfect example of how orientation cannot 
be considered discrete for all individuals. The discreteness of orientation relies on two basic 
formulations that would demonstrate open expression of sexuality. One could publicly recognize 
their sexual orientation and disseminate that information among their social and professional 
communities, or one could demonstrate qualities that are commonly associated with being gay, 
such as having a particular sense of fashion or possessing an inflection in one’s voice.51 In these 
instances, being gay can be seen as discrete, and the discreteness of these instances can indeed 
lead to discrimination.  
 The issue here is not that gays can be discrete. It is that not all gays are discrete. Many 
gays either hide their orientation from the rest of society or do not act in a way that would allow 
for others to assume that they are gay. (Yoshino 1998, 509) Among gay persons, when the 
individual recognizes this about themselves varies greatly depending on the person, with some 
                                               
51 Through this point, I want to make it clear that I am not saying the reliance on stereotypes is legitimate, accurate, 
or acceptable. The point I am trying to illustrate, however, is that when individuals in society make assumptions or 
claims that an individual is gay without direct confirmation from that person or a trusted source who definitively 
confirms this to be true, such stereotypes are used to provide the justification to the belief that someone would 
identify as gay. It is these stereotypes that are discrete, and in some instances can be used to discriminate against 
others. I do not mean to say that any individual who dresses in a certain manner or has a particular vocal inflection is 
gay, nor am I saying that those who do not dress in a way would be stereotypically categorized as gay are 
automatically straight. However, in some instances, these discrete understandings of being gay, regardless of their 
accuracy, are present in society and used for discrimination shows that there can be an element of discreteness. The 
fact that these stereotypes do not apply to everyone proves the issue with relying on discreteness altogether, as I will 
discussed further throughout the body of this chapter.  
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claiming they have known they were gay from early elementary school to others not recognizing 
that aspect of themselves until the end of their life. Now, among this population, not all will 
make their sexuality public upon recognition, with many waiting many years to publicize that 
aspect of themselves, and some not ever publicly affirming their true sexual orientation. The 
nature of sexual orientation allows individuals to be anonymous and not live openly and 
therefore make them unable to become discrete. (Yoshino 1996, 1778)  
 The reasons for staying anonymous and not publicly acknowledging one’s sexuality are 
not particularly difficult to understand. Because of widespread vitriol and codified laws 
discriminating against gays, many do not want to experience potential professional, economic, or 
social marginalization and hardship. (Sunstein 1994, 8) So, instead of putting oneself in positions 
to be subjected to that form of bigotry, they choose to stay anonymous. This does not mean that 
that individual is not being subjected to discrimination. It only means that the society that is 
enforcing said discrimination doesn’t know its exact targets. However, just because the 
oppressive majority cannot pinpoint the exact individuals they are discriminating against does 
not mean that the individuals subjected to that discrimination, even if they are subjected to it 
privately, are not harmed by the discrimination. (Ackerman 1985, 729) Equal Protection is still 
not extended to those individuals. The only difference between gays and members of discrete 
classifications is that every individual of a discrete class being discriminated against can be 
identified. This skews what it means to be marginalized, because the basis is not the 
marginalization itself, but the ability for the majority to be able to identify every member of the 
minority that they are discriminating against. The fact that the majority can’t locate all who are 
being marginalized does not take away from the existence of that marginalization. The 
precedents established, however, do not allow for this consideration to be taken into account 
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given the current established precedents and reliance on these precedents that place a premium 
on discreteness. 
 The second way in which an individual can be discrete is by possessing and displaying 
characteristics that many would attribute to homosexuality. The problem with doing so and 
relying on stereotypes to determine discreteness is that they are wholly misrepresentative. Not all 
individuals who identify as gay possess qualities that would allow them to be pinpointed as gay. 
By relying on discreteness, activists have sought to fit orientation within this paradigm. The 
question that arises is should this form of discreteness be recognized. And if it is, then would 
gays who do not embody the stereotypes traditionally associated with that form of sexuality, and 
thereby remain facially anonymous, not be considered worthy of heightened scrutiny? The 
reliance on discreteness, and lack of recognition of the ways anonymity can be applied, 
demonstrates how the law does not provide clear ways to interpret how to understand gays.  
 The other issue with discreteness is that there are benefits conferred to minorities that are 
discrete that may not necessarily be afforded to those who can be anonymous. In being discrete, 
all individuals as part of that group can easily mobilize together to achieve political and social 
change, as it is easier to know who to mobilize. (Ackerman 1985, 735) However, with gays 
having the ability to remain anonymous, it affects others who do seek to make their orientation 
public and want equal rights for themselves regardless of their orientation.(Yoshino 1996, 1778) 
In many ways, it is even more harmful that in order for gays to build coalitions to gain political 
change through legislative channels, all individuals must be forthcoming with that information 
about themselves. This is a premise that we have seen simply does not happen, as the 
metaphorical closet still holds many gays inside its confines to this day.(Yoshino 1996, 729) 
Absent this coalition building and consistently effective change to law, the need to recognize the 
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anonymity associated with being gay is absolutely necessary, yet the precedents not only do not 
recognize it, but they place a premium on the opposite quality. What can be taken from this 
dichotomy is that the precedents are rife with error and signal that something is fundamentally 
wrong.  
 When looking at the other quality of minorities that the Court has placed importance 
upon, insularity, there are similar issues arising with this concept to that of discreteness. Having 
insularity can allow for benefits that the antithesis, diffuseness, does not allow for. (Ackerman 
1985, 732) This applies aptly for gays. Gay citizens are not born into insular, self-determined 
communities in the way that racial communities naturally form. Individual nuclear families can 
and do have both gay and straight members. Gay persons can be born anywhere across the 
country into any home, regardless of the political affiliations or attitudes towards gay persons of 
the parents. (Halley 1986, 936) As such, there is not a natural gay community that exists that all 
who identify as such can become a part of without consciously seeking it out. The time and effort 
required for gays to mobilize is much more difficult than members of a similar race, because 
gays are much more spread out, which only adds to the issue of anonymity. This would lead to 
the natural conclusion that diffuseness actually acts as an obstacle to attaining political power, 
instead of a trait that can spur influence. However, the precedents are clearly aligned to not 
recognize diffuseness and instead search for the presence of insularity, which can hold many 
benefits in terms of political mobilization, as a factor in granting heightened scrutiny.  
 The thinking that insularity actually confers some benefits and should not be a 
qualification in finding for heightened scrutiny has been considered by Courts, most notably by 
Justice Antonin Scalia in his Romer dissent. While far from a conclusive understanding, Scalia 
claimed that gays were insular, he then stated that as such they had the ability to demonstrate 
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their political power, as they could mobilize and use collective resources to affect political 
change. (Romer) By being insular, Scalia claims that gays have strong political power and 
therefore do not need judicial protection, because of their insularity and the benefits conferred by 
this trait of the group. Scalia’s interpretation serves to highlight the problems with the 
application of tiers of scrutiny to new groups deserving judicial protection. Through Scalia’s 
interpretation, gays are to be seen as insular. That factor would appear to positively affect 
analysis about whether they should be awarded heightened protection. The other option the Court 
could take would be to find that or the Court could now say that being insular now allows for 
benefits that do not actually provide a need for judicial protection. (Romer) The problem with 
these options, assuming for the moment that gays are indeed insular, is that the Court either 
makes a claim that many would interpret as being untrue, (Halley 1994, 509) or the Court would 
be changing the standards for equal protection simply based on convenience and ease of 
adjudication for the particular case in front of them. If the Court can now claim that certain 
factors should not become a part of equal protection analysis, then it gives license to disregard 
other precedents and undermines the consistency that the court values so much. 
 Measuring Discrimination Against Gays  
 The one constant among Equal Protection precedence is that the Court has always 
recognized some form of prejudice directed towards groups that are ultimately given heightened 
protection. The basis of this reasoning is simple: the Court seeks to protect groups if it has been 
demonstrated that their rights cannot be insured absent the judicial branch’s involvement. 
(Constitutionals Status 1980, 1301) However, that is the extent of the shared commonality 
among all equal protection cases. As explained in more detail in Chapter Two, the way that the 
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Court measures prejudice leveled against a group is manifested in two forms: historical 
discrimination and political powerlessness of the group.  
 Before understanding how to reconcile these two different forms of prejudice, it is 
important to recognize the faults of each of these different factors when applied to gays. The 
nature of anonymity undertaken by many gay citizens contributes to the difficulty in trying to 
assess the extent of historical discrimination that gays faced. (Yoshino 1996, 1798) Historically, 
there was not much specific codified legislation that targeted gays until the 1990s, when local, 
state, and federal legislatures passed many anti-gay laws.(Constitutional Status 1980, 1307) 
However, the absence of discriminatory legislation does not necessarily mean that gays weren’t 
being discriminated against. Exercising a sexuality that ran counter to the heteronormative norms 
was not necessarily criminalized or made illegal, but the social pressures to live within those 
heteronormative bounds kept gays in the closet (Ackerman 1985, 731). The fear of ostracization, 
professionally and personally, motivated many gays to keep silent about their true sexual 
orientation. Because of the strong social pressures and widely accepted forms of animus against 
gays, there was no need for the legislature to pass laws to ensure the marginalization of gays, 
because society effectively did so on its own. (Ludwig 2006, 515)  
 The issue with trying to measure past discrimination is that there are so few objective 
methods to measure it. (Ludwig 2006, 552) One of the best and most relied upon methods is 
through analysis of the proliferation of legislation that prevented gays from accessing rights and 
privileges to the same degree as their straight counterparts. So, if the Court were to primarily 
look at discriminatory legislation, then there would be a case to be made that gays have been 
subjected to a number of different prejudices enforced by all levels of government, ranging from 
local municipalities to the U.S. Congress. However, what is important to recognize is what 
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prompted said legislation to be enacted in the first place. The anti-gay majority that had existed 
for so long was finally being challenged consistently and effectively by gay rights activists, who 
were finding more success through both legislative
52
 and judicial (Baehr v. Lewin, 1993) means 
to advance their causes. As a response to the threat that gays would be successful in gaining 
greater recognition and dismantling of the discrimination they faced, anti-gay forces sought to 
codify many of the long standing traditions of heteronormativity. As such, the 1990s saw a large 
spike in bills passed that had the intent of discriminating against gays, ranging from lack of 
extension of tax benefits for gay couples to marriage restrictions. Gays were subjected to great 
anti-gay animus in the form of legislative marginalization. The paradox created by the legislative 
developments of the 1990s was, and continues to be, troubling for the Court. (Rush 2008, 714) 
Quite simply, the Court could recognize the legislation as discriminatory and use it as evidence 
that historical discrimination occurred, thus justifying a primary factor in finding for some form 
of heightened scrutiny for gays. Looking more closely at that legislation highlights the fact that 
the great influx of discriminatory laws passed were in response to greater political influence and 
mobilization around the platform of expansion of rights for gays. (Rush 2008, 712) So, if the 
Court were to use this legislation as justification, then it would effectively be claiming that only 
when gays began to grow and gain more political power are they now more entitled to 
protection. This is problematic for two reasons. First, it established the precedents that groups are 
only entitled to protection when they begin to become politically powerful, but not so powerful 
that they can be successful through typical political avenues. By this logic, gays would have had 
to overcome the discrimination on their own to a small extent before they were entitled to 
                                               
52 Some examples include the ordinances passed in Colorado cities Denver and Boulder ensuring equal protection of 
gays, and the wide expansion of employment protections in states such as Massachusetts, California, and New York. 
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judicial protection. This is highly problematic, because the purpose of judicial intervention and 
protection is to ensure that those most marginalized are given fair opportunities to exercise their 
enumerated rights, be it political, social, economic, or any other right. (Siegal 2006, 402) Under 
the precedents established, the most marginalized would not be the ones most protected. It is 
simply the ones with the most codified legislation specifically targeting them, which does not 
directly correlate to the historical discrimination faced by the group in the way the Court would 
have it.  
The second reason that recognizing prejudice through legislation that was only passed in 
response to greater mobilization around gay rights is that it contradicts the other prong of 
measuring prejudice levied against gays: political powerlessness. As this time period saw a rise 
in political power for gays, this would signal a need for less judicial intervention, not more of it. 
This demonstrates one of the issues with relying on political powerlessness as a factor in 
determining when and how to apply heightened scrutiny. In order to satisfy the prong of 
historical discrimination, one must undermine the evidence for demonstrating the political 
powerlessness of the group. This chasm shows the discontinuity in applying the two standards in 
accordance with each other, as they only undermine the opposite and thereby give way to 
inaccurate and misleading conclusions.  
Outside of the apparent schism between the two prongs demonstrating prejudice, there 
are other fundamental issues with measuring political powerlessness when applied to gays and 
the history of gay rights. As is common with almost all social movements, as groups mobilize in 
greater numbers and find new ways to convey their message, the natural effect is that new 
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conversations are had and opinions are changed. This can act both positively and negatively.
53
 
Regardless of whether the attitudes changed are beneficial or harmful to a movement, the simple 
existence of attitudinal shifts demonstrates the lack of constancy in support for positions, and 
thereby demonstrates a lack of consistency in the political power behind certain platforms. 
Given that there are natural shifts in attitude regarding different political positions and 
that these attitudinal shifts strongly correlate to political capital, the Court must face a large 
paradox that needs to be resolved. Remember that once the Court determines a level of scrutiny, 
that tier is effectively binding for all future cases. The paradox is that the Court is applying a 
long-lasting precedent based on a factor that has been proven to change so frequently. What then 
happens is that it would seem arbitrary when the Court decides to award suspect or quasi-suspect 
class status because that determination was based on an ever-changing factor. One could 
convincingly argue that it would have made the most sense to award heightened scrutiny in the 
90s, when there was a proliferation of anti-gay legislation passed, and the political might of gays 
was weaker. (Ludwig 2006, 518) However, gays have seen many legislative victories over the 
past decade or so, rapidly seeing the expansion of marriage equality in states across the country, 
among many other victories.
54
 Therefore, it would appear as if gays now need this protection less 
than they did 20 years ago. With the Court using this as a factor, it gives them the license to 
never give a determination of the need for heightened scrutiny, because they can always call 
                                               
53 Examples where increased awareness and conversation that have led to positive impacts for the group seeking to 
highlight those conversations include blacks, women, and even gays. On the other hand, greater religious 
consciousness has had the effect of putting religious teachings, especially evangelical Christianity, in an increasingly 
negative light. Regardless of what the shifting attitudes are , the fact that these attitudes do shift and do gain and lose 
support proves a lack of constancy in political powerlessness, which is premised upon the support one has for their 
desired political outcomes.   
54 16 states now recognize full marriage equality for same sex couples, with Hawaii and Illinois both being ratified 
within the past month. The military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” provision preventing gays from serving openly in any 
branch of the United States military was repealed.  The Employment Non-Discrimination Act was also recently 
brought to the House floor after six years of not being proposed.  
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upon the argument of the lack of need for judicial intervention due to the changing political 
climate around these issues. This is problematic because it makes the entire system of tiered 
scrutiny completely arbitrary, in the sense that it is up to the Court when they decide that judicial 
intervention must become binding and ignore the developments of political movements, or that 
political movements outweigh the need for judicial decision-making.
55
 When specifically applied 
to gays, the court has been unwilling to recognize the need for judicial protection and has made 
claims that gays are politically powerful and can impact legislation without extra protection. 
(Windsor) This is inconsistent with how the Court has understood political powerlessness in the 
past, especially when compared to women. The natural conclusion is that the Court is allowed 
the opportunity to make political decisions about identity politics and justifying them in legal 
precedence. 
Another difficulty of measuring the political power of gays is due to the way gays have 
formed communities. As is rather obvious, there are areas of the country that are both more 
accepting of gays and have seen a larger concentration of gay citizens, be it families or singles. 
(Ludwig 2006, 554) For instance, areas such as San Francisco, Northwestern states (Oregon, 
Washington), and New England cities, to name a few, have demonstrated much higher levels of 
acceptance for gays,
56
 and that has been reflected both in the number of gays who live in those 
areas and the legislative protections extended to gays. However, not all areas are like San 
                                               
55 The Court has proven that they are prone to this exact form of arbitrariness regarding when they do and do not 
apply heightened scrutiny. In the early 1970s, the National Organization for Women began a campaign to pass what 
they called the Equal Rights Amendment which would ensure “equality of rights under the law shall not be denied 
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.” (Equal Rights Amendment Text) After 
receiving the requisite number of votes in both the House and Senate, the amendment later failed when being voted 
on by the individual state legislatures. However, what is important here is that women demonstrated that they had 
great political power, going so far as to be on the brink of passing an amendment to the Constitution ensuring their 
equal rights. Even so, they still were recognized as deserving intermediate scrutiny, even though they had 
demonstrated that they wielded a great deal of political capital, and were thereby not powerless. (Brown 1971) 
56 San Francisco’s estimated gay population is at 15.4%, Seattle’s gay population is at 12.9%, while Boston’s is at 
12.3%. The national percentage of self-identifying gay citizens is about 3.4% of the nation’s electorate. (Gates 2006) 
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Francisco or Seattle. There are many areas of the country that are much more hostile towards 
homosexuality, and as a result, there are far fewer (openly) gay citizens residing in these areas. 
(Yoshino 1996, 1804) Due to a lack of gay acceptance and gay population in those communities, 
gays who do live there are much less likely to have political capital and influence to access 
typical legislative channels to prevent discrimination than do gays who live in more progressive 
areas. (Ackerman 1985, 730) This begs the question as to which situation should the Court look 
to when deciding political powerlessness. Does it recognize those who are the worse off and 
have the least political power, or does it recognize that in many areas gays live almost equally to 
their straight counterparts and have great influence in their regions? The disparate amounts of 
power in different areas of the country presents a large quandary for the Court in terms of 
understanding how to measure the political power of the group as a whole. Such a factor creates 
different circumstances and different burdens in protecting people who possess the same trait 
that is being discriminated against, and only differ due to the location of residence.  
The Question of Immutability 
 Unlike many of the factors used in Equal Protection jurisprudence, immutability was not 
introduced in footnote four of Carolene as an element in finding suspect class status. Rather, the 
first time it was formally introduced was in Frontiero, in which Justice William Brennan wrote 
that the factor was necessary for finding suspect class status, as an individual was being punished 
by their government based on a characteristic that was a part of their identity but they had no 
control over. (Frontiero) The definition was further clarified in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke, in which the Court stated that immutability is one which “its possessors are 
powerless to escape or set aside.” (Bakke) 
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Given the Court’s position on immutability, gays have tried extensively to find 
orientation to be immutable, to varying degrees of success. Many researchers have found strong 
correlations affirming the belief that one’s orientation is outside of the individual’s control, 
coming to many determinations that orientation is immutable, grounded in biology, psychology, 
and genetics.
57
 However, even with much data that would suggest that orientation is determined 
by some outside influence independent of the choice of an individual, the data is not conclusive. 
There is no consensus among the scientific community that definitively states that orientation is 
immutable. (Halley 1994, 516) Without this consensus, courts have been unwilling to root their 
decisions in a determination that orientation is immutable, thus allowing them to find that gays 
are entitled to strict scrutiny. The Court does not want to establish precedents that bind their 
action for the future on a rationale that could become obsolete due to continued scientific 
research. (Constitutional Status 1985, 1302) When looking at the scientific studies regarding 
immutability of orientation, they continue to proliferate and new theories are tested and 
contributed to the literature constantly. (Halley 1994, 537) Even though many contribute to the 
literature suggesting orientation is immutable, none have been proven with the certainty that an 
alternative viewpoint contesting that view would look unprofessional or incorrect. Absent this 
certainty, the Court is put into the position of having to be the arbiter over an area of study that 
they do not specialize in and subsequently make a determination that would be binding, even 
though that decision could be proven wrong through future studies. (Balog 2005, 548) If the 
                                               
57 Kari Balog, in her piece, “Equal Protection for Homosexuals: Why the Immutability Argument is Necessary and 
How It Is Met”, argues from a perspective that science has proven sexual orientation is indeed immutable, due to the 
wide array of studies confirming links to the biology, psychology, and genetics of an individual that are outside of 
their own control. The strength of these studies, combined with their multiplicity all leading to the same conclusion 
(that orientation is immutable), Balog then argues from the perspective that others must prove that orientation is not 
immutable. This perspective, while strong in argument, has not gained much traction, either through academia 
(Halley 1994; Yoshino 1996) or thorough the Courts (High Tech Gays, 1990; Steffan v. Aspin, 1993) 
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Court were to find orientation immutable, and further studies come out proving otherwise, then 
the legitimacy of the Court can reasonably be called into question, as the previous decisions 
made would be wrong and there would be the perception that the Court is acting outside its 
bounds of authority. 
Additionally, immutability is not the proverbial smoking gun of the tiered scrutiny 
jurisprudence that gay rights activists want it to be. (Sunstein 1994, 9) Many courts have been 
unwilling to rely on the immutability of a trait so strongly that it automatically triggers strict 
scrutiny or even intermediate scrutiny (High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 
1990; Baehr) The argument commonly relied upon is that many traits are immutable, such as 
male-patterned baldness, that are not protected classes. The immutability of a trait must align 
with the other factors. (Sunstein 1994, 9) While this seems reasonable, it calls into question the 
legitimacy of Brennan’s proclamation of the factors used for heightened scrutiny. It also 
reintroduces the same unanswered question of how to weigh the different factors against each 
other.   
Finally, the issue with immutability is that many who do not endorse this view about 
orientation on the whole. There are many who believe that orientation is mutable in the sense 
that it is fluid and does not hold to one fixed construction throughout the entirety of one’s life. It 
may not be consciously switched by the individual, but it naturally changes throughout one’s life, 
in a way that does not occur with race or gender. As such, the government should not enforce 
legislation that enforces the strict binary of hetero- and homosexuality when individuals naturally 
do not fit within this construct. (Halley 1994, 517)  
Even if one were to endorse this belief about the mutability of gays, it does not mean that 
it would automatically disqualify gays from deserving heightened scrutiny. The Hawaii Supreme 
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Court, in Baehr v. Lewin, stated that the lack of scientific evidence did not prevent them from 
finding gays to be entitled to strict scrutiny. Furthermore, the Courts have demonstrated that 
certain choices are also protected by strict scrutiny, with the most salient example being religion. 
(Rush 2008, 740) There is no argument to be made that one’s religious affiliation is immutable, 
yet the fact that it is chosen by the person has been seen as a value worth protecting. (Sherbert v. 
Verner, 1963; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 1972) In extending this logic to gays, since orientation is a 
fundamental aspect of one’s self-identity in a way similar to that of religion, the choice of one’s 
orientation should be protected in a similar way, thereby lessening the need for scientifically 
proving the immutability of sexuality.  
Comparing to Past Precedents 
 As is clear, the way in which to measure many of these factors is highly subjective. As 
such, the Court has tried to draw parallels between groups that are petitioning to be granted some 
form of heightened scrutiny to those that have already become enumerated within the tiers. Once 
race was formally established as being protected by strict scrutiny, gender was subsequently 
compared to those precedents and the determination of intermediate scrutiny was based in part 
on the similarities and differences that one’s gender had upon their ability to actualize their rights 
as one’s race had. (Reed) 
 The problem with comparing different groups to one another is the system in which it is 
done. Because race was the first group to receive suspect class classification, the factors that 
were to be used in Equal Protection cases were tailored to fit with the nature and hardships 
citizens faced due to their race. Thus, it is easy to see how factors such as insularity and 
discreteness would be relied upon by the Court in order to come to a determination of the need 
for judicial protection, as blacks were clearly discrete and were segregated by law, thereby 
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making them insular and removed from political influence. (Siegal 2006, 405) Once strict 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause was formalized and other groups began to petition for 
similar protections, courts relied upon analogies to the groups that had been formally recognized 
as deserving suspect status. (Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, Montgomery County, 
Ohio, 1985) The reasoning behind this was simple. If a group experienced similar treatment and 
the element of their personhood being discriminated against was similar to that of race, then it 
would logically apply that that group would deserve suspect class status. The problem with 
relying on past precedent and analogizing groups to race is that the Court is relying on 
disanalogous parallels that are made to a group simply because it had the luxury of being the first 
to receive heightened protection by way of the Equal Protection Clause. (Schacter 1994) That is 
not to say that race shouldn’t be considered a suspect classification. However, what I am saying 
is that by forcing parallels of groups to that of race, it minimalizes the individuality of the 
problems and conceptions of other identities that have been discriminated against and mandates 
comparison to a group who happened to be selected first.  
 To further illustrate these harms, let’s pretend for the sake of argument that gays had 
received suspect class status first. Presumably, diffuseness would be recognized, as gays can be 
born into any family and cannot be segregated in nearly the same ways as blacks could be. If 
diffuseness was then a standard for finding suspect class status, then blacks would not be able to 
fulfill that standard. Does that mean that there should be less protection afforded to them? 
Presumably not. This example seeks to illustrate the fact that race was merely the first 
classification to receive protection, not the most important one that all others should measure up 
against.  
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 The issue with comparing to race or gender extends greatly when looking at how to 
measure prejudice. When looking at historical discrimination, the Courts have commonly looked 
to the fact that blacks were subjected to slavery and had all of their basic rights infringed upon, 
be it political, social, economic, and even moral rights. Because of the proclivity to compare 
groups to one another, past discrimination of groups is measured against blacks. This was one of 
the reasons that women received intermediate scrutiny, because the marginalization they faced 
was not a as great, and the intentions behind that marginalization were not as vitriolic. (Craig) 
When looking at the history of gays, they had never been subjected to something as devastating 
as slavery. The issue that arises here is that because the discrimination faced by gays was not as 
dehumanizing as the groups already protected, the history of the discrimination becomes clouded 
and lessened and understood for what it wasn’t, as opposed to what it was and how it affected 
citizens. (Ludwig 2006, 551) 
Furthermore, there are areas of discrimination faced by gays that were not experienced by 
blacks, such as the need to hide a fundamental aspect of one’s identity for the entirety of one’s 
life due to the fear of complete ostracization by one’s family or community. The intention of 
segregation and anti-gay laws also differed greatly. Segregation was meant to do just that: 
segregate the races from interaction amongst each other. Anti-gay legislation was not meant to 
segregate but rather suppress. Gays were denied any recognition of their identity, and even saw 
that identity criminalized. (Sunstein 1994, 17) These are examples of discrimination not 
experienced by blacks. Does it make it less worthy of recognition?  
Overall, the histories of different groups are just that: different.  By using a system that 
tries to standardize and compare unique, multifaceted histories, it misunderstands the effects that 
the discrimination had upon individuals, and the need for protection from said discrimination. By 
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requiring such formal factors that have so much subjectivity without any form of objectivism, the 
most logical way to achieve said objectivism under the current model is to compare different 
groups with different histories and struggles. However, doing so only creates less proper 
classification and conceptualization of the different groups applying for heightened judicial 
protection. 
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 Chapter 4 – The Right to Intimate Association 
Throughout my thesis up until this point, I have critically analyzed the direction that the 
Court was taking in extending gay rights across the country. The road to equality through 14
th
 
Amendment jurisprudence is treacherous, to say the least. Sweeping characterizations and 
drawing false analogies are the hallmarks of Equal Protection analysis, and require much of the 
discriminated group to prove that they deserve their right to be protected, which as I have 
explained I find highly problematic. 
 In the remaining chapters, I will lay out the judicial history for an alternative 
constitutional approach for understanding gay rights. The right to intimate association, found as 
an essential form of liberty enumerated under the Due Process Clause under the 14
th
 
Amendment, provides an approach that can both offer the Court much greater clarity of gay 
rights and represent the people in ways equal protection analysis is not capable of doing. The 
fundamental difference between the two approaches is the way that the Court analyzes who the 
right applies to. The Equal Protection Clause requires a minority to prove why their class of 
people deserves the right to equal protection on the basis of a multitude of haphazard factors. 
The right to intimate association does not separate citizens into distinct categories. Rather, the 
right is applied to all, and is weighed and adjudicated for its own sake, instead of being awarded 
because the individual petitioning for recognition of the right based on dividing, personal 
characteristics about oneself (as Equal Protection requires). My proposed theory is that those in 
same-sex relationships are exercising their right to intimate association, yet are infringed from 
being able to properly actualizing this right due to government and private restrictions upon these 
relationships. In this chapter, I will explain the purpose of the right to intimate association, as 
well as detail the method and the rulings that the Court has relied upon to sustain this right. This 
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serves as foundation for my original contribution, that gay rights should be adjudicated under 
this constitutional theory instead of through Equal Protection.  
 While the Supreme Court did not formally recognize it until 1984, the idea of the right to 
intimate association has long predated the Court’s analysis on the right. Alexis de Tocqueville, in 
his seminal work Democracy in America written in 1835, claimed that “Americans of all ages, 
all stations in life, and all types of dispositions are forever forming associations…of a thousand 
different types – religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very limited, immensely large 
and very minute.” (de Tocqueville 1835, 485) Many other political philosophers have echoed the 
same belief, writing that intimate association is as central to an individual’s liberty as the 
freedom of speech, because the relationships one creates with others are so fundamental to living 
meaningful lives.
58
 Outside of its constitutional justification, the right to intimate association is 
valuable for its own sake. In order to better understand its place as a well-established right by the 
Courts, we must understand its intrinsic value.  
 One of the most influential legal scholars of the past half-century, Kenneth Karst, has 
written extensively on the existence of a right to intimate association. In his 1980 piece The 
Freedom of Intimate Association, Karst gives his interpretation of the structure and purpose of an 
intimate association which seems to adequately reflect both the sentiment and the importance of 
the relationship. Drawing upon studies of prominent psychologists and sociologists,
59
 he defines 
intimate associations as close, familiar personal relationship with another person or persons. A 
prime example Karst cites is the associations formed through marriage or family.(Karst 1980, 
                                               
58 This includes, but is not limited to, Reena Raggi (Independent Right to Freedom of Association, 1977), David 
Fellman (The Constitutional Right to Association, 1963), and Charles Rice (Freedom of Association, 1962). 
59 Karst reviews prominent sociologists Emile Durkheim and Max Weber for understandings on the definition of 
intimate associations, and he notes the studies of some of the most well-known psychologists and biologists, such as 
B.F. Skinner (Science and Human Behavior), E.O. Wilson (On Human Nature), and Harry Harlow (The Nature of 
Love) 
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629) The association is more than the sum of its members, meaning that the relationship between 
the individuals provides unique benefits for those in the relationship that they would not 
otherwise exercise. (Smith  v. Organization of Foster Families, 1977)  
As social beings, Karst claims we all seek out and cherish such relationships in a 
multitude of different ways and intensities. Given that an individual is not a hermit completely 
closed off from human interaction, all individuals share in the company of others in intimate 
settings. (Karst 1980, 631) Intimate associations range from close friendships to marriages to 
sexual encounters to exclusive social groups, such as a fraternity. The pervasiveness of intimate 
associations, combined with their importance, form what de Tocqueville claims is a right that is 
as inalienable as individual liberty.(de Tocqueville 1831, 487)  
 The value of intimate associations comes from the benefits that the existence of the 
relationship confers.  Such relationships give the opportunity to enjoy the company of others, 
whether that be in conversation, in romance, or in pure sexual desire. Intimate associations fulfill 
the basic human need to feel loved and cherished, and to allow such individuals the opportunity 
to demonstrate their own capacity to love and care for another individual in a substantial, unique 
way. (Karst 1980, 632) It is through intimate associations that persons can develop their own 
intellect, emotional intelligence, or self-worth, and can aid others in developing in similar 
ways.(Karst 1980, 633)  
 The importance of the intimate association is further demonstrated through the close link 
it has with the freedom of choice and autonomy. In order to cultivate such intimate associations, 
and by extension confer the benefits, we must choose to trust another individual in such a deep 
way to allow ourselves to develop those bonds and realize those benefits. Individuals exercise a 
great deal of choosing who they trust to develop a deep connection with, which makes that bond 
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that much more meaningful. (Linder 1984, 1901) The discretion we can exert in choosing our 
intimate associations allows for the cultivation of our own unique identity and our own unique 
life course. (Karst 1980, 635) The power of the intimate association would be compromised if 
the individual was forced to coexist and share the experiences of intimate associations without 
the option of choosing who they are sharing those experiences with. Thus it show the importance 
of the choice in whom to trust and form these bonds with. In this sense, the autonomy exercised 
by individual persons reflects the liberty inherent in the formation and cultivation of intimate 
associations.(Linder 1984, 1901)   
History of Intimate Associations Under the Due Process Clause 
 The Supreme Court first formally recognized the right to intimate association in Roberts 
v. United States Jaycees in 1984, claiming the right was embedded in the precedents of the First 
and 14
th
 Amendment. However, there were many cases leading up to Roberts that shaped the 
rationale later adopted by the Court in the seminal case. By many scholars’ accounts, the ideals 
of the right to intimate association were first broached in Griswold v. Connecticut, which found a 
Connecticut statute barring married couples from accessing contraception unconstitutional. 
(Schwartzchild 2013, 97) The Court found Connecticut’s ban unconstitutional in two ways. The 
first, which has traditionally been seen as the binding precedent and the most scrutinized aspect 
of the decision, was the finding of an implicit right to privacy through the penumbra of specific 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. (Griswold, 1965) In order to support this belief, Justice William 
Douglas wrote that the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments all guaranteed specific 
zones of privacy. The common theme of these Amendments demonstrate an underlying right to 
privacy. With this new recognition to the right to privacy, the Court found the decisions made in 
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marriage regarding procreative choices to be protected by the protected sphere of privacy. 
(Griswold, 1965)   
The Court also found Connecticut’s contraceptives ban unconstitutional on 14th 
Amendment Due Process grounds. The Due Process Clause of the 14
th
 Amendment says that “no 
State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 
Especially notable about the Due Process Clause is the right to exercise one’s liberty, which the 
Court has interpreted mean that any rights fundamental to the liberty of individuals through all 
spheres of life. (Griswold, 1965) Under the liberty provision of the Due Process Clause, the 
Court established what is now known as Substantive Due Process. Any rights that may be found 
under Substantive Due Process are not found in the first eight Amendments, yet are determined 
to be fundamental to an individual’s existence and livelihood. In Griswold, the liberty being 
recognized was the right to privacy in the comfort of one’s marriage. (Griswold, 1965)  
In determining that privacy within marriage was a liberty that should be protected under 
Substantive Due Process, the Court elaborated on the purposes and benefits of marriage. 
Through this analysis do we begin to see the right to intimate association begin to develop. 
Justice Douglas stated that the decisions made within the bonds of marriage must warrant a high 
level of protection, as marriage “is intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that 
promotes a way of life; [that is] a harmony of living.” (Griswold, 1965) Griswold also affirmed 
the autonomy that is necessary in forming meaningful relationships, which lends credence to the 
perceived importance of developing marital and romantic bonds. Constitutionally, the decisions 
made in marriage are protected under the right to privacy, which is found through Substantive 
Due Process. It was this refocusing upon the liberty component of the Due Process Clause that 
laid the groundwork for the Court’s decision to come in Roberts. 
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While the idea that certain unenumerated rights could be fundamental and recognized 
under the Due Process Clause was a novel one broached in Griswold, the importance of marriage 
was an ideal that was already well-established. The majority opinion for Loving v. Virginia, 
which found all bans on interracial marriage unconstitutional, also articulated the importance of 
marriage in our society, saying that “the freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the 
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” (Loving, 
1967)Although the Court did not claim that the right to marriage was its own protected right, its 
existence and importance to individuals was a central part of the ruling, and formed the 
argumentative foundation for future cases to formalize the right to marriage, and later the right to 
intimate association.  
In 1976, the Court held in Zablocki v. Redhail that any restrictions upon an individual’s 
right to marry were subjected to strict scrutiny.
60
 The freedom to marry, the Court stated, “has 
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men.” (Zablocki, 1976) Furthermore, the Zablocki decision reaffirmed the 
principle established in Maynard v. Hill, decided in 1888, which stated that marriage is “the most 
important relation in life” and is the “foundation of the family and of society, without which 
there would be neither civilization nor progress.” (Maynard v. Hill, 1986) Zablocki relied upon 
the well-established precedent of the importance of marriage to find the right to marriage to be a 
protected element of liberty enumerated under the Due Process Clause. This finding ultimately 
became the bedrock of the Roberts decision. (Linder 1984, 1899) However, the Court also found 
that the more recent Griswold decision substantiated the finding that marriage was a fundamental 
                                               
60  Later in this chapter I will address how the tiers of scrutiny are used in determining the right to intimate 
association and the weight of that right against government interest. While it may come across that I am vehemently 
anti-tiered scrutiny, I must clarify that I believe the essence of the tiers has intrinsic merit. The way in which they 
are applied to 14th Amendment jurisprudence is the primary issue I take with the system of tiered scrutiny.  
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right to liberty. Because many of the decisions made in marriage are private and recognized as 
such, some of the most fundamental elements of marriage are already protected. This established 
reason to find the entire institution of marriage valuable in itself and therefore worthy of judicial 
protection as an essential form of liberty. 
The next year, in 1977, the Court returned to the question to clarify the importance of 
marital and family relationships and these relationships’ place under the 14th Amendment. In 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court was faced with the question as to whether a city 
ordinance that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single immediate family 
was a violation of the liberty established in the Due Process Clause. Challenging the law was 
East Cleveland resident Inez Moore, who had established residence with her son, his son (her 
grandson), and another grandson whose parents were absent from the child’s life. While the 
Court noted the city’s justification for the ordinances (overcrowding and traffic prevention, 
lessening the financial burden upon the public school system), they found that the intrusion upon 
family living relationships was a greater concern, thereby finding East Cleveland’s ordinance 
unconstitutional. Recognizing much of the same precedent used to decide Zablocki, the Court 
held that the freedom of choice in marriage and family arrangements was one of the liberties 
protected by Substantive Due Process.(Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 1977) Due Process of 
liberty, the Court said, was intended to recognize and respect the liberty of the individual, and 
balance that respect against the demands of organized society. (Poe v. Ullman, 1961) This 
protection of liberty mustn’t be determined on arbitrary lines, but rather from careful respect for 
the teachings of history and recognition of the basic values that underlie our society. (Griswold, 
1965) As such, the restriction of decisions so central to the foundation of familial life met the 
standard of impeding on the liberty of individuals in their most personal relationships. (Moore, 
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1977) The process of child-rearing is fundamental to the purpose of cultivating a family, and it is 
neither the Court’s nor the City of East Cleveland’s place to determine the way in which that is 
done. (Moore, 1977) 
There are two notable standards established by the Moore decision. First, the Court’s use 
of the Due Process Clause represented a noticeable shift towards recognizing the intrinsic 
benefits of meaningful personal relationships between individuals, instead of relying on the 
privacy necessary in cultivating these relationship. While this may appear to be a minute 
distinction, a clearer understanding about the importance of these relationship purely in their own 
right demonstrated their importance and their need to be protected in a much stronger way. 
Recognizing the relationship’s importance for their own sake is preferred over trying to faultily 
fit them under a privacy jurisprudence, especially because the right to privacy does not apply to 
all substantial restrictions upon marriage or family.
61
 This distinction made it clear that these 
intensely personal relationships are valued and protected for their own value as a form of liberty 
of all individuals. 
Moore also helped shape what became the right to intimate association through its 
recognition of personal relationships afforded through extended families. While not monolithic 
in its approach, (Meyer v. Nebraska, 1923)
62
 the Court had previously focused its liberty 
                                               
61 The questions posed by Moore show how privacy does not necessarily cover all infringements on the liberty in 
forming meaningful relationships with other in the confines of family and marriage. The case dealt with whether the 
City of East Cleveland could restrict cohabitation to nuclear families. The decision on how and who to live with may 
be personal. However, the actual cohabitation is not a private existence. It is known through census reports and 
establishment of one’s home mailing address, both of which are public records. As such, it can be convincingly 
argued that there is no privacy restriction, but there is a liberty restriction upon the right to live with the family as 
one so defines. The Court rightly made this distinction between privacy and liberty in such relationships and 
established a clear precedent for the future that marriage and familial relationships were valued in and of 
themselves, not just as a form of privacy that is protected.  
62 Other examples of cases that recognized some rights of the family include Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and Yoder 
v. Wisconsin  
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protections of such associations on the bonds and benefits afforded by marriage. (Loving, 1967)
63
 
The recognition of the importance of relationships outside the confines of marriage expanded the 
Court’s view on intimate associations. It was not that marriage is uniquely capable of providing a 
form of liberty that needed protection, but rather that marriage gave a strong example of this 
liberty. This difference, and the Court’s recognition of this difference, demonstrated a proclivity 
and openness towards accepting close, personal relationships as forms of liberty, with less regard 
for the form that these associations take. The concern was on the benefits these relationships 
conferred to individuals.  
While highly notable, the aforementioned cases are not the only ones that laid the 
groundwork for the Court’s decision to recognize the right to intimate association in Roberts. 
There are several more cases that found intrinsic value in the existence of intimate associations.
64
 
What is significant is how the foundation for the right to intimate association was so prevalently 
applied to a whole range of cases dealing with distinctly separate constitutional issues. The 
importance of this unestablished right was central to the Court’s holdings granting contraceptive 
rights to all, (Eisenstadt v. Baird, 1972) the right to sit-in to challenge racial segregation, (Bell v. 
Maryland, 1964) and the right to have parental access and guidance to one’s child born out of 
wedlock. (Stanley v. Illinois, 1972) These cases were also varied in the constitutional questions 
they posed, challenging and clarifying the understanding of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and 
14
th
 Amendments. The main takeaway from the diversity in cases that employed the rhetorical 
and argumentative force of arguing for the right to intimate association is that the right has been 
                                               
63 See also Griswold, Zablocki, and Ullman,   
64 Some additional examples include Eisenstadt v. Baird, which gave unmarried couples access to contraception; 
Doe v. Bolton, which extended abortion rights to married couples; Bell v. Maryland, which found sit-ins to protest 
racial segregation to be constitutional under the First Amendment; and NAACP v. Alabama, which found that the 
NAACP was not required to publicized its list of membership. 
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central to the facilitation of many other rights. (Linder 1984, 1887) Its importance is evidenced 
through the many cases decided on other issues that used the importance of intimate association 
as reason to uphold other rights. This shows that the intimate association has its own intrinsic 
value that needed formal recognition. 
Formal Recognition: The Court Defines the Right to Intimate Association 
 As the purpose of intimate associations became more elucidated over the course of the 
20
th
 century, both in the courts and in academia
65
, the Court formally recognized and articulated 
the right to intimate association in the groundbreaking case Roberts v. United States Jaycees.  
The case challenged whether the United States Jaycees
66
 had the right to exclude women from its 
membership. A national civic organization, the Jaycees’ expressed purpose, according to its 
bylaws, is to promote and foster the growth of Americanism and civic interest and provide its 
members with an avenue for intelligent participation in the affairs of their community, state, and 
nation, and to cultivate friendships with others sharing similar ideals. (Roberts) Additionally, the 
Jaycees restricted their memberships to only men, and justified this discrimination as necessary 
to achieve the purposes of the organization. However, the Minneapolis/St. Paul chapter began 
allowing women into the Jaycees, thus violating the national ban on female participation. As a 
result, the chapter had its charter revoked by the national office, prompting the litigation that 
eventually led up to the Supreme Court’s decision. The question faced by the Court was whether 
the associational rights of the Jaycees outweighed  the state of Minnesota’s interest in upholding 
its Human Rights Act, which states that no place of public accommodation can discriminate on 
                                               
65 See Karst (1980), David Richards (Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 1986) , Rice (1962), 
Fellman (1963) 
66 Throughout the course of the chapter, the United States Jaycees may be referred to as such, or as “U.S. Jaycees”, 
or simply “Jaycees” 
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the basis of, among other characteristics, gender. (Roberts, 1984)
67
 Writing for a 6-3 majority, 
Justice William Brennan held that the United States Jaycees were not permitted to restrict 
women from membership, employing a newly-devised metric to better weigh the competing 
interests of associations and the state that made the precedent so fundamental in future cases.  
 In their briefs to the Court, the Jaycees contended that restricting membership to only 
men was protected under their First Amendment rights to speech and association as articulated in 
NAACP v. Alabama, which had stated that the right to association was a facilitative right that was 
essential to allowing individuals the ability to actualize their First Amendment rights to the 
freedoms of speech and assembly.(NAACP v. Alabama, 1958) While the precedent of NAACP v. 
Alabama would appear to be sufficient for coming to a conclusion about whether the 
associational rights of the Jaycees merited their exclusion of women, the Court took the 
opportunity to explain exactly which associations were protected.  
Instead of accepting a broad right to association to reflect all human interactions, the 
Court clarified the scope of associational rights by diving the right into two distinct types: 
intimate and expressive association. The fundamental difference between the two is the value 
that each type has for individuals. Brennan defined expressive associations by saying that the 
Court has “long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First 
Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of 
political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.” (Roberts, 1984) Finding 
that the right to expressive association was necessary to recognize its facilitative nature in 
exercising the enumerated rights to speech and assembly, the Court determined that the right to 
                                               
67 It is a point of contention as to whether or not the Jaycees are considered a private or public organization, and as 
such, whether that requires them to abide by the Minnesota Human Rights Act, or whether they have greater latitude 
in determining the associational purposes endowed to private groups.  
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expressive association was inherent to the First Amendment. The Court then stated that given the 
state’s compelling purpose in protecting against gender discrimination, the organization must 
show why the restriction upon women is a central purpose to the association’s existence. 
(Roberts, 1984) This metric was utilized in order to determine whether or not the discrimination 
is central to the group’s existence. If a group exists to exercise their First Amendment rights to 
hate other individuals on the basis of some characteristic, then the government is not within its 
powers in suppressing that voice and association because this would effectively amount to 
censorship. However, if a group’s purpose can be blind to personal characteristics and still exist 
without fundamental harm to the association, then the discrimination against individual based on 
some arbitrary characteristic is not justified. In the case of the Jaycees, the purposes of 
promoting civic engagement for citizens ages 18-35 was not mutually exclusive to men. As such, 
the discrimination was an unjustified exclusion that was irrelevant to the actual purposes of the 
organization, which then made the state’s interests outweigh the association’s purpose in 
upholding a restriction of women. 
The second, and more important, form of association the Court delineated in Roberts was 
the right to intimate association. Unlike expressive association, which finds its constitutional 
roots in the First Amendment, the Court found this form of associational right as essential to 
personal liberty covered by Substantive Due Process of the 14
th
 Amendment. (Roberts, 1984) 
The Court recognized that there are elements of the two types of association that may coincide. 
However, they decided to separate the two forms for two purposes: to better understand the role 
of the United States Jaycees as either an intimate or expressive association, and to establish a 
clear, binding precedent articulating the importance of two separate rights that are essential to 
upholding existing enumerated rights. The intention of the Bill of Rights was to protect 
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individual liberty from the power of the government. (Rakove 1985) The Court determined that 
the intimate associations individuals form help foster and sustain that liberty by providing, 
among other benefits, emotional enrichment, a clearer understanding of one’s own identity, and 
diversity of ideals and thought.  
Brennan then goes on to provide an archetype of the ideal intimate relationship: the 
family. Stating that it is these relationships that exemplify the benefits conferred through this 
form of association, Brennan cites the intimate nature of the family and the many fundamental 
decisions made through these associations as proof of the need for judicial recognition of this 
form of liberty. (Roberts, 1984) Families, according to Brennan, “involve deep attachment and 
commitments to the necessarily few individuals with whom one shares not only a special 
community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs, but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s 
life.” The importance of these relationships manifest themselves in both theoretical ways (the 
cultivation of ideas and identity) and in practical decision-making processes exclusive to the 
family (the decision to have children(Skinner v. Oklahoma 1942; Carey v. Population Services 
International, 1977), raising of children (Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 1977), and 
cohabitation with relatives (Moore, 1977), among other decisions linked to family relationships).  
In order to determine whether or not a relationship between persons is considered to be 
an intimate association, the Court must consider only the factors of size, selectivity, purpose, 
policies, and congeniality, and any other relevant characteristics as determined by the court 
presiding in future cases regarding questions on the scope of this right.. The purpose of having 
such factors is to better understand what genuinely is to be considered an intimate association. 
Again, the Court references the family to illustrate these factors. The family is distinguished by 
relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity, and seclusion from others in critical decision 
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making. (Roberts, 1984) While these qualifications could appear to be arbitrary, they actually 
highlight the inherent value in recognizing intimate associations. The selectivity, or choice, in 
who one forms these relationships with is an element of the liberty endowed by the 14
th
 
Amendment. This choice is essential to cultivating meaningful associations, as the ability to trust 
and grow is dependent on the willingness to open up to another individual.(Karst 1980, 633)  
The size of the relationship also indicates its intimacy. Pragmatically speaking, the 
benefits that are fulfilled through intimate associations (personal growth, sharing of ideals, child 
rearing
68
) would be increasingly difficult to realize as the size of the intimate associations grew. 
For instance, it would be difficult to claim that the relationships between all employees in a 
corporation would be classified as intimate associations, as the bonds between the individuals 
within one company would most likely not be considered intimate due to lack of choice in who 
one’s coworkers are along with a lack of opportunity for all within a company to come together 
as one intimate association. However, a deep friendship or relationship fostered by way of shared 
employment could be considered an intimate association.  
As determined in earlier cases, any rights found to be essential to liberty are placed under 
strict scrutiny, in that the government must have a compelling purpose and it must be the least 
restrictive means to accomplishing that aim in order to infringe upon the right. (Griswold, 
1965)
69
  The right to intimate association is rooted in the liberty component of substantive due 
process, meaning that any infringements on this right must be weighed under the scale of strict 
scrutiny.
70
  
                                               
68 In the case of marriage or family, which the court has already is the archetype for protected intimate associations. 
69 This precedent was reaffirmed in Zablocki (1976), Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County (1974), and Carey v. 
Population Services International (1977) 
70 It is here that there could be potentially some confusion about what I am advocating for. In chapters Two and 
Three, I provided a detailed critique of the way in which Equal Protection precedence has been established. In short, 
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Additionally, what is notable about the Roberts decision is the emphasis placed on the 
importance of this right for its own sake. There is little analysis that the right to intimate 
association only is endowed to a select few, or endowed to those who cultivate specific types of 
intimate associations. All Brennan does in this opinion is establish that there is a right to intimate 
association found as essential to exercising the liberty, and illustrate the basic structure of the 
form that these associations could take. There is no mention of appealing to historical norms or 
traditionally-protected relationships. This is notable, as future courts begin to try to redefine the 
right to reflect appeals to historical norms and traditions as necessary to guaranteeing this form 
of liberty to individuals.  
Questioning the Scope of the Roberts Decision 
In the 30 years since Roberts was decided and the right to intimate association was 
formally recognized as protected through Substantive Due Process under the 14
th
 Amendment, 
the Court has not been faced with many cases forcing them to further clarify or limit the 
understanding of the right. One tension that has arisen, however, is whether intimate associations 
are only protected if they are a relationship this is rooted in the traditions, culture, and morals of 
                                                                                                                                                       
the way in which the tiers of scrutiny are employed is highly problematic. This analysis could lead many to believe 
that I am against the use of the tiers of scrutiny in weighing rights claims. However, the problem I have with Equal 
Protection jurisprudence is not that the tiers of scrutiny are used. It is the way that they are used for the Amendment. 
Individuals’ equal rights claims are adjudicated based on the characteristics of one’s identity, thereby separating 
everyone into categorized groups and weighing whether certain groups are deserving of equal rights or if they are 
not. This separation is perpetuated by attributing an assigned tier to different minority groups (e.g. strict scrutiny for 
race, intermediate scrutiny for gender). In this system, the tiers are not the problem. The way the tiers are used is the 
problem. When looking at the ways the tiers operate for their own sake, they provide a weighing mechanism that 
clearly establish the burden upon the government in order to justify why a right can be infringed. This shows the 
importance of the right and compares it to the importance of the government’s purpose. The primary difference 
between the tiers of scrutiny for Substantive Due Process claims and Equal Protection claims is that the right is 
being endowed to everyone, not a select few based on capricious characterizations. As such, there is much less 
subjectivity and arbitrariness as to who gets enhanced judicial protection, as everyone is ensured the exact same 
protection of the right, given that rights are endowed to all unless there is some extenuating circumstance (e.g. 
imprisonment).  
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the nation and its history. This question was broached in FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas in 1989, 
only five years after Roberts was decided. In a case that was primarily focused upon whether the 
First Amendment allows the distribution of pornography, the Court weighed whether an 
individual’s right to intimate association was being violated by disallowing hotel to rent rooms at 
hourly rates, which are typically purchased for brief sexual activity. In a comprehensive bill 
aimed at protecting the morals of the community, the City of Dallas barred hotels from offering 
rooms for ten hours or less, claiming that such rates promote non-procreative sexual conduct and 
prostitution. The petitioners claimed that this provision of the bill infringed on the right to 
intimate association, asserting that the right to engage in sexual activity with a partner of one’s 
choosing fit under the model of an intimate association laid out in Roberts. (FW/PBS, 1989) 
Unfortunately for the petitioners, the Court did not agree with their stated position. While 
the Court reiterated the need for recognition of the right to intimate association as an essential 
form of liberty, they claimed that the sexual relationship between individuals consummated in 
hotel rooms are not a protected form of intimate association. (FW/PBS, 1989) Such sexual 
conduct is not the sort of relationship that has traditionally conferred the benefits of intimate 
association that allowed the right to be recognized in the first place. The FW/PBS decision 
created a schism in how intimate association should be understood. Does the right encompass 
non-traditional relationships, as suggested in Roberts, or is it limited only to associations 
commonly rooted and viewed as essential to the cultural and moral fabrics of our society? 
(Marcus 2006, 287) 
This question was highlighted again in Bowers v. Hardwick, in which the Court upheld 
bans on sodomy committed by individuals of the same gender. While the Court was not as 
explicit in recognizing the importance of the right to intimate association as they would be in 
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FW/PBS, they decline to recognize the relationships of those partaking in same-sex sexual 
conduct as constitutionally protected, finding that there is no element of gay sex that is essential 
to the liberty of the 14
th
 Amendment. (Bowers¸1986) The majority justified this view by saying 
that homosexual sodomy has no root in the traditions or commonly accepted beliefs of the 
country. Given that there was no lasting expectation that individuals should have the right to 
engage in these actions, there could then be no claim that such conduct is essential to liberty, 
because it had never been widely considered essential prior to the previous few decades. If it is 
not rooted in history, then it is not an everlasting principle that simply hadn’t gotten judicial 
recognition. (Bowers, 1986) 
The dissent in Bowers lamented the Court’s holding, finding that they had not grappled in 
any way with the right to intimate association, only concerning themselves with the question of if 
there is a fundamental right to sodomy. The dissent, written by Justice Harry Blackmun, 
reaffirmed Roberts in saying that the right to intimate association is indeed essential to liberty, 
and it is not the state’s role to determine what forms those associations may take. (Bowers, 1986) 
Even when appealing to history, Blackmun claimed that protection of these associations fits 
within the national ethos that the majority claims they are rooting their decision in. He held that 
the liberty of individuals to form their own relationships has always been valued by our country, 
and that the autonomy to choose is one of the bases of our nation’s existence. Furthermore, he 
says that the fact that these relationships are non-traditional is actually reason that they should be 
protected, not restricted. (Bowers, 1986) Non-traditional relationships, such as romantic 
relationships between individuals of the same sex, foster diversity throughout society. Diversity 
Binder  104 
 
of views, demographics, and identities, are protected through the Bill of Rights and is celebrated 
as one of the unique qualities of American culture.
71
 
Only 17 years later, the Court explicitly overturned Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas, finding 
that the choice of individuals to partake in sodomy was protection under the right to privacy that 
is intrinsic to the liberty protected under Substantive Due Process. (Lawrence, 2003) Less 
notably, Lawrence also clarifies the question of whether only traditional relationships were 
protected intimate associations. The ruling signaled a willingness of the Court to defer to the 
right to autonomy of individuals to choose their own relationships, as opposed to allowing the 
government to define which relationships were permissible based on commonly-held tradition. 
(Lawrence, 2003) The Court takes two approaches to repudiate the FW/PBS standard. They state 
that there is no one clear way to understanding history and tradition, and that the state should not 
be defining the relationships people can and cannot have. In trying to homosexual sodomy, the 
state argued that individuals partaking in sodomy were acting against widely accepted morals. 
The Court rejects this claim, however, saying that history is being distorted to fit the views of the 
petitioner, not the other way around. When analyzing the enacted laws during the late 18
th
 
century, when the United States gained its independence, there were no laws distinctly targeting 
gays. Rather, it targeted all sodomy between any adults, regardless of the genders of the 
participants.
72
 The beginning of anti-gay legislation and law enforcement began in the mid 20
th
 
century, which would certainly not be representative of a commonly held belief rooted in our 
nation’s ethos. This example illustrates the majority’s point that in determining whether a right is 
                                               
71 Among others, the First Amendment clearly seeks to promote differing views and lifestyles to allow for all to 
cultivate their own chosen identity and prevent a monolithic conglomeration understanding of culture. 
72 There are some who argue that homosexual sodomy would not have been conscribed into law because it was seen 
as so abhorrent that it was obvious that it would not need to be codified. However, to the point in which such 
extrapolations are continuously drawn to support theses on the morals of the country, it only shows the difficulty in 
relying on historical morals and traditions as an objective measure of whether rights should be protected. 
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fundamental to all individuals, the history is simply not conducive or extensive enough to justify 
whether a right can or cannot be proscribed. 
The Court frequently seeks to distance itself from relying on historical ethos arguments in 
rights analysis. But even if the history was clear enough to definitively dictate whether a form of 
relationship is morally rooted in the country’s ethics, the government does not even necessarily 
have the right to restrict non-traditional relationships. The majority claims that the government 
does not have such a strong interest in defining the deeply personal relationships of private, 
consenting citizens. The interests of the Court are “to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our 
own moral code.” Given that the sexual relationships of consenting individuals are a private 
matter, and therefore protected by the substantive due process right to privacy, the obligation of 
the Court is to determine how that right can be best protected, so long as there is no 
countervailing right that would allow for restriction of the original right. With the only opposing 
interest in Lawrence an appeal to tradition, which the majority was skeptical of, the opinions of 
each individual justice were of no concern in deciding whether non-traditional intimate 
associations should be protected found that their opinions of the private relationships were of no 
concern. 
What is key to recognize about the Lawrence decision is the how they found non-
procreative sexual relations to exist as a right under Substantive Due Process. They did not say 
that the government’s ban was infringing on the liberty central to intimate associations. Rather, 
they found that the law violated privacy rights in choosing and actualizing sexual desires with 
another individual. (Lawrence, 2003) Considering not all sexual actions are allowed, namely that 
individuals are not allowed to have sex or any like conduct in public, the private setting in which 
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many choose to have these relations reduces the interests of the government because of the 
interests in protecting privacy rights. 
Although the Court did not explicitly call upon Roberts to decide Lawrence, the past 
intersectionality of the privacy and intimate association arguments, along with their shared  
constitutional justification of Substantive Due Process, provide a common argumentative basis. 
The justification for the Court’s decision in Lawrence may not specifically call upon the right to 
intimate association, yet  much of the same precedents can be applied as support for both an 
argument for right to intimate association and right to privacy. Much of Roberts was based off of 
the privacy determinations made in Poe, Griswold, and Roe, among other cases, and many cases 
justified by privacy after Roberts were decided upon analysis given by the Court in Roberts.
73
 
The exact same approach to understanding Roberts can be applied to the understanding of 
intimate associations implicit in the Lawrence decision.  
Other Instances of Right to Intimate Association After Roberts 
 Outside of the questions about the role of morality and tradition in granting intimate 
associational rights protection, the Court has been faced with other quandaries regarding the 
scope of the right to intimate association. While the Supreme Court has not decided many cases 
since Roberts that directly clarify the definition of the right, that does not mean lower courts 
have not been posed with shaping the right in certain ways. Since Roberts, many have claimed 
that their association be protected under Substantive Due Process as an intimate one, with 
varying degrees of success. There has also been dispute as to whether all restrictions of intimate 
association are adjudicated under strict scrutiny, or if there are some infringements on 
                                               
73 Examples include Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), Washington v. Glucksberg (1997), Cruzan by Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Dept. of Health (1990) 
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relationships that could be interpreted as intimate associations that are not entitled to strict 
scrutiny. (Akers v. McGinnis, 2003) 
 In the Roberts majority opinion, Justice Brennan suggested that there could be a sliding 
scale in determining both the level of intimacy in a relationship and the importance that 
relationship has for an individual. (Roberts, 2003) While the courts have not adopted a clear 
sliding scale, they have continued to use the example of the romantic and family relationship as 
the archetypical intimate association. (Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of 
Duarte, 1987) In conjunction with this, courts have also relied on the parameters established by 
Brennan in the Roberts opinion of size, selectivity, and purpose, to best understand the essence 
of an intimate association.  
 Utilizing these factors, different courts have characterized other relationships as intimate 
associations essential to liberty. There have been many cases that protect the relationships of the 
family that extend outside the bounds of the immediate nuclear unit. (Parham v. J.R., 1979) The 
bonds of foster children with their foster parents are considered to be intimate associations, even 
though the children are not legally considered to be permanent dependants or members of the 
parents’ family.(Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 1977) The relationship between an 
aunt and her niece was protected as an intimate association. (Prince v. Massachusetts, 1944) The 
right to divorce one’s partner is also protected as a decision under the liberty needed to create 
intimate associations. (Boddie v. Connecticut,  1971) The realm of intimate association goes so 
far to even include protection from prosecution of marital rape, as the bind shared between those 
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married outweighs the government interest in prosecuting sexual assault. (Dworkin 1988, 165-
67)
74
 
 Outside of the family, the Court has also recognized other forms of intimate association. 
The bonds of close friendship have been continuously protected, as they confer many of the same 
benefits about cultivating one’s identity, exercising one’s autonomy in choosing relationships, 
and trusting another individual in profound ways similar to the bonds of family.(Corrigan v. City 
of Newaygo,1995) Fraternities and sororities are also considered to be intimate associations, as 
they function in relative seclusion and maintain a level of exclusivity that allows bonds to be 
fostered that have inherent meaning to the individual in a similar way that other protected 
intimate associations do. (Chi Iota of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City University of New York
 
, 2007) Prisoners, even though they have forfeited many of their rights by committing crimes, 
have their right to be visited by family members protected under the right to intimate association. 
(Overton v. Bazzetta, 2003) To be clear, I am not necessarily endorsing that all of these 
associations be considered intimate and essential to the liberty of Substantive Due Process. My 
point in illustrating the different types of associations is to show how the Courts have applied 
this line of precedence to a wide range of relationships, which can then be used to show how 
same sex relationships can also be covered.  
 The tier of scrutiny applied to intimate associations has also been in a minor state of flux. 
The courts have ruled that not all relationships that could be construed as intimate are worthy of 
the protection of strict scrutiny.  In Akers v. McGinnis, the Sixth Circuit held that relationships 
                                               
74 While this is a highly controversial notion, and one that many persons would find morally reprehensive and many 
Courts would seek to repudiate, my choice to include this form of protected intimate association is to show the 
breadth of relationships and privileges within those relationships that the Court protects. In Chapter Five, I will 
compare the government interests in preventing the actualization of gay relationships to the government interests in 
not being able to prosecute rape, given this example, to elucidate the breadth of what is considered an intimate 
association. 
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that are intrinsically intimate, such as marriage, are not always protected by strict scrutiny. In this 
case, the court was asked if a policy of the Michigan Department of Corrections that barred 
employees from any non work-related conduct with the prisoners being held in the corrections 
facility infringed upon the employees’ or prisoners’ right to intimate association. The plaintiffs 
claimed their rights to privacy and intimate association were being violated. However the court 
was not compelled by their claims.(Akers, 2003) The reasoning behind this decision is highly 
noteworthy. First, the court reaffirmed that intimate associations are a form of liberty protected 
under the 14
th
 Amendment. Yet they also stated that not all intimate associations are protected by 
strict scrutiny, and that the impact upon the right must pose a substantial harm or potential harm 
to a large number of people in order to trigger strict scrutiny protection. In this case, the right to 
intimate association only applied to employees of the prison and the prisoners. The Sixth Circuit 
found that the restrictions upon these individuals’ right to intimate association was not so 
fundamentally restrictive that it required such strong protection, because the relationships 
between employees and prisoners were not so important, and this policy did not restrict anyone 
outside of the prison. The restriction also only limited the individuals affected in a marginal way, 
as there were many other people in both employees and prisoners lives’ to form intimate 
associations with. Strict scrutiny was reserved for cases in which a large subset of the population 
is affected by some restriction. This case did not apply to that necessary large subset. As such, 
the Court determined that rational basis review was appropriate for adjudicating this case. Under 
this metric, the state was found to have a rational basis for preventing non work-related contact 
between corrections facility employees and prisoners.  
 While the Akers rationale may appear flawed, it has been upheld by other Courts, and 
remains a rather strong precedent in adjudicating intimate association claims. The Sixth Circuit 
Binder  110 
 
found in Anderson v. City of Lavergne that police officers of different ranks were not allowed to 
be in a relationship while both were employed at the same precinct. They were given the option 
of one being transferred to another precinct within the district. (Anderson, 2004)The court stated 
that this imposition did not amount to a categorical infringement upon their 14
th
 Amendment 
rights, and was therefore adjudicated under rational basis review and the ban on inter-office 
relationships was upheld. Cases that dealt with issues of intimate association infringement of 
small magnitude were decided similarly, thus proving the strength of the Akers standard. 
(Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power System, 2001) 
 Finally, I would be remiss if I did not discuss two of the biggest right to association cases 
regarding gays in the past twenty years. In 2000 and 1995, respectively, the Court decided in Boy 
Scouts of America v. Dale and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of 
Boston that expressive associations were allowed to ban participation and inclusion of gays if 
their central purpose was based around disapproval of gays. The Court found in both cases that 
the government could not force associations protected by the First Amendment to include 
individuals that went against the fundamental beliefs of the associations, as that would 
effectively be censorship. (Dale, 2000; Hurley, 1995) Stating that as long as the central purpose 
of the association was disapproval of gays, such exclusion was allowed. However, if the 
discrimination was secondary and not fundamental to the speech being advocated for through the 
association, then the bans would not be permitted. In both of these cases, the Court held that the 
central purposes of the expressive association in question did indeed seek to discriminate against 
gays, thereby permitting continued discrimination. (Dale, 2000; Hurley, 1995)  
While these were seen as large blows for gay rights, they actually served to strengthen 
associational rights and limit government involvement in associational formation. Although 
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these cases dealt at expressive associations instead of intimate association, the notion that the 
association’s right to define its own membership outweighs the government’s interests in 
dictating that membership has positive implications for intimate association, as the logic could be 
applied to the formation of intimate associations. With the strengthening of associational rights, 
the limits upon the government are also subsequently strengthened, thus making it more difficult 
for the government to infringe upon the right to association. 
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 Chapter Five – The Rights of Those in Same-Sex Relationships 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the history and development of the right to intimate 
association, found under substantive due process of the 14
th
 Amendment. It is this right within 
the 14
th
 Amendment that I believe best represents the most sound and reasonable constitutional 
claims for those who are restricted based on their choice to form same-sex relationships. It is this 
line of precedent that most properly reflects the constitutional claim that restrict ions upon those 
who engage in same-sex relationships are unconstitutional. As an alternative to Equal Protection, 
I believe that the relationships between two individuals of the same gender ought to be 
considered an intimate association under the 14
th
 Amendment. The right to intimate association 
does not characterize people by any labels or imposed identities. It instead recognizes the nature 
of certain relationships between people and weighs whether those relationships are worthy of 
protection. Given the precedence and the purposes for protecting intimate associations, it is my 
belief that same-sex romantic relationships should be considered intimate associations protected 
under the Due Process Clause. This then establishes the right to engage in these relationships as a 
fundamental right, entitling individuals to the protections that come along as such.  
 Before explaining the unconstitutionality of restrictions upon those engaging in same-sex 
relationships, it is important to properly identify to whom this right extends. Over the past half-
century, with particular emphasis on the past 10 years, there has been a large groundswell in 
support for gay rights on the whole.
75
 One of the goals of gay rights activists has been to try to 
                                               
75  Gallup has tracked the public opinion on gay rights over the last 30 years. With regard to whether or not 
homosexual sexual conduct should be legal, 64% of respondents in 2013 believe it should be, compared to only 31% 
who believe it should be illegal. This represents a 21-point increase since 1977, when support for legalization of 
homosexual conduct was only at 43%, and fell to its low of 32% in 1986, the year the Court decided that Georgia’s 
ban on sodomy was constitutional in Bowers v. Hardwick. With regard to same-sex marriage, only 27% of 
respondents believed same-sex marriage should be recognized in 1996, compared to 68% who believed there should 
be no formal recognition for gay couples. Those numbers look dramatically different now, as a majority of citizens 
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achieve equality and proper recognition of same-sex relationships by the government and by 
society.
76
 The means to achieve these goals have ranged from challenging discriminatory laws 
through the court system , to political influence, to spreading a unified message through media. 
As a movement, those in support of gay rights have mobilized and changed mass public opinion 
in unprecedented ways.
77
 
 Central to the discourse around gay rights has been the debate about the source and 
manifestation of homosexuality in individuals. One of the most common questions has been the 
source of homosexuality and whether it is immutable or chosen by the individual. Additionally, 
there a large amounts of conversation about whether one’s orientation is fixed, or if it is fluid and 
ever-changing over the course of a person’s life. 78  Many believe that homosexuality is 
immutable and as such should be reflected in the Court’s understanding of sexual orientation, 
(Balog 2005, 548) while others claim that because there is no conclusive scientific evidence that 
proves immutability, along with individuals who claim that their sexual preference is fluid, the 
Court should not recognize this factor. Along with this debate is the role of one’s orientation in 
forming their personal sense of identity. For many, one’s sexual orientation can be a defining 
                                                                                                                                                       
believe same-sex couples should have their relationship recognized (54%), compared to only 43% in opposition. 
(Gallop 2014). This trend in greater support is more obvious over the past ten years, as support for marriage equality 
was only at 33% of citizens, a 21-point differential. (Pew Research 2014) 
76 One method to determine the goals of the gay rights movement is to look to the mission statements of prominent 
gay rights organizations. The Human Rights Campaign, which is the largest LGBT rights organization in the 
country, states that their mission is to “end discrimination against LGBT citizens and realize a nation that achieves 
fundamental fairness and equality for all.” (HRC, 2013) GLAAD (formerly the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against 
Discrimination) holds their purpose to “promote understanding, increase acceptance, and advance equality.” 
(GLAAD, 2014) Because of their influence and large representation of LGBT persons, they serve as a strong basis 
to understanding the goals of the gay rights movement on the whole. 
77 In addition to the commentary in footnote 1, the percentage of respondents who responded with no opinion has 
steadily and consistently decreased, signifying the wider education of more people on gay issues. Even if some of 
those individuals who would have said no opinion later stood in opposition to gay rights, the fact that more have an 
opinion signals that there is a greater public consciousness of gay issues, which is essential to either attract new 
supporters or change the views of those opposed. (Gallop, 2014) 
78 This is argued through academia and national media. See Halley (1994), Balog (2005), Ambrosino (2014), and 
Michelson (2014)  
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quality in shaping their identity of themselves. (Nurius 1983, 128) As we’ve seen the Court 
articulate, one’s identity and the cultivation of this identity is an essential aspect of what makes 
us human. (Lawrence v. Texas, 2003) For others, however, orientation is simply a stated fact 
about oneself that was outside of their control, similar to that of their race or gender. As such, 
this does not define that individual any more than the aspects of oneself that are consciously 
chosen by that individual, such as their interests or profession. (Nurius 1983, 124) 
 These conversations among the gay community and throughout society on the whole are 
greatly beneficial to the gay rights movement. They have an impact both in greater awareness 
and acceptance of sexualities outside of heterosexuality. For the right to intimate association, 
however, these distinctions and understandings about sexuality are irrelevant. Under the 
approach that I advocate for, it is not relevant whether an individual chooses to identifies as gay, 
or whether or not one’s sexuality is immutable. It also does not matter if an individual’s sexuality 
may change 20 years from now. All that is relevant is if a same-sex relationships exists at some 
point in time, and whether or not these same-sex relationships should be protected under the right 
to intimate association. If that relationship is not recognized simply due to the genders of the 
individuals. This constitutional theory is not meant to protect just those who identify as gay. 
Rather, the right to intimate association is a right that is extended to all, and all ought have the 
opportunity to actualize this right. 
 This clarification is important because it contrasts the Equal Protection argument. There 
are many rights that are not intended for all to use and call upon. However, what is important is 
that all have the opportunity and ability to have their rights protected, even if one is not actively 
employing in their daily lives. The potential for infringement signals the need to recognize all 
rights for all individuals. One prime example of rights extended to all that may not apply to all is 
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the free exercise of religion. In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court said that the State could not 
withhold unemployment benefits because of an individual’s unwillingness to work on Saturdays 
because of her beliefs as a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, the religion of her 
choosing. (Sherbert v. Verner, 1942) While a very small subsection of the population practices as 
Seventh Day Adventists, the right to free exercise of religion is extended to all, regardless of 
religion. An individual’s practice of religion may not be infringed in one moment, but there is the 
potential for it to be infringed in the future. This principle is further elucidated through the 
understanding of identity and religion. One cannot be discriminated on the basis of their religion, 
even if they do not actively practice. This example parallels the right to intimate association in 
protecting same-sex relationships. Not all citizens will partake in these relationships. However, 
the right is extended to all, regardless of the way that one self-identifies.  
 Given that this right applies to all, it is important to understand how this right will be 
extended. What I will do over the course of this chapter, is argue that same-sex relationships fit 
the parameters of an intimate association established by the Court. The purposes and 
composition, among other features, of same-sex relationships align with the necessary 
qualifications the Court has previously articulated. Over the course of this chapter, I will 
articulate how same-sex relationships fit within the Court’s precedents, and how the application 
of the right to intimate association when applied to individuals in same-sex relationships 
withstands any countervailing challenges.  
Same-sex Relationships as Intimate Association Essential to Liberty 
 As I explained in Chapter Four, the right to intimate association is valued for many 
reasons. It is through intimate associations that we enjoy the company of others, fulfill a 
necessary psychological need to interact with others, (Karst 1980, 627) grow through 
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conversation, experience romantic and sexual intimacy, and develop our own emotional 
intelligence in more profound ways, among many other benefits. (Rice 1962) The association is 
valued for more than just its individual members. The actual relationship is valued, because the 
benefits would not be conferred if it were not for the existence of that relationship. Intimate 
associations are also valued for the autonomy inherent to their formation. In order to enter an 
intimate association, one must consciously choose to develop bonds with another individual or 
group of individuals. An individual’s choice to trust and develop a relationship with a person of 
their choosing is that much more powerful than any relationship forced on an individual, as the 
value of intimate associations comes from the choice to enter into one with another person, or 
group of people. (Karst 1980, 630)  
 Before I explain how such relationships fit into this established framework, it is important 
to understand the nature of same-sex relationships. In short, same-sex romantic relationships 
function in highly similar ways to opposite sex relationships. Those in same-sex relationships 
make life commitments to each other (and marry if their state of residence has recognized their 
union), they raise children together,  reside together, share financial commitments, and make 
important life decisions as a unit. However, not all same-sex relationships require such a deep 
commitment. Same-sex relations can be purely of a sexual nature, resulting in satisfying sexual 
desires with another individual similar to that of opposite-sex relationships of like form. Overall, 
the manifestation of same-sex relationships does not differ fundamentally from the more well-
known and culturally accepted opposite sex relationships.
79
 
                                               
79 I recognize that there is a large debate over whether same-sex relationships are actually similar to opposite sex 
relationships, with many who seek out same-sex relationships wanting to distance their associations from the 
puritanical rigidity of opposite sex relations. Many argue that aspects of lifelong commitment, such as monogamy, 
are inherently unhealthy and unreasonable to expect out of individuals. (Ghaziani 2011) As such, many see same-
sex relationships as an opportunity to show different forms of love and commitment outside of society’s 
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 Inherent to the practical manifestations of the relationship are the intrinsic goods that are 
essential to that relationship. At the foundation of these associations are the qualities that apply 
to all intimate associations. Relationships between individuals of the same-sex in a romantic way 
allow for those a part of the relationship to establish a deep connection with another individual, 
and build a unique level of trust with that person. They allow for a greater realization of one’s 
own identity, through deeper conversation and the resulting self-worth that comes from feeling 
loved and reciprocating that same love. Same-sex relationships are even more likely to allow one 
to develop their sense of self-identity and feel confident about that identity more than any other 
relationship, due to the historical and current societal animus directed at individuals partaking in 
such relationships. (Porche and Purvin 2008, 147) To love and trust an individual of the same 
gender in the face of widespread contempt, and to do so publicly, creates a sense of self that is 
more resilient, because the barriers to overcome in order to have that relationship are 
comparatively so much higher.  
 Furthermore, it is clear that entering into a same-sex relationships takes a strong will of 
choice and autonomy, which the Court has said is paramount to the existence of intimate 
associations. If somebody seeks out romantic relationships, and chooses to find those 
connections with somebody of the same-sex, they are exercising the liberty of choice that is 
essential to forming any intimate association. The choice about which gender one prefers may be 
biologically driven, or may be decided by the individual under their own exercise of their 
autonomy. Under this constitutional theory, this distinction is irrelevant and unnecessary. As 
                                                                                                                                                       
expectations. (Michelson 2014) While this may be true, it does not take away from the fact that for many, their 
same-sex relationships are similar to many depictions of opposite sex relationships. The comparison is used to 
illustrate the nature of same-sex relationships, to give a clearer understanding about the dynamics and intimacy of 
the association.  
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long as an individual is exercising some choice in forming their intimate associations at the time 
of their conception, then the motivation for why they chose the individual they did is irrelevant 
in the eyes of the law.  
 In Roberts, the Court stated that in order to find a relationship between persons to be an 
intimate association, they must look to the size, purpose, selectivity, and congeniality of the 
relationship. (Roberts) As I’ve explained, the purposes of same-sex relationships clearly aligns 
with the objective that the Court has established. With regard to the selectivity, the choice that is 
exercised demonstrates the exclusivity and uniqueness of the relationship. That that choice is 
made in the face of societal vitriol only strengthens the resolve of the individual in making that 
choice. The congeniality is inherent to the choice being made. If both individual consent into the 
relationship, then they would be doing so in a congenial manner, as it is a relationship pursued 
and desired by both parties. Same-sex relationships also clearly fit within the constructs of the 
final factor: size. Relationships between two persons of different genders have always been 
recognized by the government. There is no difference between opposite-sex relationship and 
same-sex relationships in size, as the only fundamental difference between these couples is the 
genders of the individuals in the relationships.  
 In addition to the provisions established in Roberts, Brennan found that intimate 
associations exist on a spectrum, with some being more important and essential to liberty than 
others. The archetype of the most important association to protect is that of the family. (Roberts) 
This includes both the romantic relationship between two individuals and the familial 
relationships between parents, children, siblings and other relationships formed within the family 
structure. Relying on this archetype, Brennan claims that both the family and romantic 
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relationship allow “individuals [to] draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties 
with others.” The prevalence and meaningfulness of families and their benefits prove their 
importance to both the individual and society. (Roberts) Under this claim, the families that are 
created by two individuals of the same-sex confer all of the same benefits as families with 
opposite gendered parents and mates. Individuals in same-sex unions create the lasting ties 
between individuals in ways opposite sex couples do. They raise children. They experience life 
together in similar ways.  The families and marital relationships of individuals of the same-sex 
are not fundamentally different in any way other than in the genders of those in the relationship, 
which is important because the genders should not be relevant if the purposes of the relationship 
align with the Court’s precedents. 
 The claim that individuals in same-sex relationships should have their association 
protected due to the parallels to the Court-established archetype is even more substantiated when 
comparing it to other protected intimate associations. In keeping in line with Brennan’s belief 
that there is a continuum of different forms of intimate association and variance as to their 
importance, (Roberts) the Court has found there are many types of intimate associations that 
range in their form and purpose. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court ruled that an 
extended family constituted an intimate association. (Moore) The Court has consistently stated 
that close friendships constitute an intimate association. (Corrigan v. City of Newaygo, 1995) 
Even fraternities and sororities, due to their selectivity, private nature, and positive effects that 
they have upon their members, are protected under this right under the 14
th
. (Chi Iota Colony at 
Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City University of New York)  When taking Brennan’s analysis 
about how there is a hierarchy of protection of different forms of intimate association, what must 
be done is a comparison between same-sex romantic relationships and other protected forms. 
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Keeping in mind that the family is the archetype for protection, the association between two 
consenting same-sex adults in a romantic relationship would quite clearly be considered closer to 
the ideal than that of a close friendship or fraternity. By comparing these different forms of 
association, we can see how the associations formed by those in same-sex relationships would be 
considered more meaningful and therefore more worthy of protection given the Court’s method 
of understanding intimate associations. With lesser forms of intimate association being afforded 
the full protections of substantive due process, the logical conclusion is that gay relationships
80
 
would then have to be afforded all of the same protections afforded to all intimate associations. 
 The Court has also emphasized that the recognition and protection of intimate 
associations should not be based on who the individuals are in the association. What is important 
is whether the association fulfills the Roberts requirements, which do not specify who the 
individuals can and cannot be in any way. (Doe v. Doe, 1973) In Moore, the Court specifically 
said that arbitrariness in deciding what constitutes an intimate association for an individual 
cannot be endorsed. It is not the Court’s role to determine what relationships have meaning in a 
person’s life. (Moore) As long as that relationship fulfills the requirements established in 
Roberts, then it ought to be recognized as an intimate association. The Court, in writing this, was 
referring to the existence of familial relationships and how they take many forms. They stated 
that the nuclear family is not the only form of family that should be protected. Rather, the 
extended family can serve the exact same purposes and have the same impact upon one’s life as 
the immediate family does, (Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 2002) and it is arbitrary and 
                                               
80 When I say “gay relationships”, I want to be clear about its definition. While I understand that it could be 
interpreted in this way, I do not mean that it is a relationships predicated upon the identities of the individuals. 
Rather, I am using the term interchangeably with “same-sex relationship”, meaning any romantic relationship 
between individuals of the same-sex. I employ this terminology merely to avoid constant repetition of “same-sex 
relationship”. 
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unjustified for the Court to say that the nuclear family is the only form of familial relations that 
confer the intrinsic benefits of intimate association. (Moore) In applying this logic to gay 
relationships, it is arbitrary to say that only those in opposite gender relationships are cultivating 
intimate associations that are essential to one’s liberty, but those in same gender relationships do 
not. This is the exact form of arbitrariness that the court is seeking to avoid, yet absent any 
recognition of same-sex couples as intimate associations, the Court is directly endorsing this 
subjectivity.  
 The Court articulated an additional purpose in avoiding arbitrariness when determining 
what should to be considered an intimate association under the 14
th
 Amendment. In writing about 
how the family cannot be understood to just mean the nuclear family consisting of two parents 
and their legal children, the Court stated that this understanding of a family cannot be considered 
the “normal” or desired form of family because it does not reflect the diversity of society. Rather, 
it is an imposition of white, suburban ideals. (Moore) The Court does not want to take away from 
the associations formed in these relationships, but these norms should not be dictated as 
preferred by the Court, or the only family relations worthy of judicial protection. By holding the 
nuclear family dynamic as the preferred family structure, the Court would then be protecting a 
style of living that is reflective of only a small subset of a population that has been privileged 
above many others. The Court has the duty to recognize that meaningful family structure come in 
all different forms, and only recognizing the form of family that those with privilege have 
constructed does not reflect the duties of the Court, which is to adequately dispense rights to all, 
regardless of their place in society. (Johnson) 
 This logic correlates to gay relationships. It is not the Court’s place to uphold certain 
forms of relationships simply because they are strongly rooted in society due to the power those 
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with privilege wield. Opposite sex relationships are strongly rooted in our society’s history, and 
they have shaped much of our country’s cultural attitudes about the formations of romantic 
relationships. However, given the Moore precedent, the Court is not concerned with merely 
upholding associations created by those with privilege. It is concerned with determining what is 
essential to liberty, and how the Court can best preserve what they deem to be essential to 
liberty. Denying same-sex relationships as a form of intimate association would be accepting the 
norms established by the majority, instead of searching for the mere existence of intimate 
associations and the benefits they confer. The Court has made it clear that the form of the 
relationship is not relevant, and that they should not only concern themselves with the forms of 
association merely because some associations have been normalized by populations of privilege. 
The source or tradition of association is irrelevant; the purposes, benefits, and links to liberty are 
what matter. And in the case of same-sex relationships, they clearly align as intimate 
associations, and the source of these relationships is not relevant to their existence and need for 
protection.  
How to Adjudicate Such Cases 
 Having established that the relationships between members of the same gender should be 
considered intimate associations, it is imperative to understand what that means in terms of how 
cases involving infringement upon this right should be treated by the Court. Because this is a 
right found under substantive due process under the 14
th
 Amendment, it would be designated a 
fundamental right. (Roe v. Wade, 1973; Griswold) As a fundamental right, it is protected by strict 
scrutiny, which in review means that in order to infringe on the right, the government must have 
a compelling reason to infringe and the means of achieving the compelling purpose must be 
narrowly tailored. (Korematsu) As explained in earlier chapters, this is the highest standard, 
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meaning it is the greatest form of protection of an individual right. The perceptions of strict 
scrutiny is that it is overwhelmingly protective of the individual’s rights. The protections would 
be unprecedented for individuals in same-sex relationships , and would change the entire legal 
understanding of same-sex relationships in society. 
 Even though it has been well-established that rights found essential to liberty under the 
Due Process Clause are to be adjudicated under strict scrutiny, the Court has sometimes found 
that there are situations in which the right to intimate association can be infringed in a minor 
way. (Zablocki) This belief was broached in Roberts, when Justice Brennan wrote that if not all 
of the qualities are met to prove that some relationship is an intimate association, then lesser 
burdens can be imposed on the government in order to restrict the right. For situations when the 
right is not restricted in a fundamental way, the Court has determined that rational basis review 
ought to be applied. (Roberts) Articulated in Akers v. McGinnis, infringements upon the right to 
intimate association are only weighed under strict scrutiny if they  affect a substantial portion of 
the population. Situations in which  select individuals are being restricted, but the rules 
restricting them do not apply to a large subset of the populace, then rational basis review should 
be employed. (Akers) 
 It is my contention that if a right is fundamental to liberty, then the scope of the 
restriction upon the number affected should not be relevant. If there is an infringement to 
individual liberty, then the Court should recognize that infringement upon an individual for its 
own sake and the effect on that individual in that courtroom instead of weighing if it applies to a 
great number of people. However, given the Akers standard, the Court has and continues to make 
differentiations between restrictions upon intimate associations. Even with this standard in place, 
any restrictions upon relationships between individuals of the same sex should still be 
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adjudicated under strict scrutiny and could not be lowered to the more deferential tier of rational 
basis review. By not recognizing relationships between individuals of the same sex, it limits the 
possibility of developing meaningful romantic and family relationships by half of the available 
population, as they are limited to finding those connections with only members of the opposite 
sex. For those who identify as gay or lesbian, and prefer to find these relationships exclusively 
with persons of the same sex, this serves as a restriction that cannot be avoided, as they would 
not seek relationships with members of the opposite gender. As such, it is clear that even with 
the Akers standard in place, limitations on same-sex relationships constitute a substantial 
infringement on a large subset of the population.  
 The only way that a restriction on a gay relationship would be lowered to rational basis 
review is if the same restriction was placed on a straight relationship. Why is this? Because the 
Akers standard is blind to who the individuals are in an intimate association, and only recognizes 
the sum of its parts. The examples of allowed restrictions include preventing workplace 
disruption or maintaining productivity. (Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power System, 2001) Neither 
of these justifications, or many others, are exclusive to one type of couple. They instead are 
reflective of the effect that the existence of a relationship can have upon a workplace or other 
relevant setting. As such, rational basis review is used for instances in which it would be more 
productive for the workplace environment to transfer one employee to another department or 
branch within a company to maintain professionalism instead of having both members of a 
couple working together, as was the case in Anderson v. City of Lavergne. But if the harm being 
imposed on a relationship singled out those only in same-sex relationships, then they would 
unjustifiably be prioritizing the genders of the individuals in one relationship over another. When 
the relationships between opposite and same-sex couples act in highly similar ways, yet one type 
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is allowed while another is not, that should trigger strict scrutiny, because the marginalization of 
one’s choices is more profound, due to their being limited based on their partner’s gender.  
Weighing Same-sex Couples’ Right to Intimate Association against Competing 
Compelling Purposes 
In advancing this alternative theory substantiating the constitutional rights of those in 
same-sex relationships, there are two prongs that must each be analytically satisfied. First, those 
in same-sex relationships must be proven to form intimate associations. As I have discussed at 
length throughout this chapter, gay relationships clearly fall within the Court’s precedents as an 
intimate association that is deserving of strict scrutiny. The second prong relies on the first 
prong, that same-sex relationships are considered intimate associations. In order to determine 
whether same-sex relationships ought to be protected under strict scrutiny, the right must be 
weighed against competing governmental purposes, as is the case with all rights analysis. Simply 
establishing same-sex relationships as an intimate association under substantive due process does 
not guarantee judicial protection of the relationship. All it does is establish how the Court should 
understand same-sex relationships. In order to formally receive protection, it must be weighed 
against competing values, and determined whether or not the right is deemed more or less 
important than the given government purpose.  
Because gay relationships have not been recognized as intimate associations, the courts 
have not had the opportunity to say whether the  government purposes for restricting this right 
are compelling enough to outweigh the interests in protecting the liberty of the 14
th
 Amendment. 
Even so, the arguments against gay rights employed in the more traditional Equal Protection 
cases apply to this constitutional approach. Primarily, the arguments against same-sex 
relationships are rooted in arguments about the national ethos, morals, and protection of 
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traditional values. Although the Court has taken into account the role of morals and national 
tradition in its decisions, these arguments are insufficient when weighed under strict scrutiny. 
They are not nearly compelling enough to outweigh a fundamental aspect of liberty such as the 
right to intimate association.  
The argument that gay relationships should not be recognized and protected as an 
intimate association has been argued by claiming that such relationships are not deeply rooted in 
society. (Doe v. Doe, 1973) These relationships do not adequately reflect the long standing 
traditions of our country and have not been essential to persons throughout the country’s history. 
Opposite sex marriage and its recognition has been the bedrock of organization of society at the 
micro level. (Loving) Persons interact with the world through their families, and it is these 
relationships that have established the nature of our society. What is key is that these families 
have taken the form of opposite sex relationships. While I, and many others, have claimed that 
this is an arbitrary distinction, there are many who argue that it is this familial relationships that 
is fundamental. The exact form of the family is relevant, because it is this form that is enduring 
and continued to be seen as the model of stability in society. (Devlin 1965, 64)  
Because opposite gender relationships are deeply rooted in the ethics and norms of our 
society, and have proven to be beneficial to cultivating a rights-enhancing, democratic state, then 
it is argued that this should be protection of opposite-sex unions. By looking at the practicality of 
the relationships, and that this practicality has been shown to be valued and beneficial, it then 
provides an additional basis that the right is both necessary for individuals and important for the 
government to protect for society on the whole. When analyzing same-sex relationships, there is 
no history that they can serve the same purposes for society in similar ways to opposite sex 
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relationships. Many contend that same-sex relationships simply cannot be as meaningful as 
straight relationships.
81
 The more salient argument, however, is that even if the relationships 
between same-sex individuals are just as meaningful as opposite sex relationships, there is no 
proof that they would benefit society in the same way as the relationships that have been proven 
to be fundamental to our nation. (Devlin 1965, 61-62) Without this assurance, the government 
then has a compelling claim at prioritizing relationships that are known to be positive for the 
functioning of the state on a macro level.  
The reliance on traditional norms is expounded in FW/PBS, in which Justice O’Connor 
claims that intimate associations must be recognized as part of the country’s traditions in order to 
be considered a fundamental right. Her argument was that if our country has been so successful 
and individuals have been able to thrive for so long without recognition of this right, then is it 
actually fundamental? If a right is so fundamental to liberty, then it would have been recognized 
and become part of the national ethos, because any right that is so important wouldn’t be so 
grossly overlooked.(FW/PBS) It is on these grounds that marriage between opposite sex couples 
was recognized as a fundamental right. (Zablocki) It is an institution that had endured since our 
country’s inception, and one that the majority of individuals seek out. (Loving) Because we as a 
nation have always sought out to fill this need in our lives, the right can then be claimed to be 
fundamental. But when applying that to gay relationships, there has been no such push or desire 
to actualize these relationships in public settings. As such, the right cannot be thought of as 
fundamental, because it wasn’t necessary for such a long period of time.  
                                               
81 Some of those who argue against recognition for gay relationships include Debra DeLaet (2008), Gay Marriage as 
a Religious Right, Manuel Lopez (2005), and Sherif Girgis (2012)  
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While this argument can be persuasive, there are many responses that mitigate the impact 
of this rationale. First, appealing to national ethos and tradition is inherently an arbitrary process. 
(Richards 1986, 957) Slavery was a fundamental part of the country’s economy, culture, and way 
of life for the first 70 years of the United States’ existence. Does that justify the practice, because 
it is deeply rooted? What if we only look at any blatant racial discrimination, which was 
explicitly codified into law for almost 200 years? (Millett 1963, 35-37) While these may seem 
like extreme, straw man examples, they highlight the fact that under an appeal to tradition, truly 
morally reprehensible practices could be justified as legitimate simply because they have been 
important in society in the past. Argumentatively, the reliance on traditions of rights, instead of 
analyzing a right for its own sake, is an is-ought fallacy. Because society has promoted and 
endured with certain practices does not inherently justify them, and it does not preclude other 
practices from being necessary as well. The simple existence of opposite sex relationships and 
their success does not mean that there are no other relationships that can serve the same purpose. 
This argument can only be used to reiterate the importance of opposite-sex relationships, which I 
am not trying to take anything away from. The true role of opposite-sex relationships in my 
argument is to show how they confer benefits very similar to same sex relationships. This then 
lends credence to the argument that their similarities in structure and conferred benefits should 
lead to similarities in judicial protection. 
Additionally, the argument that because there is no proven track record of the beneficial 
nature of gay relationships to society, there is no reason to recognize the right, is flawed in other 
ways. The argument goes that it has not been proven that society would be detrimented by 
recognizing same-sex relationships in equal ways to opposite sex relationships. While many 
contend that states that have full recognition of same-sex relationships have had no issues in 
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integrating same-sex couples and families into modern society, we cannot say with complete, 
unflinching confidence that these relationships will ultimately have no effect or prove beneficial 
to the democratic state, politically or culturally. (Baker v. Nelson, 1971)  
Through my view, allowing gay relationships would actually provide its own intrinsic, 
unique benefits for society. A greater understanding and acceptance of diversity allow 
individuals to feel more comfortable and confident in all facets of their life, because they know 
they would not be ridiculed or harmed because of aspects so fundamental to their life. While I 
can reason and convince others that greater acceptance of different forms of romantic 
relationships would be beneficial to society, I cannot prove with definitiveness. The lack of 
definitiveness exists for speculation about whether recognition of gay relationships would be 
positive or negative for society, because they have not been recognized in order to know with 
any certainty one way or the other. To the point where we do not know one way or another what 
the general impact of widespread recognition of these relationships are, however, we cannot rely 
on any sort of determination that would presuppose their impact. Because no determination can 
be made about the impact of gay relationships the Court should then remove any thoughts on the 
impact of gay relationships upon society, and merely look at the relationship for its own sake and 
whether the rights of those individuals should be valued. By removing speculation about the 
impacts of same-sex relationships, the argument about why we should uphold only traditional 
values and practices over protecting individual rights is severely weakened. With its weakening, 
this purpose becomes far from compelling, and is therefore unable to sustain a ban on same-sex 
relationship recognition.  
As is clear, the reliance on tradition is fraught with issues in allocating and recognizing 
rights essential to liberty. However, for the sake of argument, let’s assume that we must rely on 
Binder  130 
 
the traditions of the nation in order to justify any claims of liberty under the Due Process Clause. 
This leads us back to the initial problem with relying on tradition: that it is inherently arbitrary 
which ideals are worthy  of protection. (Schwartzchild 2013, 120) Just as opponents make 
frequent claim that only opposite gender relationships are rooted in our nation’s history and 
culture, those in favor of same-sex relationships can consequently say that recognizing their 
intimate association does align with national traditions. Part of our national ethos is valuing 
choice, and how that choice allows individuals to construct meaningful lives. As a country, we 
value the individuality of persons and the autonomy that they have the potential of exercising. 
Additionally, we value the exercise of that choice in the relationships that we form, as evidenced 
by the enumerated rights to assembly (Thomas v. Collins, 1945)
82
, right to free exercise of 
religion (which is typically done in communal settings), (Sherbert)
83
 right to protection from 
quartering of soldiers (recognizing the sanctity of the home and the relationships that make up 
the unit),and right to protection of one’s persons and papers, (Weeks v. U.S., 1914)84 among 
others. The Bill of Rights, and subsequent amendments, highlight a general motivation in valuing 
the individual capabilities and autonomies that all persons can exercise if given the opportunity. 
The original purpose of the Bill of Rights was to ensure that the individual citizen’s autonomy 
was protected in some fundamental ways.(Rakove 1985) 
It is this tradition of protecting the basic essences of being a human being in a democratic 
state that has been central to the formation of our government. These feelings of protecting 
individuality have persisted throughout our country’s history to the present day, as evidenced by 
                                               
82 Other cases affirming the freedom of assembly include Edwards v. South Carolina (1963), and De Jonge v. State 
of Oregon (1937) 
83  Other cases affirming the free exercise of religion include Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith (1990) and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah (1993) 
84 Other cases affirming the protection from search and seizure include Boyd v. U.S. (1886) and Schermber v. 
California (1966) 
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the intense focus upon libertarianism in our political debates today. When looking at our nation’s 
traditions from this perspective, recognition of same-sex relationships would definitely fit into an 
ethos of individual rights and self-actualization. The argument of appealing to tradition could be 
applied as support, not opposition to the recognition of gay relationships. In comparing support 
and opposition to same-sex relationship recognition when viewed through a framework of 
comparison to national traditions, it can be convincingly argued that the text and basic ideologies 
are aligned with recognition. The Bill of Rights alludes or specifically mentions the rights to 
choice and association, whereas it makes no mention whatsoever about the genders of a romantic 
couple.  
The metric used to evaluate whether the government can infringe upon a fundamental 
right requires a compelling purpose to outweigh the rights infringement. It does not require an 
equal balancing between government objectives and rights protection. In order to serve as 
justification for infringing upon the right to intimate association, the argument of upholding 
traditional values must be so strong that it outweighs the interests of protecting the liberty 
endowed in the 14
th
 Amendment. First, it is not clear that we have selected the right value to 
uphold, which undermines any argument that protecting one definition of a relationship is more 
valuable than protecting a fundamental right. Second, even if it was clear that the definition of 
proper relationships was the primary value to protect over all others, that still does not explain 
why it is so compelling, and narrowly-tailored, to restrict all individuals from actualizing 
relationships between themselves and individuals of the same gender and gaining proper 
recognition of that relationship. It has not been shown that there is a tangible, significant harm in 
recognizing same-sex relationships, which is necessary if the government purpose is to be 
recognized and upheld. (Karst 1985, 649) As such, opponents must be able to show both why the 
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value of opposite sex relationships so important, and how that value would be harmed in a 
significant way if same-sex relationships were to be recognized. The argument of protecting 
traditional values cannot do either of these two things, thereby showing its limitations and 
inadequacies as a justification for restricting this structure of the right to intimate association.  
 Another argument employed by those against same-sex relationships is similar in form to 
upholding traditional values. Many against gay relationships appeal to arguments about 
upholding common morality. One of the most influential scholars in the field of legal 
philosophy, Lord Patrick Devlin, articulates the nature of how law is determined. As a legal 
precedent, he claims that the law is based on moral law, and that the root of codified laws is 
reflective of moral underpinnings. (Devlin 1965, 61-62) When discussing the morality of 
protecting strictly opposite sex relationships, the most common association discussed is 
marriage. Devlin claims that marriage should be protected as an institution of one man and one 
woman, because it both reflects the moral fabric of society and is a proven institution in society 
that cultivates progress and stability. (Devlin 1965, 62-63) This logic can be applied to all 
opposite sex relationships. Any form of limitation on recognition of relationships based on the 
genders, can be attributed to the moral underpinnings.  
 The flaws with appealing to morality run deep. The entire argument is a monumental is-
ought fallacy. The arguments to appeal to morality is made by stating that the law reflects 
morals, and because the law has only reflected the legitimacy of opposite sex relationships, they 
therefore can continue to recognize only these relationships. This argument assumes either 
assumes that morals do not change, or it accepts that the only morals that are relevant are those 
determined during the foundation of our country. It does not reflect the shifting understanding of 
what is right and what is good. This is a common view of originalists, most notably Associate 
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Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. Some originalists believe that the Court should interpret 
the Constitution based on the cultural and social understandings of rights during the time that the 
Constitution was written and ratified in 1787. In that time, same-sex relationships were not 
allowed or written into the constitution as a protected right. (Scalia 1988) If it was actually 
important to guarantee the right to have same sex relations and expect government recognition, 
then the right would have been incorporated into the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. Since 
they were not, then we cannot subsequently find a right to exist in the constitution when the right 
was not clearly explicated by the drafters.  
 The ultimate problem with appealing to morality is that there is no true understanding 
about the origination of the morals that are supposedly essential to uphold. There is nothing to 
reflect the sentiment that opposite sex relationships are philosophically more justified for 
recognition than same-sex relationships. The most salient arguments for many against same-sex 
relationships come instead from religious teachings.
85
 Sonu Bedi, one of the leading scholars on 
this matter, claims if  we were to look to morals to justify bans on same-sex couples, the only 
moral justification is rooted in religious teachings. Therefore, they are what he calls a “shadow 
establishment of religion.” (Bedi 2013, 218) Upholding values rooted strictly or primarily in one 
theology, as bans on same-sex relationships do, the Court would violate the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment, which states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion.”86 It would be irresponsible for the Court to rely on a justification to 
restrict one’s rights that is unconstitutional in itself. The logical conclusion is that the reliance on 
                                               
85 In reviewing the arguments by those opposed to same-sex marriage, one of the most prominent is that a belief in 
gay rights goes against their religious convictions. (TFP 2014; Hawkins, 2012, National Organization for Marriage, 
2014). Additionally, when asked of citizens who are opposed to same-sex marriage, the most common reason for 
opposition was that it conflicts with their religious beliefs (47%) (Gallup 2014) 
86 The Establishment Clause has been interpreted to include all government bodies and agencies, not just acts of 
Congress. The Establishment Clause states that the government cannot endorse any organized religion in any way.  
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morality is wrought with far too much error to be used to infringe upon the fundamental right to 
intimate association. 
 If the morality preferring opposite sex relationships is not rooted in religious text, then it 
must be found through secular reasoning in the will of the people. Such is claimed emphatically 
by Devlin. (Devlin 1965, 47) It is my primary contention that morality, even if believed by the 
vast majority of people, is not able to substantiate a ban on a fundamental right to humanity 
without some other interest to substantiate that ban.
87
 However, even if we are to accept Devlin’s 
framework that the government’s understanding of morality should be based on the will of the 
people, it isn’t clear that the moral proclivities of persons in the United States today would 
actually support restriction on same-sex couples. In actuality, more than half of the country’s 
population supports marriage equality for same-sex couples. (Gallup 2014) Additionally, gay 
marriage is the issue in which there is the greatest resistance in extending protections to 
individuals in same-sex relationships. Employment protection and recognition of civil unions, 
among other issues, show much greater widespread support for protection of same-sex couples.
88
 
                                               
87 This belief is also well substantiated in academia. In a series of writings, Devlin and the father of legal positivism, 
H.L.A. Hart, each articulated their views on the role of morality in the common law, and how the morality of the 
people could be determined or enforced. Hart responds to Devlin, who claims that the laws should reflect the will of 
the people, and if the will of the people includes a clear consensus around some moral conviction, then the law 
should reflect that. Hart counters by saying that morality can only be used as justification to restrict an individual’s 
rights if the supposed immoral “act harm[s] anyone independently of its repercussions on the shared morality of the 
society? And does this act affect the shared morality and thereby weaken society?” (Hart 1963) Hart reviews laws 
predicated on upholding morals with a more critical eye, finding that if immoral actions were to be allowed in spite 
of the common morality of the general public, there must be some clear, demonstrative harm that results. Absent any 
harm, the morals do not outweigh the right of the individual being infringed. I, along with many others (Kenneth 
Karst, David Richards, Hanna Schwartzchild), find myself aligned with this viewpoint. 
88 72% of all citizens believe gays should receive employment protection, meaning that they cannot be fired based 
on their sexual orientation. 67% of respondents believe that gay couples should receive equal rights as straight 
coupes in the form of a civil union, compared to only 28% in opposition. Of note is that these polls were worded 
recognizing one’s orientation as more fixed and a fundamental part of their identity. This differs from my legal 
belief, that the relationship is all that is relevant, not the conception of identity. However, even though there is a 
difference in approaches, it does not negate that the general  public does not hold the strong moral beliefs against 
same-sex relationships that would be used as justification to restrict the rights of those in same-sex relationships. 
(Gallup 2014) 
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So, if we were to rely on the will of the people (which as I’ve stated is problematic in its own 
right), we would still come to the conclusion that same-sex relationships should be recognized. 
This metric lends clear support for recognition of this right as a 14
th
 Amendment form of liberty. 
It does not serve in any reasonable way as a government justification to limit the rights of 
citizens.  
Additionally, the arguments appealing to morals are vulnerable to the same criticism as 
those about protecting national tradition. It is arbitrary which long-held morals are valued. While 
there are many who consider the restriction of same-sex unions as a moral duty, this is not the 
only moral obligation that can be conferred for this issue. For many, protection of diversity and 
the cultivation of that diversity is important, so as not to homogenize society into one limiting 
identity. (Marcus 2006, 282) This diversity allows for a greater freedom of expression and the 
ability to develop one’s identity on an individual level. It also encourages a wider discourse of 
ideas and perspectives. (Bowers) Another moral consideration could be the prevention of 
government intervention into individual decision making. As a moral consideration, the 
individual’s self interest in determining their own life path is essential to the construct of their 
character and the pursuit of happiness.  
Both of these moral claims, along with many others, are highly important in the minds of 
many. To the point that these moral beliefs have real traction and can reasonably function as 
government interests, then there is no reason that the moral that restricts the rights of same-sex 
couples should be prioritized over all other valid moral considerations. Again, if it cannot be 
determined which moral conclusion the government has a clear duty to uphold, then how can it 
be claimed that one of these moral stances is so important to outweighs fundamental rights? The 
simple conclusion is that it cannot.  
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The final argument against recognition and protection of same-sex relationships is that 
those in gay relationships can’t procreate. Those opposed claim that one of the primary purposes 
of marriage is to provide an optimal relationship for child-rearing, and incentivizing the most 
healthy relationship for procreating. Given that procreation can only be done between and 
biological men and women, it is argued that the government should protect the optimal 
relationships that promotes healthy procreation patterns. It is obvious that two individuals of the 
same-sex cannot procreate on their own. (Lopez 2005) Given this, the argument is that by having 
equal recognition between opposite sex and same-sex couples, the government would be 
conflating an ideal form and a lesser form of romantic relationships under the umbrella of one 
definition, even though there is one form of the relationships that is preferred, because of an 
opposite sex couples’ ability to procreate. It does not mean that those in gay relationships should 
have no rights. But given that they are not capable of procreating, and conferring all of the 
benefits that come with being able to procreate, the legal recognition should not allow these 
relationships to be seen as completely equal. (Girgis, Gordon, and Anderson, 2012) 
 This argument is deeply flawed for a multitude of reasons. First, it conflates romantic 
relationships and procreation to a point in which they are inextricably linked to each other, which 
is categorically false. While many in opposite sex relationships do choose to marry and have 
children as married partners, that does not mean that the practice of procreation is inherent to 
marriage of opposite sex relationships. Individuals frequently procreate outside the confines of 
marriage, yet are not restricted in any way for doing so. Also, those in opposite sex relationships 
that do not procreate are not prevented from having their relationship recognized. The fact that 
such relationships and procreation are linked in some way does not mean they are mutually 
exclusive to each other. Because individuals in same-sex relationships cannot beget a child on 
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their own, their relationships are to be seen as less valid because of this incapacity. However, if 
this logic were to be applied to all, then any couple who was infertile, medically unable, or 
elderly would not have their relationship recognized as well, because they are just as incapable of 
procreating as same-sex couples.  
 Furthermore, this argument is even less compelling when used as justification against the 
right to intimate association instead of Equal Protection. As explained earlier, the right to 
intimate association is one that is focused upon the benefits that intimate social relationships 
between individuals have upon those involved. Among many other benefits, they allow one to 
grow, development of virtues such as trust and love, and exploration of different ideas through 
social relationships. All of these benefits, along with many others, are for the purpose of 
recognizing the liberty essential to personhood. These rights are not awarded because of some 
utilitarian societal benefit. Because these rights are solely focused on the individual, the societal 
harm must be so great so as to outweigh the individual right. However, there is no harm 
demonstrated in recognizing same-sex relationships that relates to procreation. Greater 
recognition of same-sex relationships does not mean there will cease to be opposite sex 
relationships in which individuals choose to beget children. Consequently, there is no compelling 
purpose regarding protecting procreation that allows the individual right to be limited. If we 
began to see a sharp population decline due to a much higher percentage of individuals in non-
procreative relationships, then there may be a compelling government purpose in protecting the 
interests of society. Absent this decline or any sign of the size of the population being threatened 
in essential ways, there is no purpose that outweighs the individual right on this basis. 
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Expanding the Scope of the Right to Intimate Association 
 Up until this point, I have focused upon the rights of individuals who are in same-sex 
relationships. This could lead to the conclusion that the right to intimate association only would 
extend to those who have found that intimate association, and would only cover restriction that 
affect the existence of same-sex relationships. However, this would misinterpret the purpose of 
the right. At its basis, the right to intimate association, as with all rights found  under the liberty 
provision under the Due Process Clause of the 14
th
 Amendment, is one endowed to the 
individual. It is not solely attributed to the existence of a romantic, same-sex couple, but rather to 
the individuals within that relationship. All should have the right to pursue whatever 
relationships that they desire, provided that those relationships don’t create a net harm that would 
form a basis for government intervention. The focus has been on the actual relationship because 
the reasons for protecting this individual right are found through the formation of the association. 
The restrictions against individuals who seek to exercise this right have also been argued much 
more strongly against the actual relationship, instead of the beliefs that underlie the relationship. 
The opposition against same-sex relationships has focused their arguments on the relationship 
itself, instead of focusing on the rights of the individuals in the relationship.  
 As I have stated numerous times, the purpose of the right to intimate association is one 
that all should be able to access. Given this premise, the fact that one is actually in a relationship 
that would be characterized as an intimate association is irrelevant. If one expresses a desire to 
enter into a same-sex relationship, then they cannot be restricted from doing so, unless the 
government could show a compelling purpose for restricting this desire. The reason for doing is 
one cannot be punished merely for having a desire to exercise a constitutionally protected right. 
It would be completely illogical for the Court to protect individuals in a constitutionally 
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protected relationship, but then allow for restriction of individuals based on their want to employ 
that exact right.  
 This analysis also extends to the right to not form intimate associations, and to not be 
discriminated on this basis. If an individual seeks to never form any romantic relationships in her 
life and chooses to remain single, she has the right to choose whether or not she actualizes her 
fundamental rights. The choice that is so important in forming intimate associations still exists in 
the right to not form such relationships. One is consciously exercising their autonomy to not 
commit to a relationship with another individual. (Karst 1985, 634) They cannot then be 
penalized for acting on their ability of choice in not pursuing the relationship. Abortion serves as 
a compelling example to highlight this point. The majority of women will never have an 
abortion, yet they all still have the right to choose to receive one or not. Such is the same with 
intimate associations. 
 The idea of protecting one’s right to not act upon a constitutional right is not simply 
drawn from logic. We see examples of the Court recognizing that an individual’s choice to not 
actualize a right is still protected. The Second Amendment allows the individual the right to bear 
arms, yet it is not required that she must do so. (District of Columbia v. Heller, 2008) The choice 
of whether or not one wants to act upon their enumerated right by owning a firearm is essential 
to the right’s existence. The individual cannot subsequently be harmed in a significant way 
because of their decision on whether or not they choose to actualize the right. As long as the 
right is premised on the choice of the individual, then that individual can’t be punished for 
choosing whether or not they want to exercise that right.  
 Additionally, this right would protect those who are discriminated on the basis of 
appearance of homosexuality. Even if one does not make it public what their preferred gender is 
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when forming intimate associations, such individuals can still be discriminated for how they 
would appear to actualize this right. Therefore, one cannot discriminate against another 
individual due to their appeared sexual preference, because the discriminator is still making an 
unconstitutional value judgment upon someone else’s protected right to intimate association. 
This is further substantiated when remembering the choice that is so important to developing 
intimate associations. If one can choose their intimate partners, and another person can 
stereotype another individual about who they would associate with, and consequently harm them 
in some way, then the choice of the individual is being marginalized, because their choice (or 
perceived choice) is the reason for their discrimination.  
 Throughout this chapter, I have explained in great detail why the arguments allowing for 
the discrimination of those in same-sex relationships do not justify infringing the right to 
intimate association. While the arguments seeking to restrict the right to intimate association are 
lacking in substance, it does not mean that there are no instances in which this right can be 
restricted. The limits of the protections associated to the right to intimate association when 
applied to individuals in same-sex couples are reached when weighed against the right to free 
speech and right to expressive association. The Court has repeatedly reiterated the importance of 
the right to free speech and freedom of belief, and that the government cannot censor 
individuals’ right to expressed their own beliefs. With regard to free speech, one limit upon the 
right to intimate association is that other individuals are constitutionally protected in their ability 
to transmit speech in opposition to same sex couples. As the first Court stated in Abrams v. 
United States, it is not the Court’s nor the government’s role to decide what can be characterized 
as acceptable speech or thought. That right and duty is proscribed to the people. (Abrams v. 
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United States, 1919)
89
 If one does promote socially unacceptable views, then it is up to the 
people to mobilize and actualizes their own right to free speech in order to drown out those 
unpopular views. (Linder 1984, 1902) This is applicable to opposition to gay relationships. 
Realistically, we can reasonably claim that there will be persons who would not accept same-sex 
relationships as legitimate, and would advocate against their recognition and protection, as 
almost half of the country’s electorate still opposes recognition of gay marriage. (Gallup 2014) 
The right to express discriminatory views is protected, so long as it does not directly infringe 
another individual’s right to intimate association. 
 The other limitation on the bounds of the right to intimate association when applied to 
same-sex couples is the right to expressive association. As explained in Chapter Four, the right to 
expressive association is rooted in the First Amendment as a facilitative right to freedom of 
speech and freedom of assembly. (Board of Directors of Rotary Intern. v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 
1987) The right allows individuals to congregate together and impart their collective views as an 
organized body,  merely forming an additional way in which an individual can actualize their 
right to free speech. (Thoum 2002, 646) Because it is an extension of free speech, the rights of 
expressive associations allow for a level of what would appear to be discriminatory practices. 
The Court has stated that if the central purpose of an expressive association’s purpose is intended 
to promote a viewpoint against the rights of some other group, then that association is allowed to 
exclude members of the targeted group from joining the organization. This principle was clearly 
explicated in the case Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor of Thurmont, 
in which the Maryland District Court stated that the KKK is not required to admit blacks into the 
                                               
89 Other reiterations of this right include U.S. v. Rumely (1953), Lamont v. Postmaster General (1965), N.Y. Times v. 
Sullivan (1964), and Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) 
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organization, and was allowing the group to restrict the rights to Equal Protection.
90
 (Invisible 
Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor of Thurmont , 1988)The reason was that the 
KKK’s expressed purpose is the devaluation of rights for African-Americans. If the government 
were to force the KKK to admit blacks, the group would be forced to compromise their beliefs, 
and thereby forced to suppress the right to free speech they were trying to actualize. (Invisible 
Empire)  
The same logic has been applied to individuals desiring same-sex relationships in the 
monumental case Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, in which the Court stated that because the Boy 
Scouts are a private expressive association intended on instilling values in the younger 
generations of males, they can decide what values they hold central to their concept of morality. 
With this liberty, the Boy Scouts have held that homosexuality and same-sex relationships are 
not moral and should not be pursued of one wants to live a value-laden life. (Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale, 2000) There have been many who have disputed that the views opposing 
homosexuality are the central purpose of the Boy Scouts. Organization such as HRC claim that 
the Boy Scouts are instead intended to promote values such as community-building and 
teamwork. (Windy City Times, 2000) However, the Court has affirmed that when a group claims 
that the fundamental reason for their existence does have discriminatory views, and there is proof 
that the group’s practices reflect those views, then they are allowed by way of the First 
Amendment to discriminate against a group. This right would supersede the right to intimate 
association and the protection of this right. (Hurley)  
 To be clear, the right to expressive association does not cover any group who makes a 
claim that they stand in opposition to some group of people, and therefore are allowed to limit 
                                               
90 Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor of Thurmont 
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the rights of those individuals. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees and Rotary Club International v. Duarte 
prove that an association cannot claim that their fundamental purpose is premised upon the 
exclusion of some group of people and instantly receive protection. The Court said that the both 
the Jaycees and the Rotary Club, which both excluded women, were not founded to express 
views on male superiority. Rather, they were create for the purposes of networking and civic 
engagement, which are not exclusive to men. As such, women could not be prevented from 
joining the group. This line of precedents illustrates that restrictions and harms placed upon 
individuals who seek to actualize their fundamental rights cannot be arbitrary. In order to 
discriminate, such views must be central to actualizing the right to free speech. Otherwise, the 
rights of the marginalized group of people hold more importance. (Roberts; Rotary Club)  
This dynamic also explains the rights of businesses or other private actors. A business or 
employment opportunity could not be restricted to only those who pursue opposite sex 
relationships, because the central purpose of the business is not to impart views of opposite sex 
relationship superiority. Their central purpose is to provide a service or good and generate a 
profit. Most institutions or associations that would seek to restrict those in gay relationships do 
not have an expressed purpose of restricting such individuals. (Roberts) Because of this, these 
institutions are not constitutionally permitted to discriminate. The distinction between the central 
purposes of different associations establish the brightline as to when individuals in same-sex 
relationships can be discriminated against and when they cannot, and further clarifies the scope 
of these protections. 
 To clarify, the examples referenced were of institutions exercising their right to 
expressive association to discriminate against other individuals in same-sex relationships. In the 
courts, these cases weighed the rights to expressive association against a minority’s right to 
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Equal Protection, not their right to intimate association. Even though Equal Protection was at 
issue in those cases, the logic still applies to the right to intimate association. The target of 
discrimination does not need to be a group of people seeking equal rights and recognition of their 
rights to Equal Protection. As long as an expressive association is seeking to restrict the rights of 
some individuals, then the right that is being infringed is irrelevant. So groups that want to 
infringe upon an individual’s right to intimate association must show that it is their central 
purpose to restrict such individuals in order to prevent them from joining their association. As 
long as that is proven, then the targeted group does not need to be targeted on the basis of 
preventing equal protection, just on the basis of preventing some individual from being able to 
access some established right. On the other hand, associations whose central purpose is not 
premised upon discrimination against individuals in gay relationships cannot harm such 
individuals through restriction or marginalization. 
Strategic Avoidance: Why the Right to Intimate Association was not Pursued by 
Gay Rights Activists 
 Throughout this thesis, I have explained at great length why pursuing a right to intimate 
association would be preferable to protect gays than an Equal Protection justification. However, 
if this right was is so preferred compared to Equal Protection, and was a part of the case law 
during the time of many of the preeminent gay rights cases
91
, then it begs the question as to why 
it was not pursued by gay rights activists seeking equality through the courts. The answer is not 
that the legal analysis of gays’ right to intimate association was not compelling, because these 
                                               
91 Roberts v. Jaycees was decided in 1984. The  first case that the Supreme Court heard and decided with a formal 
written opinion was Bowers v. Hardwick in 1986. The only case regarding gay rights that came before the Supreme 
Court prior to Roberts was Baker v. Nelson in 1971, in which the Court decided via summary judgment that gays did 
not have the right to marry.  
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arguments were strongly considered and argued in Bowers v. Hardwick. (Schraub 2010, 1448) 
The answer lies in the political considerations for the gay rights movement, and were the basis of 
the case’s dissent. Activists had to consider a legal strategy that could both had a chance at being 
effective in court and would also cast gays in a favorable light politically. Throughout the 1980s, 
the concept of homosexuality as an identity was in its infancy, and did not have the support of a 
substantial portion of the population in the way that the belief has nowadays.
92
 Much of the 
country saw gays as individuals who chose to partake in alternative forms of sexual conduct, and 
not as individuals who held an identity that deviated from the concept of heterosexuality. (Pew 
Research 2013) It was the goal of activists to try to change the perceptions of the wider 
population that being gay should not be reduced simply to the sexual conduct between two 
individuals. These strategies sought to better reflect the way many felt about their sexual 
orientation: that it was a defining characteristic that shape their life and understanding of 
themselves. It was not simply an explanation for the sexual conduct that went on behind closed 
doors. 
 The goal of shifting the public’s understanding of gay rights was to humanize gay 
citizens. It was to show that homosexuality did not only result in perceived deviation from 
common sexual norms, but rather were born possessing a differing identity and still were good, 
moral people who simply were sexually attracted to other individuals of the same-sex. (Brookey 
2002) There was a focus upon the individual and their identity, and not the sexual pair, which 
was a common view for the time. (Pew Research) The intention of humanizing gays was to lead 
to greater social acceptance of gays within all interactions and institutions one comes in contact 
                                               
92 While I was unable to find any data from the 1970s-80s, the general opinions of the U.S. populace about whether 
or not homosexuality was a choice have shifted dramatically since the mid 1990s. Today, 65% of individuals believe 
one’s sexual orientation is not within the individual’s control. In 1994, the same poll was given, with only 49% of 
individuals believing that homosexuality was not a choice. (Pew Research) 
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with throughout their life. (Anderson 2006, 104) It also served to distance gays from the 
demeaning reduction of one’s identity to their sexual conduct.  
 It was not just the general public that needed to shift its understanding of being gay from 
a choice of sexual conduct to an understanding of an individual’s identity. The courts also 
considered gays to be defined by the sexual acts and choices as opposed to understanding their 
homosexual status. No case greater exemplifies this view than Bowers, which found Georgia’s 
bans on homosexual sodomy constitutional due to the lack of a fundamental right to engage in 
non-procreative sexual conduct. (Bowers,1986) In that case, the majority only saw gays as 
products of their sexual choices as opposed to their status, and as such claimed that there was no 
protection of those choices. Justice Powell referred to Georgia’s ban as “uncommonly silly”, yet 
found that the State of Georgia’s restriction of sexual conduct was allowed because there was no 
constitutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy. (Bowers, 1986) Especially notable was 
how the Court refused to determine whether sodomy was a form of privacy or intimate 
association. They merely stated that there was no right to engage in sodomy, without any regard 
for whether this conduct could be considered a protected form of liberty under Substantive Due 
Process.  
 In terms of public opinion, The Bowers decision was highly detrimental to gay rights 
advocates, as it reaffirmed the common perceptions of homosexuality. The case was a well 
calculated effort by Lambda Legal try to push gay rights into the national political consciousness 
and advance awareness and discourse by way of a monumental legal victory. (Murdoch and 
Price, 2001) However, the Court’s opinion finding the state’s ban on homosexual sodomy 
constitutional not only established a negative precedent. It also served to legitimize the view that 
gays could be characterized by their conduct as opposed to their identity. Gay rights activists 
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accurately predicted that this case would draw great attention across the nation. However, the 
loss galvanized the opposition and served to highlight the deficiencies in the movement, thus 
leading for a call to refocus on how to best win equal rights. (Anderson 2006, 94) 
 Legally, Bowers posed great problems to those within the gay rights movement, as it 
legitimized the notion that those who partake in homosexual sodomy were criminals. With this 
title, it made discrimination against such individuals much more palatable. (Anderson 2006, 93) 
There were many cases decided in the following years that relied on Bowers’ analysis on the 
nature of gay citizens as criminals choosing to partake in criminal behavior. This was the 
justification that allowed the FBI to reject an otherwise qualified applicant who identified as 
lesbian (Padula v. Webster, 1987), maintain a ban on gays from serving in the Navy (Woodward 
v. U.S., 1989), and prevent anyone identifying as gay or straight from adopting children.(Appeal 
in Pima County Juvenile Action B-10489, 1986) By focusing on the identity component of sexual 
orientation, activists could distance themselves from decisions like these that focused exclusively 
on the conduct of individuals without recognizing the underlying, legitimate identity that 
determined the motivating sexual conduct. The argument for equal protection would provide a 
constitutional doctrine that could highlight this new conception of homosexuality as an identity 
could unify the movement under one coherent message. The right to intimate association, on the 
other hand, relied on analysis that was too close to the negative precedents established and 
reinforced the conduct aspect of same-sex relationships too strongly. (Anderson 2006, 120)  
After Bowers, gay rights activists sought to affirm the ideal that being gay was both not a 
choice and was more than one’s choice of sexual conduct.  This led to the concerted effort to 
discover the “gay gene” to affirm that homosexuality was immutable and was not determined 
simply through the choice of the actor. (Brookey 2002, 156) With regard to litigation strategy, 
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this approach to humanize and normalize gay identity needed to be substantiated through legal 
means. The best constitutional approach to achieving gay rights while fitting the new image that 
activists so desired to portray was that of Equal Protection. If being gay was a mark of 
immutability and was a central factor in one’s formation of their identity, then it could be 
covered under the 14
th
 Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause based on the Court’s prior rulings. 
This strategy both aligned with the wider movement while being constitutionally 
permissible.(Anderson 2006, 114) 
The right to intimate association, on the other hand, too closely reflected the argument 
that gays could be defined by their sexual conduct, which was the argument that advocates so 
actively sought to fight against. The focus of the movement was to move away from the actual 
relationship between individuals of the same sex, and instead characterize such individuals as 
minorities possessing a new form of identity. (Thomas 1992, 1452-53) The right to intimate 
association was too directly affiliated to the unacceptable conception of sexuality as merely a 
product of sexual conduct. While it may not have been the best legal strategy, pushing equal 
protection better aligned with the wider considerations of the movement that needed to be 
considered. 
The shift in rebranding the gay population proved effective through further litigation. The 
Court recognized both in Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas that gays should be considered 
as a group of people bound together by a common identity, instead of as individuals choosing to 
engage in alternative sexual conduct. (Romer; Lawrence) In each case, the Court claimed that the 
state cannot justify any discrimination on gays with no rational purpose other than demonstrated 
animus against individuals of the group. This is significant because of were being seen by the 
Court as a group whose identity needed protecting, which is essential to earning the protections 
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associated with the Equal Protection Clause.
93
 While neither of these cases granted gays the 
protections of a higher tier of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, which was one of the 
expressed goals for the movement, they did legitimize the shift away from being characterized as 
sexual deviants, and highlighted the coalition of gays as a distinct minority group.  
Since the 1990s, the debate over gay rights has become more central within the political 
sphere. It also has attracted much more support, as I explained earlier. This support has led to 
victories through legislative means,
94
 ballot referendums,
95
 and Supreme Court victories,
96
 most 
notably in U.S. v. Windsor. As the movement has progressed and support for gay rights is much 
more prevalent across all demographics, there is less need to align litigation strategy with the 
platform of the social movement. There is a broad enough base of support for gay rights that the 
strategy is now less important than the outcome of cases. As such, with less need to align with 
the overall movement, then it makes it even more prudent to employ the right to intimate 
association as the preferred constitutional theory. While the Supreme Court is supposed to 
interpret the law and the constitution without concern for political leanings, and decisions should 
not be more acceptable at certain times than others, the reality is that the public opinion 
surrounding high-profile issues greatly influences both the way these cases are argued by the 
parties involved and the way these cases are decided by the courts.  
                                               
93  The only uses of the Equal Protection clause that have been applied to give higher protection has been to 
individuals who identify as part of some group  
94 Some legislative victories include the repeal of the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, which banned gays 
from openly serving in the military (2010), the recognition of orientation as a basis for pursuing hate crime charges 
(2009), and state legislation that legalized gay marriage, including Rhode Island, Delaware, Minnesota, New 
Hampshire, New York, and Hawaii  
95 Citizens of Minnesota struck down a 2012 ballot initiative to amend the state constitution to restrict marriage to 
only unions between a man and a woman. The states of Maine, Maryland, and Washington all voted in affirmation 
of the legalization of gay marriage. 
96 The most notable court victories were last year’s U.S. v. Windsor and Hollngsworth v. Perry. However, there have 
been many cases within the past couple of years that challenge bans on gay marriage, whether they be in state courts 
(Garden State Equality v. Dow, Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, among others) or lower federal courts 
(Bradacs v. Haley, Kitchen v. Herbert, Love v. Beshear, among others) 
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The growth in support signals the readiness to choose a legal theory that is legally most 
compelling. As I have explained, an argument supporting gay rights through recognition of all 
individual’s right to form intimate associations much better reflects both the individual and their 
choices, and allows for greater consistency and clarity of law. My goal with this thesis has been 
to determine the most convincing legal theory that serves the purposes of constitutional 
processes in the most honest form. Pursuing a theory predicated on the Equal Protection Clause 
muddles the clarity of law, thus undermining the desire for consistency and clarity. An argument 
through right to intimate association establishes a clearer precedent that coincide with past 
rulings is a more coherent fashion while dictating a clear doctrine to be applied in future cases. 
These purposes were not of great concern to the gay rights movement during the 1980s and 
1990s, which goes to explain the emphasis placed on the political optics of the legal theory 
advanced. These earlier decisions by those active in the gay rights movement to pursue Equal 
Protection was not because advocating for the recognition of gay relationships as intimate 
associations was inadequate.   
Furthermore, the nature of the gay rights movement has adapted greatly from the late 20
th
 
century to today. While much attention and focus was placed upon mobilizing all gay individuals 
together in order to show that they all shared a collective identity, the understanding of identity 
has grown and become much more diverse. There is simply a much greater consciousness around 
the many different identities that one could subscribe to, instead of the simple binary of gay or 
straight. The prominence of bisexuality has increased, along with the belief that sexuality can be 
fluid and ever-changing, even if the source of our sexuality is out of our control. There is a much 
greater awareness about the difficulties and limiting natures of gender binaries that restrict men 
and women to societal expectations based on their biological gender. Identities such as being 
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transgendered
97
 highlight the diversity in the way that individuals self-identify by helping to 
deconstruct norms around the expectations of persons to conform their social identity to the body 
they were born into.  
The many different identities that people possess, along with the greater social 
consciousness about the plethora of different identities and the importance of these different 
identities, better coincide with a constitutional theory based around the right to intimate 
association, instead of Equal Protection. Assume for the moment that both constitutional 
philosophies led to the same results in terms of spreading equal rights for all individuals in or 
desiring same-sex relationships. If the ends are the same, then we would look at the means used 
that represent the people. When analyzing how the people are represented, the right to intimate 
association better captures the nature of identities and the fluidity and individuality inherent to 
them. With Equal Protection, the burden is on the minority group to clearly define many 
different dimensions of their identity, such as immutability, discreteness, and the historical 
discrimination against them. However, this is incredibly limiting, because it forces a group of 
people to be defined under one monolithic conception of sexual orientation. This goes against 
common understanding of sexuality, especially when considering the intersectionality of gender 
and sexual orientation issues and identities. The diversity of individuals, their identities, and their 
relationships cannot be defined by one uniform definition. It would not properly represent the 
people that the Court would be trying to establish equal right for. Rather, it leads to the potential 
of codifying mass mischaracterizations of large swaths of people. This could have the effect of 
                                               
97 While a true comprehensive understanding of what it means to be transgendered would require much greater 
analysis than just this footnote, one good definition is provided by the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender 
Community Center of New York, which states that transgendered “at its most basic level, is a word that applies to 
someone who doesn't fit within society's standards of how a woman or a man is supposed to look or act.” For 
example, one who identifies as female, yet is born as a biological man, may identify as a transgendered female. (The 
Center, 2014) 
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rendering a decision whose precedence could be seen as obsolete and a relic of a past time in the 
coming years, which had an unclear and narrow-minded understanding of identity. 
The right to intimate association, however, does not place any burden on individuals to 
define themselves in any way. Instead, it simply seeks to determine whether there are meaningful 
relationships between individuals that are not being protected in a way that preserves their liberty 
enumerated to them by the 14
th
 Amendment. To the point that there are meaningful relationships 
between individuals of the same gender, it does not matter how those individuals identify 
themselves. All that matters is that these relationships exist. This is preferable because the Court 
does not have to characterize a diverse group of people through one overarching definition. 
Rather, the decision of how one sees themselves is properly left up to the individual, instead of to 
the government. When recognizing the tides and movements of the public independent of the 
development of the law, the opportunity to avoid sweeping characterizations of people who are 
keen on highlighting the subtle difference and embracing the diversity that comes from these 
subtle difference better represents the exact people the Court would be awarding rights to.  
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 Conclusion 
In search of a legal rationale to uphold gay right, the Equal Protection Clause of the 14
th
 
Amendment is not the only way to protect and attain these rights. The right to intimate 
association has the potential to provide the desired equality sought through litigation. The 
purpose of extending the right to intimate association is not to suggest that an Equal Protection 
claim is unable to provide the desired outcomes for those within the gay rights movement. When 
considering the interests of the judicial system in conjunction with the aims of those within the 
gay rights movement, the right to intimate association as a justification for a greater expansion of 
gay rights better reflects the desires and needs of all of the different relevant interests. 
 When analyzing how judges are told to interpret laws affecting gay citizens, the right to 
intimate association provides greater clarity for judges than does an argument of Equal 
Protection. Effective precedents should be clear in the rationale that they rely upon, and should 
consequently be easily applicable to later cases that deal with similar issues. The nature of the 
right to intimate association better lends itself to this purpose than do the precedents for Equal 
Protection. 
 Determinations about which groups receive protection under the Equal Protection Clause 
are rather subjective. There are many factors that the Court is to take into account when deciding 
if a group is entitled to heightened judicial scrutiny for their right to Equal Protection. 
(Ackerman 1985, 726) They include whether or not a group is discrete or insular (Carolene), 
whether the group has experience prejudice in the form of historical discrimination of the 
political powerlessness of the group, whether or not trait being discriminated against is 
immutable, and whether the trait bears relation to the government purpose in discriminating. 
(Frontiero) 
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 Each of these different factors poses real problems of subjectivity and lack of clear 
application and interpretation. They also do not necessarily represent all minority groups who 
may have a claim to deserve Equal Protection, yet cannot fit within the confines established. 
Discreteness of a trait, or the ability to clearly recognize a characteristic of an individual, may 
have been the basis for discrimination against blacks and women, but not all groups petitioning 
for Equal Protection have traits that are visually apparent. (Ackerman 1986, 729) Such does not 
mean that the claim of their discrimination and need for Equal Protection are invalid. It just 
means that they cannot fulfill the established, necessary factors. Insularity suffers from the same 
problem, as it is not a trait that is necessarily essential to demonstrating the need to award a 
certain group heightened status.  
Measuring prejudice is especially difficult, as there is no clear and objective way to 
understand past discrimination or to measure a group’s political power. Without a clear metric 
for understanding prejudice against a group, it allows for judges to be selective in what evidence 
they use, and does not provide any check upon judges to reflect the entirety of past 
discrimination or political power. Furthermore, measuring historical discrimination of a group 
and the political power that group now wields both reflect the prejudice faced by the petitioning 
group, but still asks separate questions. There is no apparent method to weigh the historical 
discrimination against the current political power of a group in a cohesive fashion that would 
establish a clear understanding of a prejudice felt by a group. (Strauss 2011, 154) 
Immutability and relevance of trait to discrimination each pose their own issues as factors 
in Equal Protection litigation. The intention of immutability is to reflect that an individual should 
not be discriminated on the basis of a characteristic they have no ability to change. (Halley 1994, 
514) However, the way in which that has manifested is that the quality must either be 
Binder  155 
 
biologically determined or unable to be changed over the course of a person’s life. This is 
problematic because it only validates discrimination against an individual if the basis of the 
discrimination is against a quality that will never be changed in the future. It does not recognize 
that discrimination of a trait is bad for its own sake, regardless of how long the discriminated 
person will possess that trait. Relevance of the trait in discrimination is problematic because a 
policy could be directly attacking a quality about an individual and the purpose for doing so is 
because of that quality. (Strauss 2011, 165) 
Each of these different qualities is flawed in their own right and difficult to determine or 
apply. When courts then have to take all of these factors that are difficult to interpret and 
combine them together in order to form a determination about whether a class deserves 
heightened status, there is no guarantee of any real precision or consistency in applying the law. 
With so many different factors to consider, and no understanding of which to prioritize, it places 
a high burden upon judges to adequately weigh the different factors against each other properly. 
Yet without any metric for how to do so, the result is that almost any justification can be 
determined for petitioning groups depending on the relative importance each judge places on 
each factor. 
The problems of the Equal Protection jurisprudence are elucidated when applying the 
factors in coming to an understanding of how to interpret sexuality. There are problems with 
each of these factors, in that they either do not reflect the hardships experienced by gays or they 
are difficult to measure. Gays would not fulfill either of the first two factors necessary to find for 
heightened class status: discreteness or insularity. (Ackerman 1985, 729) Yet, even though gays 
may be anonymous and diffuse (the opposites of discreteness and insularity), these attributes can 
be seen as harming gays more than being discrete or insular would have. (Wilkinson 1975, 980) 
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Because individuals do not have to be public with their sexuality, they can choose to remain 
anonymous. This fear is harmful to the individual and is directly caused because of societal 
discrimination. It is questionable as to whether or not one’s sexuality is immutable, with many 
arguing passionately on both sides of the debate. However, the question remains as to whether or 
not it is relevant that sexuality is immutable. To the point that one is discriminated based on their 
identity and chosen understanding of their sexuality, then it should not matter if their orientation 
will remain fixed in the future or was determined at birth. (Strauss 2011, 163) If the 
discrimination exists, then there should be recognition of such and steps should be taken to 
remedy that discrimination. 
The issues of measuring historical discrimination and political powerlessness are also 
highly problematic when applied to gays. There is no clear way to measure the historical 
discrimination faced by gays. One could look to the legislative history that served to discriminate 
against gays. Yet, they would find most anti-gay laws were ratified in the 20
th
 century. Does that 
mean that gays were not discriminated against prior to the passage of these laws? (Hoffman 
2003, 1255) Or does it mean that marginalization of gays was so commonplace that there was no 
need to codify that discrimination, because it was simply implied? The questions are left 
unanswered and are again within the purview of any presiding judge faced with Equal Protection 
claims. (Wilkinson 1975, 981) Measuring the political powerlessness of gays is especially 
troubling, because gays have different amounts of political influence in different areas of the 
country. In the northeast and pacific northwest, for instance, gays experience a great deal of 
support and wield significant political capital. However, in less tolerant regions such as the 
south, there is much less acceptance of homosexuality, which translates to more prevalent 
discrimination and less political power for gays in those regions. With such disparity in political 
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capital throughout the country, the question then becomes how the court should take into account 
these disparities, to which there is no clear answer. 
Overall, the way that the Equal Protection precedents are established prevents a clear 
understanding of what tier gays should be adjudicated under. The factors could be interpreted to 
justify a decision under any of the levels of scrutiny. These issues prompt the need for a better 
judicial philosophy that can be easily decided and establishes a clear precedent. The right to 
intimate association can provide that alternative for gay rights. While there are many benefits 
that are exclusive to the right to intimate association, the approach is not without some flaws. 
Just like there is a level of subjectivity in Equal Protection precedents, the right to intimate 
association is not immune from some subjectivity as well. In review, the Court decided in 
Roberts that the right to intimate association was found as essential to the liberty endowed in the 
14
th
 Amendment’s Due Process Clause. (Roberts) Within that precedent, the Court stated that 
there were four primary factors that made up an intimate association that future Courts could use 
to determine whether certain relationship should be considered intimate associations. The four 
relevant factors in determining whether a relationship is an intimate association are purpose, size, 
selectivity, and congeniality. The purpose of the association must align with the intended reasons 
for recognizing the right in the first place. The size of the association must be small enough or 
conducive to allowing individuals to have the opportunity to develop bonds with another 
individual or individuals. Recognizing selectivity as a factor acknowledges the autonomy of an 
individual to form their own intimate associations, and reinforces the notion that the most 
meaningful relationships are those that are chosen by the individual. Congeniality is closely 
related to selectivity, as intimate relationships are chosen on the basis that individuals gain real 
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benefits from being a part of them, and inherent to gaining these benefits is that there is a sense 
of congeniality among those in the relationship. (Roberts) 
The reliance on these factors could be vulnerable to the same criticism as Equal 
Protection: that judges are basing their decisions on whether to consider a relationship as an 
intimate association on the same subjectivity that proves perilous for Equal Protection. Judges 
can still preference certain factors over others in determining whether a relationship should be 
protected under Substantive Due Process as a fundamental right. (Roling 2012, 908) Also, there 
is the question as to whether a relationship must be aligned with national tradition in order to be 
worthy of protection. The precedents appear to lean towards recognizing all relationships 
regardless of their historical prevalence or significance, yet without a clear dictation making this 
explicitly clear, judges in future cases could reasonably choose to only protect associations that 
clearly are reflected in the nation’s tradition. This is both an area of ambiguity in the law and 
gives the opportunity for same sex relationships to not be recognized as a protected form of 
intimate association, which would mean that those in same-sex relationships would receive no 
extra judicial protection.  
While there is an element of subjectivity that does exist for adjudication of the right to 
intimate association similarly to that of Equal Protection, the level of subjectivity is 
comparatively less than it is for Equal Protection precedents. The burdens placed of judges 
through the right to intimate association are much more manageable, with fewer factors. All of 
these factors are also more clearly defined for the right to intimate association. The size of a 
relationship, or the simple fact that the individuals chose to enter the association, can be easily 
understood, especially when compared to determining how the Equal Protection precedents are 
to be understood.  
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The difference in the level of subjectivity and lack of clarity between the two theories can 
be attributed to what is ultimately attempting to be achieved through each theory. In order for 
gays to earn suspect or quasi-suspect class status, the entire minority must be defined in a way 
sufficient for the Court. Having to define an entire group of people and then use that definition to 
understand whether or not those people deserve extra judicial protection of their rights is an 
incredibly difficult task and lends itself to great amounts of subjectivity on the parts of judges. 
Defining a group of people in a comprehensive way that both reflects their individuality as a 
people but also fits within past precedents that were determined through analysis of other groups 
is incredibly difficult. Defining the nature of a relationship, as is needed when understanding the 
scope of the right to intimate association, is much simpler due to the nature of understanding a 
relationship between two people. All that is necessary to find is whether or not that relationship 
allows individuals to fulfill the liberty endowed by the 14
th 
Amendment, and whether the 
structure of the relationship is conducive to achieving that liberty.  The Court does not have to 
classify a group with a definition that will endure through generations, as is necessary in Equal 
Protection. The target of the judge’s interpretation is easier to comprehend and characterized in 
the right to intimate association, which lends itself to greater clarity in the how decisions should 
be interpreted and applied by future courts. 
Another similarity between the way cases are adjudicated under the Equal Protection 
Clause and the Due Process Clause’s right to intimate association is that both rely on the use of 
analogies to best understand the case before the Court. As an attempt to create objectivity within 
Equal Protection cases, the Court began analogizing any group petitioning to protected minority 
groups. (Craig v. Boren, 1976) The two that petitioning groups are most commonly compared to 
are blacks and women, as those are the two groups that were used to establish strict scrutiny and 
Binder  160 
 
intermediate scrutiny. The right to intimate association uses the family and marriage as the 
archetypical forms of association that other relationships must demonstrate and mimic the form 
and the purposes of these relationships. (Roberts) 
While this could appear to cause similar problems between the two theories, this would 
overlook what is actually necessary in order to draw these comparisons between the archetype 
and the entity the Court is asked to adjudicate. The process of comparing a group of people to 
another is both incredibly difficult and allows for misrepresentation of two different groups. How 
must the Court weigh the history of discrimination of gays against blacks, when the hardships 
that members of each of these groups experienced were distinctly and independently difficult for 
individuals? Further, some of the factors employed by the Court are based on requiring the Court 
to compare different groups in a false way. Discreteness and insularity may have been reasons 
that blacks were disenfranchised, but they do not apply to gays, yet in petitioning for heightened 
scrutiny, gays must try to fit themselves into a confine that is misrepresentative of the nature of 
sexuality and of the hardships experienced by members of the group. (Ackerman 1985, 729) 
The necessary comparisons to be drawn in the right to intimate association cases is not as 
difficult to make for courts as it is in Equal Protection cases. At their root, all intimate 
associations should confer roughly the same benefits, including but not limited to aiding the 
development of one’s emotional faculties, experiencing the feeling of love and reciprocating that 
feeling, and improving one’s outlook on elements of the world that can be stimulated through 
close relationships with other individuals. (Karst 1980, 629-32) Familial or marital relationships 
are used as the comparison because they illustrate a relationship where all of these benefits are 
clearly derived. Measuring the benefits of a relationship and comparing them to the benefits 
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derived from familial associations requires less extrapolation and sweeping generalizations 
because there is less depth to the analogy.  
 Another difference between these two views is whom these rights apply to. The Equal 
Protection Clause is only extended when a group of individuals are deemed worthy of the 
protection. The right to intimate association does not require individuals to label themselves in 
any way, and the rights are extended to all regardless of the way one identifies. This is important 
because one does not need to prove themselves worthy of gaining judicial protection of their 
rights. Furthermore, the right to intimate association is one that is provided to all without any 
reservations or complications. If same-sex relationships were to be recognized as intimate 
associations, then anyone would be granted the right to enter such relationships. The vast 
majority of the individuals may choose to not actualize this right, but it is still available to all.  
 Not only is this right available to all, while Equal Protection requires proof of 
deservedness of judicial protection, it better reflects the nature of sexual orientation and the 
power of the individual to choose their own identity. The right to intimate association does not 
require those who enter into same-sex relationships to clarify for the Court how they perceive 
their own identity. This is especially important because of the increasing awareness of the 
differences in the identities that people hold so central to their personhood. Some feel their 
orientation is fixed in themselves, while others believe their sexuality is more fluid. Some 
believe that there is fluidity in gender and gender identity, and that they should not be defined by 
their biological anatomy they were born with. Because they do not want to subscribe to beliefs 
about how they should act based on their bodily capabilities, they do not define themselves as 
one fixed gender or orientation. The differences in these identities may appear minute, yet one’s 
conception of their own identity plays a substantial role in their understanding of their worldview 
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and their own place within that worldview. The right to intimate association allows individuals to 
continue to explore and determine their identity for themselves. The law simply allows 
individuals to pursue the relationships of their choosing without unnecessary government 
intervention. 
 Equal Protection analysis does not allow for individuals to self-determine their identity 
while also extending legal protections for gay individuals. Gays only attain judicial protection by 
classifying themselves in one way. This is not necessarily reflective of how individuals see 
themselves, and also limits the autonomy of individuals to cultivate their own identity and not 
feel restricted. If the Court prioritizes on conception of gay identity over all others, then it 
continues the practice of favoring certain identities over others. Even if there are more 
protections extended, the hierarchy of who deserves rights still is perpetuated, which is one of 
the aspects of discrimination that gay rights advocates are concerned with eliminating. 
The right to intimate association can remedy many of the issues that have arisen 
throughout gay rights litigation focusing on Equal Protection. That is not to say the theory is not 
without its faults. A reexamination and strengthening of the right to intimate association opens 
the door to challenge other restrictions that may also impede upon the right to intimate 
association, such as polyamory. While I cannot comment in too much depth about other 
independent issues that could arise, the other cases that could be argued under the right to 
intimate association may have legitimacy in their own right. If a romantic relationship of three 
individuals confers all of the same benefits as a two-person relationship, then the questions 
remains if the government should be dictating that only two-person relationships should be 
recognized. (Bedi 2013, 212) 
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This example, along with many other instances of non-protected associations (incest, 
bestiality, among others), is vulnerable to the issue of consent, and whether or not those in the 
relationship are genuinely consenting to become a part of those relationships. If they are not, 
then there is basis to not recognize the relationship, as the congeniality factor would not be 
fulfilled. There may be other reasons that would justify government bans or lack of recognition 
that could be developed through a more clear focus upon those issues. Additionally, while other 
groups could feel emboldened by the advancement  of gay rights under the right to intimate 
association, the right has existed for 30 years, and there have been no prominent challenges using 
the available case law. Recognition of same-sex relationships does not mean that there is more 
justification to recognize these other forms of association.  
The right to intimate association is vulnerable to the criticism that the protections for 
those not in same-sex relationships but desire them may not be as strong as possible. I’ve 
dedicated much focus upon the rights of those in same-sex relationships, and then explained how 
one who desires to such relationships can’t be restricted from wanting to actualize one of their 
fundamental rights. There is the potential that lower courts could divide on whether or not the 
right to intimate association is solely restricted to those in same-sex relationships. If so, then the 
impact of the right is significantly reduced, as any individual who seeks same-sex relationships 
would not be protected and would be vulnerable to the injustices that this constitutional theory 
seeks to prevent.  
Even with these potential weaknesses, they do not negate the innate positive benefits that 
this constitutional theory possesses, especially when compared to Equal Protection. Individuals 
do not have to be defined through one, overarching definition of sexuality through a right to 
intimate association, as required by the Equal Protection. The rationale to come to a decision is 
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much clearer and easy for lower courts to follow, which is important because of the inevitable 
challenges to discriminatory laws upon same-sex couples that will continue to arise through 
lower courts. Overall, the right to intimate association is preferable for both the courts and for the 
citizenry on the whole. In the late 19
th
 century, the country was not necessarily ready for a right 
to intimate association argument as justification for striking down discriminatory laws prevalent 
across the nation. (Anderson 2006, 129) We have developed our understanding  of gay issues 
and identities significantly since that time. Our preferred legal doctrines should follow this trend, 
and develop and grow in the most effective way possible for all actors affected. The right to 
intimate association is the vehicle that allows this development to happen. 
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